

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1350715-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 34

Page 16 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 18 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 20 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 37 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 64 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 89 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 90 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 92 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 93 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 95 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 99 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 106 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 121 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 122 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 131 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 132 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 133 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 134 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 135 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 154 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 167 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 172 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 196 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 201 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 217 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 263 ~ OTHER;
Page 282 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 302 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 303 ~ Referral/Direct;

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 07-29-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

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Director's Sec'y _____

FBI/DOJ

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

GEORGE E. MACKINNON
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

December 19, 1979

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Security Surveys

Mr. William Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Pennsylvania Avenue between 9th
and 10th Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Bill:

I had been informed that my involvement
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review would result in a security check of
my chambers and home. Other factors also make
this advisable. It has not been done and it
is requested that the security check be made
as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

George MacKinnon

George E. MacKinnon

62-97308-922

JAN 8 1980

[Signature]

*ack 1/2/80
KTB/c*

DO-7

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW

Mr. Colwell _____ ()
Mr. Boynton _____ ()
Mr. Moore _____ ()
Mr. Bailey _____ ()
Mr. Bayse _____ ()
Mr. Cregar _____ ()
Mr. Herndon _____ ()
Mr. Joseph _____ ()
Mr. Long _____ ()
Mr. Mintz _____ ()
Mr. Mullen _____ ()
Mr. Otto _____ ()
Mr. Stames _____ ()
Mr. Bruemmer _____ ()
Mr. Hotis _____ ()
Mr. Roin _____ ()
Mr. Steel _____ ()
Tele. Room _____ ()
Miss Devine _____ ()

Please handle

See Me _____ ()
Note and return _____ ()
Prepare reply and return for my signature _____ ()
Please Handle _____ ()
Respond over your signature _____ ()
Prepare memo for the Department _____ ()
For your recommendation _____ ()
What are the facts? _____ ()
Hold _____ ()

Remarks: _____

FBI/DOJ

b6
b7C

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

January 2, 1980

Security Surveys

Honorable George E. MacKinnon
United States Circuit Judge
District of Columbia Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Washington, D. C. 20001

Dear George: ~~MacKinnon~~

Thank you for your letter of December 19 requesting a technical sweep be made of your chambers and home. The engineering staff advises me that the sweep team will next be available on January 14. On that date, Special Agent Jerry H. Breidenfeld and [redacted] will visit your chambers to perform the technical inspection and make appropriate arrangements for checking your home at a time convenient to you.

b6
b7C


Sincerely yours,

William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director

DE-5

62-97308-923



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for & Sec'y _____

- 1 - Mr. Boynton
- 1 - Mr. Bayse - *detached*
- 1 - Mr. Campbell
- 1 - Correspondence-UCR Section
- 1 - [redacted] b6
b7C

KTB:jo*
(7) *JP*

MAIL ROOM ☒
'80

APPROVED:

Director *W. H. Webster*
Exec. AD-Inv. *✓*
Exec. AD-Adm. *✓*
Exec. AD-LES *✓*

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Tech. Servs. *W. H. Webster*
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2141

100-10507

FM MO

FM MO

FM 10507 D C 70

FM ALBUQUERQUE (20-40) D

FM DIRECTOR CONTINUED

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION FOR

TRIP WARE

Security Surveys

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WORK OF THE ALBUQUERQUE OFFICE,
IT IS REQUESTED THE BUREAU AUTHORIZE TRAVEL FOR APPROPRIATE
PERSONNEL TO COME TO ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, IN ORDER TO
PERFORM COINTEGRATED MEASURED EXAMINATIONS OF THE NEW ALBUQUERQUE
OFFICE. AT THIS POINT, ALL SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN INSTALLED
AND IF THIS TRAVEL IS APPROVED, DETAILS AS TO THE EXACT
DATE FOR THIS TRAVEL WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH PERSONNEL IN
TOP AND A TIME SCHEDULE DETAIL.

BT

OK

OK

W. Stinson
B. Stinson

100-10507-926
62-17302-926

FEB 1 1980

PRNTG. & ST. GR. TEST SEC

8412020'80

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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

SAC, Albuquerque (66-42)

1/31/80

Director FBI (62-97308)

1-Mr. Bayse
1-Mr. Killion
1-Mr. Wade
1-Mr. Breidenfeld

SPACE MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEYS

Reurteletype 12/4/79 requesting a countermeasure sweep of the new Albuquerque space.

and SA J.H. Breidenfeld conducted a countermeasure sweep of the new space 1/23-25/80.

b6
b7C


No indication of tampering or clandestine devices was observed during the sweep.

JHB:cah
(7)

done

62-97308-927

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23 FEB 1 1980

MAIL ROOM ☐

84 FEB 15 '80

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040047 0307411Z

FM HI DL

DE SA

R 0307411Z FEB 80

FM SAN ANTONIO (00-103)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

DALLAS ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

REQUEST FOR SECURITY SWEEP - UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

RE SAN ANTONIO TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, JANUARY 29, 1980;
BUREAU TELETYPE TO SAN ANTONIO, JANUARY 31, 1980; AND SUBSEQUENT
TELECALLS BETWEEN FBIHQ, SAN ANTONIO, AND DALLAS DIVISIONS.

FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ, SAC, SAN ANTONIO, TELEPHONICALLY
CONTACTED SAC, DALLAS; ON FEBRUARY 6, 1980, DURING WHICH CON-
VERSATION IT WAS AGREED THAT SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] DALLAS
DIVISION, WILL TRAVEL TO THE SAN ANTONIO DIVISION DURING WEEK
OF FEBRUARY 11, 1980 FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING SECURITY
SWEEP OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN AUSTIN AND SAN
ANTONIO. THIS SECURITY SWEEP WAS REQUESTED BY THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE LEAKS IN HIS OFFICE. SA [REDACTED] WILL

b6
b7C

7 FEB 25 1980

97 MAR 14 1980

PAGE TWO (SA 65-173) UNCLAS F F I O

BE ASSISTED IN AUSTIN AND SAN ANTONIO BY TECHNICALLY TRAINED
PERSONNEL OF THE SAN ANTONIO DIVISION".

BT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 9 JAN 1980

FROM : *D. Jerry Rubino*
D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT: Security Survey of Attorney General's Office

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Associate Attorney General's Offices and the Deputy Associate Attorney General's Offices in the 3100 and 3600 corridors of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

*1/29/80
Rm 3143
10:30 AM*

*Let to Rubino
DOJ
2/7/80
5:46 PM*

(PS)

62-97308-929
25
FEB 11 1980

Rubino
SEARCHED



8 FEB 1980

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade
1 - Mr. Breidenfeld

2/7/80

D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
SECURITY SURVEY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Reference is made to your letter dated 1/9/80 requesting a microphone and telephone security survey of the Associate Attorney General's offices and the Deputy Associate Attorney General's offices in the 3100 and 3600 corridors of the Main Justice Building.

Personnel of the Technical Services Division, FBI, conducted a microphone and telephone security survey of requested space on 1/29/80.

No evidence of tampering or clandestine devices was discovered during this survey.

b6
b7C

NOTE: Survey conducted by [redacted] and [redacted] and SA Jerry H. Breidenfeld.

JHB:jfm
(7)

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Assoc. Dir. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
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OK 5841 JBR

DE-32

6-7-80

930

FEB 11 1980

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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

0141

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bayse *wab/gno*

DATE: 4/9/80

FROM : R. W. Witzel *rw/wab*

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES SECURITY SURVEY
ROOM H-310 U. S. CAPITOL

Security Surveys

PURPOSE: To document a security sweep of U. S. Capitol space conducted by FBI personnel.

DETAILS: At the request of [redacted] Administrative Services Division, a physical search and electronic sweep of room H-310 of the U. S. Capitol building was conducted on April 2, 1980. This effort was initiated as a security measure in view of the fact that the Director and other Bureau officials were to appear before the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in closed session on that date.

b6
b7C

The security sweep, conducted by SA David W. Wade and [redacted] and [redacted] revealed no evidence of clandestine listening devices installed in the room.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

62-97308

1 - Mr. Long

Attn: [redacted]

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Wade

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

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Tech. Servs. *wab/gno*
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

(18)

(5)

DE-40

62-97308-931

24 APR 11 1980

97 MAY 14 1980

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bayse *WAB/MS*

DATE: 5/8/80

FROM : *Ry* W. Witzel

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES SWEEPS

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Exec AD Adm. _____
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Director's Sec'y _____

Security Survey

C^{sr} PURPOSE: To provide information relative to countermeasures sweeps conducted during the month of April for the FBI.

DETAILS: On 4/17/80, an electronic countermeasures sweep was conducted in room 2200 of the Rayburn House of Representatives Office Building. The sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and [redacted] at the request of SA [redacted] (Congressional Affairs) in anticipation of Assistant Director Edward J. O'Malley's appearance before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee. Due to the sensitive nature of the discussions being held, a countermeasures sweep was considered appropriate. b6
b7C

Although no evidence of clandestine audio listening equipment was found during the sweep, the presence of public address equipment was noted. The vulnerability posed by this equipment was brought to the attention of Mr. O'Malley and it was agreed that the in-place public address system would not be utilized during the hearing. (18)

On 4/23/80, a sweep was conducted in room S-146 of the Capitol. This sweep was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted] at the request of Deputy Assistant Director Clyde L. Groover (ASD) in anticipation of Director Webster's appearance before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee. No evidence of clandestine audio listening equipment was found during the sweep.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information only.

- 1 - Mr. Long
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Wade

DWW:jdm
(6)

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

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Public Affs. Off. _____

12 MAY 12 1980

84 JUN 6 '80

1-Mr. Bayse
1-Mr. Witzei
1-Mr. Wade
1-Mr. Breidenfeld

February 8, 1980

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

Mr. William Green
Director
Office of Investigations
U. S. Custom Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20229

Security Survey

Dear Mr. Green:

Pursuant to your letter dated January 10, 1980, requesting an electronic countermeasures sweep of your office at 803 W. Broad Street, Falls Church, Virginia, personnel of the FBI conducted a sweep of your offices on January 30, 1980.

No evidence of tampering or clandestine devices was located during this sweep.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

b6
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Note: Survey conducted by [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] and SA J. H. Breidenfeld.

RECEIVED

62-97308-934

FEB 11 1980

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JHB:cah OCT 17 1979

SA

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file 62-97308

MAIL ROOM []

84 JUN 23 '80

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade
1 - Mr. Breidenfeld.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

February 8, 1980

Honorable Charles F. C. Ruff
United States Attorney
Constitution Avenue and
John Marshall Place, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20001

Dear Mr. Ruff:

Pursuant to your letter dated January 30, 1980, requesting an electronic surveillance sweep for your Executive Staff, Fraud Division and Major Crimes Division, personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the requested sweeps of your phones and space on February 5, 1980.

No indications of tampering or clandestine devices were located during the sweeps.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

62-97308-936

NOTE: Sweeps conducted by [redacted] and SA Jerry H. Breidenfeld.

JHB:lm
(6)

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file 62-97308

MAILED 23.80

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

May 20, 1980

Mr. William H. Randolph
Director
Investigations and Security
United States Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230

Dear Mr. Randolph:

Pursuant to your letter dated April 8, 1980, personnel of my staff conducted an electronic countermeasures sweep of the Interagency Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) conference room, located at 1325 G Street Northwest, Washington, D. C.

The sweep, conducted on May 9, 1980, revealed no evidence of tampering or the presence of clandestine audio transmission equipment.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

b6
b7C

NOTE: Sweep conducted by SA David W. Wade and ETs [redacted]
and [redacted]

MAILED 14

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FBI

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Director's Sec'y _____

DWW:jfm
(5)

APPROVED:

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62-97308-938

MAY 21 1980

61 JUN 12 '80

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

DATE: APR 28 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

FROM : Federal Bureau of Investigation

D. Jerry Rubino

Department Security Officer

Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Security Survey of Associate Attorney General's Office

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Associate Attorney General's Offices and the Deputy Associate Attorney General's Offices in the 3100 and 3600 corridors of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

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b7C

*Completed 5-1-80
AAG's Office in 3100
corridor only.*

*OK
210*

*File
Dwyer*

Hager


(AC)

*Let to DOJ
5/20/80
DWW dm*



File 62-97308

62-97308-939



EX-100-111

97 JUN 13 1980

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice (DOJ)

May 20, 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
SECURITY SURVEYS OF DOJ SPACE

Reference is made to your letters of April 28, 1980 and May 7, 1980, requesting microphone and telephone security surveys of the Attorney General's Office and the Office of the Associate Attorney General.

On May 1, 1980, personnel of my staff conducted an electronic countermeasures sweep of the Associate Attorney General's Offices in the Main Justice Building. No evidence of clandestine listening equipment was found during the sweep. It was noted, at the time of the sweep, that the secure telephone instrument was located in proximity to the commercial telephone. A minimum of six feet separation between these instruments is considered adequate to preclude acoustic coupling of the two systems. This potential hazard was rectified at the time of its discovery.

On May 8, 1980, a sweep was conducted in the Attorney General's Office and adjoining conference room. Once again, no evidence of clandestine listening equipment was found.

During the May 8, 1980, sweep, it was noted that contractor personnel, whose security clearances were unknown, were working in the Attorney General's Office and adjoining conference room unescorted. Such a situation is generally considered to be a potential threat to physical security and consequently tends to lessen the benefits of countermeasures efforts. This situation was brought to the attention of [redacted] of your staff.

NOTE: Sweep of Associate Attorney General's Office on May 1, 1980, was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted]. Sweep of the Attorney General's Office and adjoining conference room was conducted by the above ETs under the supervision of Unit Chief [redacted].

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Director's Sec'y _____

62-97308

DWW:jfm
(6)

MAIL ROOM ☒

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Exec. AD-LES _____

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/leg

TO : William A. Hayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Security Survey of Attorney General's Office

DATE: MAY 7 1980

Security Survey

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Attorney General's Office and conference room and Room 5123 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

OK
Qm



(13)

11-20

DE-67

62-97308-9411

MAY 21 1980

Let to DOJ
5/20/80
DWW/jm



84 MAY 27 '80

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Form OBD-197
5-79

R 180815Z SEP 79

FM BERN (66-2)

18 SEP 79 11 04z

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

282-1
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VISIT BY FBI TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

Security Services

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Adm. Servs.	_____
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Ident.	_____
Insp.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgmt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

RE STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE, SEPTEMBER 15, 1979.

RE CABLE RECEIVED BY ACTING LEGAT, BERN, SEPTEMBER 17, 1979,
ADVISES:

"MR. JERRY H. BREIDENFELD, FBI TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION,
WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE LEGAL ATTACHES AT THE ADDRESSEE POSTS.
HIS SCHEDULE FOLLOWS:

- FRANKFURT 8-30 SEPTEMBER
- ROME 1-2 OCTOBER
- BERN 3 OCTOBER
- BONN 4-5 OCTOBER
- PARIS 6-9 OCTOBER
- LONDON 10-11 OCTOBER

18

"ONE OF THE SUBJECTS MR. BREIDENFELD WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS
IS COUNTERMEASURE SERVICE (ACM) PROVIDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL
SECURITY OFFICES, I.E. RTC AND TSO. HE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSUL-
TATION WITH INTERESTED RSS, RSO AND TSO OFFICERS - CONTACT AND

62-77308-9412

9 MAY 2 1980

McShane

[Signature]

10+0

84 JUN 27 '80

PAGE TWO BER 66-2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULING SHOULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE POST LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE.

"MR. BREIDENFELD WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MR. WILLIAM C. JOHNSON WHO IS CURRENTLY SECONDED BY FBI TO THE DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE. BOTH MR. BREIDENFELD AND MR. JOHNSON ARE TRAVELLING ON DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS."

FBIHQ SUTEL BERN AND OTHER APPROPRIATE LEGATS FULL DETAILS REGARDING NATURE OF VISITS BY BREIDENFELD AND JOHNSON.

~~C AND E 1175, REASON (2) & (3), DRD SEPTEMBER 18, 1999.~~

BT

941

Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____
Exec. AD-LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

R 131813Z SEP 79

X FM PARIS (08-10)

19 SEP 79 07 54z

TO DIRECTOR (62-97308) ROUTINE RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES, LEGAL ATTACHES~~

RE BUREAU CABLE, SEPTEMBER 17, 1979. *Security Surveys*

DATES SET FORTH IN REFERENCED CABLE FOR TRAVEL TO PARIS BY
SAS BRIDENFELD AND JOHNSON INDICATE SCHEDULED ARRIVAL AT PARIS
ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1979, AND DEPARTURE ON TUESDAY,
OCTOBER 9, 1979. FOR INFORMATION OF FBI HEADQUARTERS, MONDAY,
OCTOBER 8, 1979, IS AN AMERICAN HOLIDAY AND PARIS EMBASSY WILL BE
CLOSED. IN VIEW OF UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY THAT CONSTRUCTIVE CONTACTS
WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL, IF REQUIRED, CAN BE HELD DURING PLANNED
PERIOD, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT VISITING AGENTS MAY WISH TO CHANGE
DATES OF PARIS TRAVEL. SUCAB.

~~C AND L 2415, RELEASE FORM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 AND 3), DRD~~

SEPTEMBER 18, 1999.

BT

DE-28

62-97308-943

Reshank

29
MAY 2 1980

10+D

84 JUL 8 '80

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

DATE: 5/20/80

FROM : J. H. Geer

SUBJECT: ~~ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES SEMINAR, JUNE 2-5, 1980~~
~~COUNTERMEASURE SECURITY SWEEP~~

PURPOSE:

To request that Technical Services Division conduct a countermeasure security sweep of the auditorium of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, and of the crime-scene classroom at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That appropriate Technical Services Division personnel conduct a countermeasure security sweep of the auditorium at the FBI Academy and the crime-scene classroom prior to the holding of the above conference.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. was/les
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____


See TSD addendum page 4

JWM:mpb (9)

1 - Mr. W. A. Bayse

1 - 
1 - 
1 - 
1 - 

CONTINUED OVER

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. R. T. Castonguay
1 - Mr. J. M. Sturgis
1 - 

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
Classified and Extended by 222
Reason for Extension EOTM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2)
Date of Review for Declassification 5/20/2000

84 JUN 30 '80

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: AG Guidelines Seminar, June 2-5, 1980, Countermeasure
Security Sweep

2. That FBI Academy Auditorium be secured by
Quantico personnel Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, May 30, 31,
and June 1. ~~(S)~~

(U)

JH Geer
EJ O'Malley

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Intell. <u>EDM/HQ</u>	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory <u>7/8</u>	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

CONTINUED OVER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: AG Guidelines Seminar, June 2-5, 1980, Countermeasure
Security Sweep

DETAILS:

The Director has authorized the holding of an Attorney General Guidelines seminar at the FBI Academy in the auditorium from June 25, 1980. The first two days of this seminar will be devoted to an explanation of revisions in the Attorney General Guidelines and additions thereto. The Attorney General Guidelines are classified SECRET and expositions of them would likewise be classified SECRET. The Attorney General Guidelines lay out the fundamental investigative parameters of foreign counterintelligence investigations and allude to sensitive investigative methods and techniques. The conference will be attended by approximately 100 FBI counterintelligence field supervisors and about 50 FBI Headquarters counterintelligence supervisors. It is expected that a great deal of administrative, legal, operational, technical, and other sensitive discussions will take place. For these reasons, the dual recommendations above are imperative. ~~(C)~~

(U)

Because the FBI Academy auditorium is in use on June 5, the half day which will close this seminar will be held in the crime-scene classroom. That classroom is a large classroom above the swimming pool and adjacent to the crime-scene search rooms and audio visual facilities at the Academy. While only Field supervisors will attend this session and the Guidelines discussions will be over, it is likely that sensitive discussions will also be held in this room. Consequently, it is requested that this room be swept also. ~~(C)~~

(U)

During the seminar, a representative of the Training Unit, INTD, will secure the lecture space at Quantico during coffee or lunch breaks. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Addendum to memorandum J. H. Geer to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
RE: ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES SEMINAR,
JUNE 2 - 5, 1980
COUNTERMEASURES SECURITY SWEEP

ADDENDUM OF TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION (TSD): *WJW* *6/5/80*

On May 30, 1980, personnel of the Engineering Section, TSD, conducted an electronic countermeasures sweep of the auditorium of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. The sweep included a security check of telephones within the auditorium, and the RF spectrum was monitored from 3kHz to 2GHz. No evidence of tampering or presence of clandestine listening equipment was found during the sweep.

On June 2, 1980, to insure that no transmitters were activated during the seminar, a second RF spectrum scan was conducted while the seminar was in progress. No evidence of transmissions of any kind was found.

INTD, advised that, due to schedule changes, there was no longer a need to conduct a countermeasures survey of the crime-scene classroom at Quantico.

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WJW*
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

RWW/gbr

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM : *[Signature]* P. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice
SUBJECT: Security Survey of Special Security Center

DATE: 23 MAY 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

[Signature]
[Signature]

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 and the Judge's Chambers, Room 6725 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on

b6
b7C

*Schedule at mutual
convenience. [Signature]*

OK
[Signature]

*Completed 5-29
SSC + Judge Hart's
Chambers. All OK
AET, DWB*

(12)

62-97308-945

JUN 9 1980

*Let to Rubino
6/6/80
DWB*



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

84 JUN 27 '80

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

June 6, 1980

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
SECURITY SURVEY OF SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER

Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1980, requesting a security survey of the Special Security Center (SSC) and the Judge's Chambers, room 6725, of the Main Justice Building.

On May 29, 1980, personnel of my staff conducted a telephone security check and monitored the RF spectrum from 3kHz to 2GHz in Judge Hart's chambers (6725). Since the only telephone in the SSC is a KY-70, only an RF spectrum sweep was conducted there. No evidence of clandestine listening or transmitting equipment was found in either location at that time.

b6
b7C

NOTE: Above sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and ET [redacted]

DWW:ffm
(6)


APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Public Affs. Off. _____

Exec AD Inv. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

84 JUN 27 '80



62-97308-946

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

TO : William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM : *[Signature]*
D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice
SUBJECT: Security Survey of Criminal Division Offices

DATE: MAY 15 1980

W. J. Rubino
Done

Security Survey

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division offices in room 2107 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on

b6
b7C

*Done 5-23-80
by JWR/DEM
negative
due to contractor work
in remodeling office*

OK *[initials]*

[Circular stamp with initials]

[Stamp]

62-97308-947

*Let to Rubino
6/3/80
DWR/jgm*

17 JUN 12 1980

File: 62-97308

[Handwritten signature]



84 JUL 15 '80

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

June 3, 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

SECURITY SURVEY OF CRIMINAL DIVISION OFFICES

Reference is made to your letter of May 15, 1980, requesting a security survey of the offices of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.

On May 23, 1980, personnel of my staff conducted a counter-measures sweep of offices located in room 2107, Main Justice. No evidence of tampering or clandestine listening equipment was found at the time of the sweep.

b6
b7C

NOTE: Above countermeasures sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and [redacted]

DWW:jfm
(6)


APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
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Crim. Inv. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____



02-97308-948

84 JUL 10 80

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-78)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/2/80

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
SA DAVE WADE

FROM: *LM* *EDH/108* SAC, BALTIMORE (66-3370)

SUBJECT: CENTREVILLE RESIDENT AGENCY
BALTIMORE DIVISION *Security Survey*

Bureau assistance is requested to conduct a countermeasures survey at captioned RA. Contact SA ROY L. ATHERTON in order to determine a mutually agreeable date to conduct same.

*5/15/80 - scheduled
for 5/28/80 @ 10 AM
per req. by R. L. Atherton
DWC*

*Ltr to BA
6.12.80
DWC: jfm*

② - Bureau
1 - Baltimore
RLA:mbc
(3)

*Wade
Routman*

66-3370-949

JUN 20 1980

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) (Time) Per _____

84 JUL 15 '80

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

SAC, Baltimore (66-3370)

6/12/80

Director, FBI (62-97308)

Security Survey
CENTREVILLE RESIDENT AGENCY
BALTIMORE DIVISION (U)

Re Baltimore airtel, 5/2/80, requesting an electronic countermeasures survey of captioned RA space. (U)

On 5/28/80, personnel of the Engineering Section, Technical Services Division, conducted a telephone security and RF spectrum sweep of the RA located on the second floor of the Centreville, Maryland, Post Office. (U)

No evidence of tampering with respect to telephones or evidence of clandestine audio transmission equipment was found during the sweep. (U)

(U) During the survey of the space containing special collection and transmission equipment; however, potentially hazardous conditions were noted. The separation between the secure data communications equipment and telephone lines, alarm lines, and other electronic equipment was not within the normally acceptable limits. Such a situation increases the possibility of highly sensitive information radiating outside the facility either through spatial radiations or conductive emanations down telephone lines or other fortuitous conductors. (S)

(S) Discussions of future plans with RA personnel revealed that increased coverage of [redacted] b1
The addition of more technical equipment to the RA space to accommodate increased coverage would increase the potentially hazardous conditions now existing. Therefore, in order to provide additional coverage from the RA, expansion of this facility will be necessary. (S)

(U) In view of the above, Baltimore should include in any planned expansion of collection activities at the Centreville RA considerations for relocating the collection activity to larger space. The degree of expansion required will depend on the extent of increased coverage, the type of coverage provided, and other technical factors. Consequently, any planned increases should be thoroughly discussed with appropriate elements at FBIHQ. (S)

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II,
1.2.4.2 (2, 3)
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
June 12, 2000

~~SECRET~~

84 JUL 15 '80

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. Bayse *wab* (3)

DATE: 6/27/80

FROM : R. W. Witzel

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

PURPOSE: To obtain authority for SA David W. Wade and [redacted] to travel to Dallas and San Antonio, Texas, to assist the Dallas Office in conducting a countermeasures sweep of new office space and to effect on-site contractor monitoring at San Antonio.

DETAILS: Dallas teletype, dated June 16, 1980, captioned "Relocation of Dallas Office - Countermeasures Survey," requested FBIHQ technical assistance in conducting an electronic countermeasures sweep of the new office space recently occupied by Dallas personnel.

It has been the policy of the Engineering Section to provide technical assistance to field offices in conducting the initial sweep of newly occupied office space. This insures that personnel experienced in electronic countermeasures are made available to the field to support the first technical inspections of the office. This is considered a good security policy and should be implemented whenever possible. It is anticipated that a 2-3 day effort will be required to support Dallas' request. (14)

SA Wade and [redacted] will be available on July 9-11, 1980, to support the Dallas request and are experts in electronic countermeasures.

In addition, FBI contract J-FBI-7838 with Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) has recently been modified to require the production of two each BODET III devices. Extension of the Dallas field support trip to include San Antonio (SWRI) for the purpose of monitoring the SWRI contract is considered appropriate

Enclosures (2)

- 1 - Mr. Long
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Wade

b6
b7C

DWW/kmm*
(6)

68 AUG 14 1980

V-56

DE-58

(CONTINUED - OVER)

17 JUN 30 1980

RECEIVED

Memorandum R. W. Witzel to Mr. Bayse
Re: Countermeasures Matters

from both an economic and manpower utilization standpoint. SA Wade is replacing SA Jerry Breidenfeld (retired) as C.O.T.R. of this contract, and [REDACTED] has been involved in this effort since its inception. This effort is expected to require 1-2 days at San Antonio.

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b7C

Costs to be incurred for the above trip to Dallas and San Antonio would include \$467 for each employee's travel and \$244 for each traveler for per diem, totalling \$711 per traveler or \$1,422.

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That SA David W. Wade and [REDACTED] be authorized to travel to Dallas, Texas, to support their request for technical assistance.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. <u>WAB/As</u>
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Public Affs. Off. _____

2. That, if recommendation #1 above is approved, SA Wade and [REDACTED] be authorized to continue on to San Antonio (SWRI) for the purpose of monitoring contract J-FBI-7838.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. <u>WAB/As</u>
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Public Affs. Off. _____

3. That, if recommendations #1 and #2 above are approved, the attached teletypes to Dallas and San Antonio be approved and transmitted.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. <u>WAB/As</u>
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Public Affs. Off. _____

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



P. Witzel

Subject

Security Survey of U. S. Attorney's Office

Date

July 8, 1980

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

To

William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

for *Communications*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Department of Justice

TELETYPE SOPV-4

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the U.S. Attorney's Office, Executive Offices, and Fraud Division rooms on the second and sixth floors of the U.S. District Courthouse, 3rd Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C.

Please contact Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on

b6
b7C

*letter to Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
7/22/80 DW: can.*

*OK
LB*

(108)

62-97308

62-97308-952

JUL 24 1980

[Signature]
DIRECTOR

84 AUG 13 '80

1-Mr. Bayse
1-Mr. Witzel
1-Mr. Wade

Date: July 23, 1980

To: Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Subject: SECURITY SURVEY OF U. S. ATTORNEY'S
EXECUTIVE OFFICES AND FRAUD DIVISION
U. S. DISTRICT COURTHOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference is made to your letter of July 8, 1980,
requesting a security survey of the U. S. Attorney's Office,
Executive Offices, and Fraud Division, on the second and sixth
floors of the U. S. District Courthouse, Washington, D. C.

On July 3, 1980, in response to a telephone request by
[redacted] of your staff, personnel of the FBI's
Technical Services Division accompanied [redacted] to the
U. S. District Courthouse and conducted the requested survey.
Telephone security checks of all telephones in the space and
monitoring of the Radio Frequency Spectrum from 10MHz to 2 GHz
disclosed no evidence of tampering or the installation of
clandestine listening equipment in any of the areas surveyed.

b6
b7C

Note: Above sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and
[redacted]

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

DWW:cah can
(6)

62-97308

DE-73

JUL 24 1980

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

87 JUL 18 '80

1-Mr. Bayse
1-Mr. Witzel
1-Mr. Wade

July 23, 1980

Mr. William H. Randolph
Director
Investigations and Security
United States Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Randolph:

Pursuant to your letter dated June 5, 1980,
personnel of my staff conducted an electronic counter-
measures sweep of the Offices of the Deputy Under Secretary
for International Trade, located at the Main Commerce
Building, rooms 3840 - 3856.

The sweep, conducted on June 30, 1980 revealed
no evidence of tampering or the presence of clandestine
audio transmission equipment.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Dayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

b6
b7C

Note: Above sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and

62-97308

DWW:cah
(6)

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

APPROVED:

Director _____
Asst. AD Inv. _____
Asst. AD Adm. _____
Exec. AD LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

MF TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: ENGINEERING SECTION
TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

DATE: 7/1/80

FROM : *JL*
SAC, SAN ANTONIO (66-269-SUB 1)

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
TELEPHONE ANALYZER

Security SURVEY

Re Baltimore letter to San Antonio, dated 6/23/80.

Being shipped to Dallas by Federal Express under separate cover is the Dektor telephone analyzer received by San Antonio from Baltimore. The two cartons received were not opened by San Antonio and reshipped to Dallas for utilization by Special Agent David Wade, FBIHQ.

Baltimore indicated that the only number that could be located on either case was 990, which is probably the serial number.

*Dallas will
send to FBIHQ for
repair.
Bates - 7/16/80*

*file: 62-97308
62-97308-*

3 JUL 8 1980

②-Bureau
②-Dallas
1-San Antonio
TEM:mms
(5) *66 JUL 21 1980*



1*

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

KX 009Z

PP H

DE KX

P 11 2006Z JUL 80

FM KNOXVILLE (62-0)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ENGINEERING SECTION

U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CHARLES G. NEESE, GREENEVILLE,
TENNESSEE

Rec'd
Engineering Sect
1804 JUL 11 1980

RE KNOXVILLE TELCALL TO BUREAU AND BUTEL CALLS KNOXVILLE,
JULY 10, 1980.

ON JULY 10, 1980, U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CHARLES G.
NEESE, GREENEVILLE, TENN., TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ASSISTANT
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE WILLIAM D. FALLIN AND REQUESTED THAT
NEESE'S JURY ROOM, USDC, GREENEVILLE, TENN., BE CHECKED BY
THE FBI FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DEVICES. NEESE INDICATED
THAT DURING A RECENT UNION-RELATED JURY TRIAL, AN UNIDENTIFIED
INDIVIDUAL EXITED JURY ROOM PRIOR TO JURY DELIBERATION.

955

*Approved by
KTB 7/10/80
based on ref
Tel OAS:*

*Travel agency
points made
telephonically*

Date 7/11/80

*1 cc retained
in Eng. Sect.
Date 7/29/80*

XEROX
AUG 6 1980

b6
b7C

22 AUG 11 1980

*TTY to KX
7/27/80
Dawson DMD*

84 AUG 14 '80

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

KX 62-0 PAGE TWO UNCLAS

DEPUTY USM BRUCE MONTGOMERY, GREENEVILLE, TENN.,
ADVISED JURY ROOM HAD BEEN SEALED SINCE THAT TIME.

KNOXVILLE DIVISION IS REQUESTING THAT TECHNICAL
SERVICES DIVISION MAKE AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL
IN ORDER THAT A COUNTER MAJOR SURVEY CAN BE CONDUCTED
FOR JUDGE NEESE. IF APPROVED, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE
BY BUREAU SUPERVISOR DAVID WADE AND SA
OF KNOXVILLE DIVISION.

b6
b7C

BT

#

096

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-12-2011

1 2

JULY 29, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

FM096ERR KXDE HQ H0096 H0096 292036Z JUL 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

TO FBI KNOXVILLE {62-0} ROUTINE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEPHONE SECURITY SURVEYS

US DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CHARLES G. NEESE, GREENVILLE, TENNESSEE.

{U}

b6
b7C

REKXTEL, JULY 11, 1980. {U}

ON JULY 14, 1980, SA DAVID W. WADE AND [REDACTED]

{FBIHQ} MET WITH SA [REDACTED] {KNOXVILLE} AND TRAVELED
TO GREENVILLE, TENNESSEE TO CONDUCT A COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP IN
CAPTIONED MATTER. ON THAT DATE, THE JURY ROOM, COURTROOM,
AND CHAMBERS OF JUDGE NEESE, AS WELL AS THE OFFICE OF JUDGE
NEESE'S [REDACTED] WERE PHYSICALLY
AND ELECTRONICALLY SEARCHED. AN ELECTRONIC CHECK OF ALL
TELEPHONES, AS WELL AS A RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRAL SEARCH FROM
10 MHZ TO 2 GHZ REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING OR THE
PRESENCE OF CLANDESTINE LISTENING EQUIPMENT. ~~ECJ~~

WAB/B

DWW:DMH {4}

7-29-80

1B046/8

5823

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - MR. WADE

AUG 6 1980

RECEIVED FBI KNOXVILLE
JUL 30 1980

1055281
JUL 30 1980

62-97308-956

AUG 4 1980

28

84 AUG 14 '80

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-88301-

2

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0096 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SWEEP, JUDGE NEESE WAS ADVISED
OF THE RESULTS AND EXTENDED HIS APPRECIATION TO THE FBI FOR
ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. {U} ~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY~~
~~3445. REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (2). DATE OF~~
~~REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION JULY 29, 2000.~~

BT

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE: ABOVE COUNTERMEASURES SHEEP WAS CONDUCTED IN
RESPONSE TO REKXTEL. APPROVAL FOR SA NAME AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS GRANTED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
KIER T. FOYD TELEPHONICALLY TO UNIT CHIEF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ON JULY 30, 2010. (U)

b6
b7C

098

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-12-2011

JULY 29, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#F098ERR DLWDE HQ H0098 #HBYCER 292039Z JUL 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

TO FBI DALLAS {66-1265} ROUTINE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O TELEPHONE SECURITY

SURVEYS

RELOCATION OF DALLAS OFFICE - COUNTERMEASURES {U}

REDTEL, JUNE 16, 1980, AND BUTEL, JUNE 27, 1980. IN
 RESPONSE TO REDTEL, SA DAVID W. WADE AND [REDACTED]
 CONDUCTED AN ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP OF THE NEW DALLAS
 OFFICE SPACE FROM JULY 7 - 9, 1980. ALL TELEPHONES IN THE
 OFFICE WERE PHYSICALLY AND ELECTRONICALLY EXAMINED, AND A RADIO
 FREQUENCY SPECTRAL SEARCH FROM 3 KHZ TO 2 GHZ WAS CONDUCTED.
 NO EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING OR THE PRESENCE OF CLANDESTINE
 LISTENING EQUIPMENT WAS FOUND AT THE TIME OF THE SWEEP. ~~EX~~ (U)

DALLAS TECHNICAL COORDINATOR, SA [REDACTED] WAS BRIEFED ON
 THE RESULTS OF THE SWEEP, ON JULY 9, 1980. ~~CLASSIFIED AND~~
~~EXTENDED BY 1445. REASON FOR EXTENSION ECTM II, 1-2.4.2 {2}.~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION JULY 27, 2000.~~

MAB/B

DWW:DMD {4}

7-29-80

18046/8

2700

957

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - MR. WADE

WU

AUG 4 1980

XEROX

AUG 6 1980

84 AUG 14 '80

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT CONVERSATIONS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-10

NOTE: REDLTEL, JUNE 16, 1960, REQUESTED A COUNTERMEASURES
SWEEP OF THEIR NEW OFFICE SPACE. IN R. U. WITZEL MEMO TO
MR. DAYSE, JUNE 27, 1960, CAPTIONED "COUNTERMEASURES
MATTERS," APPROVAL WAS GRANTED FOR SA HAFE AND
TO TRAVEL TO DALLAS TO CONDUCT THE SWEEP. ~~SEP~~

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

FBI

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1,6)
DATE 05-29-2011

957

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ ~~SECRET~~
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/28/80

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: SA [REDACTED] TSD)~~SECRET~~

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-779)

~~CONSOLIDATED PLANT OPERATIONS~~
(OO:WFO)*Security Surveys*

In view of recently increased requests upon WFO technically trained Special Agents to provide technical security and conduct technical sweeps in captioned matter and other FCI related operations, WFO requests that the appropriate personnel within the Technical Services Division of FBIHQ provide up to date specialized training to five selected Sound Agents of WFO in this area.

The training should include latest electronic equipment for detection of hardwire and RF microphone devices as well as latest telephone instrument sweep techniques.

Selection of above SAs to be trained and establishing training dates for training should be coordinated through Technical Supervisor [REDACTED] at WFO.

~~SECRET~~

Classified & Extended by 9526

Reason for Extension, FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2&3)

Date of Review for Declassification (May 28, 2006)

(S)

Note:

② - Bureau
1 - WFOMCO:smt
(3)

Request handled informally with SA [REDACTED] CI-8. Request will be given instruction to [REDACTED] OT during sweeps of HQ SA's & ETs. Equipment provisioning [REDACTED] as funding [REDACTED]

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

84 AUG 26 '80

~~SECRET~~

FBI/DOJ

b6
b7Cb1
b6
b7C

6-7-8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

DATE: 6/9/80

b6
b7C

FROM : ROOM 1B053

SUBJECT: SAC, SAN ANTONIO (66-269-SUB 1)

TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

Security Search

Being returned to the Bureau under separate cover are the following items of equipment which have been used on a regular basis for security checks of San Antonio Headquarters city and Resident Agencies:

One each Scanlock Mark V receiver, serial number IHS/78/0164

One each modified Triplet, model 3400 Digital VOM, property number 199078

One each amplifier

One each Tone and Warble generator

One each RF signal generator

Zero case, property number 42760

66-71-1-1

FBIHQ is requested to furnish San Antonio with one set of above listed equipment for permanent assignment for use in regular security checks of San Antonio Headquarters city and Resident Agencies in view of sensitive nature of foreign counter-intelligence investigations presently being handled by this Division.

22 AUG 4 1980

Technical Services Division is also requested to furnish San Antonio with copies of the following counter measures documents as well as any other deemed appropriate:

3-Bureau
(1-Package Copy)
2-San Antonio
TEM:mms

*Let to SA
7-30-80
Daw: DMD*



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112

SA 66-269-SUB 1

Telephone Security Manual (ITC)

Technical Surveillance Counter Measures Committee -
Procedural Guide Number 3

Guidelines for conducting audio counter measures
surveys

b6
b7C

Handcarried
to 7/10/80 [signature]

FCUY

DLO 0005 168 1518Z

PP HQ

DE DL

P 161445Z JUN 80

MF
FM FBI DALLAS (66-1265)

TO DIRECTOR FBI PRIORITY

ATTENTION: ELECTRONIC ANALYSIS UNIT, TSD

BT

UNCLAS

RELOCATION OF DALLAS OFFICE - COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY

DALLAS OFFICE ANTICIPATES RELOCATION TO NEW OFFICE SPACE
ON JUNE 21, 1980. NEW TELEPHONE SWITCH WILL BE BELL DIMENSION
400 WITH CONVENTIONAL (NOT ELECTRONIC) INSTRUMENTS.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT BUREAU PERSONNEL TRAVEL TO DALLAS TO
ASSIST IN THE INITIAL COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY OF THIS NEW OFFICE
SPACE, INCLUDING ALL TELEPHONE INSTRUMENTS.

IT IS ALSO REQUESTED THAT A NON-LIN SCOUT BE FURNISHED FOR
THIS INITIAL SURVEY. DALLAS WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE RECEIVING
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE SCANLOG RECEIVER IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO
ASSIGN A UNIT TO THIS OFFICE. 62-97308-959

THE WEEK OF JUNE 23-27, 1980, WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THIS
SURVEY.

BT

#0005

NNNN

84 AUG 20 '80

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

16 JUN 80 15 27

RECEIVED
ACTION

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

[Handwritten signature]

*114 to DL
1/5/80
Daw: DWD*



DL
1/5/80
XEROX
AUG 13 1980

[Handwritten signature]
b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1265-1

1 1
6/27/80 DWW

UNCLAS E F T O

ROUTINE

*F010ERR DL8DE HQ H0010 H*H04YER 301426Z JUN 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

TO FBI DALLAS (66-1265) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

Security Survey

RELOCATION OF DALLAS OFFICE - COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY

REDTEL, JUNE 16, 1980.

ON JULY 7, 1980, SA DAVID W. WADE AND [REDACTED]

WILL ARRIVE DALLAS TO ASSIST TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN ELECTRONIC
COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP OF NEW OFFICE SPACE. SPECIFIC TRAVEL
ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE TELEPHONICALLY FORWARDED TO DALLAS WHEN
FINALIZED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ABOVE PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN
IN DALLAS UNTIL JULY 9, 1980.

BT

1

2

WAB/RS

DWW/KMN (43)

6/27/80

18053

2780

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - MR. WADE

62-97308-960

Ruxfus

JUL 11 1980

AUG 13 1980

01333 Vrl

84 AUG 20 '80

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI-622

b6
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-10-

NOTE: REDTEL REQUESTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONDUCTING INITIAL COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP OF NEW DALLAS OFFICE SPACE. DALLAS' REQUEST AND ASSOCIATED TRAVEL OF FBIHQ PERSONNEL WAS APPROVED BY MEMO R. W. WITZEL TO MR. DAYSE DATED JUNE 27, 1980.

SAC, SAN ANTONIO (66-269-SUB 1)

July 30, 1980

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-97308)

TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Security Survey

b6
b7C

Re San Antonio letter dated June 9, 1980.

In response to your request for technical equipment and information as set forth in relet, copies of the Telephone Security Manual and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee Procedural Guide Number 3 were provided to SA [redacted] on July 10, 1980. Procedural Guide Number 3 includes Guidelines for Conducting Audio Countermeasures Surveys.

Your request for the permanent assignment of additional technical equipment is being held in abeyance. At the present time, there are only a limited number of Scanlock receivers in the Bureau's inventory and the available units are being assigned to those offices having fully trained countermeasures personnel. As additional equipment becomes available your request will again receive consideration. Should you require the use of a Scanlock receiver in the interim, advise FBIHQ, Attention Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, and appropriate action will be taken to temporarily transfer equipment to you from another field office.

Regarding your request for a modified Triplet, model 3400 digital meter, FBIHQ is currently in the process of having several units modified to incorporate an amplifier suitable for use in countermeasures sweeps. When this modification is completed, your request will be considered.

The amplifier, tone generator, and RF signal generator requested in relet should be available in your Kaiser 1040 kit. If this equipment is not operating properly, return it to FBIHQ for repair and/or replacement.

Any questions regarding the above should be directed to SA David H. Wade, FBIHQ, extension 2700.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

DMW:dmd
(5)
Wade
for

MAIL ROOM ☐

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

DWW
Wade



8/11/80

b6
b7C

Subject

Security Survey of the Office of Professional
Responsibility

Date

July 30, 1980



To

Wg
William A. Bayse, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Department of Justice

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a
microphone and telephone security survey of the Office of Professional
Responsibility offices in Room 4306 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact  Security Specialist, Security Programs
Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on 

*Completed 7-31-80
based on telephone
call of
(DoJ/OPR) to
DWW*

b6
b7C

(S)

62-97302-961

*Ltr to DoJ
8-8-80
DWW:DM*

AUG 11 1980

84 AUG 26 '80

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Wade

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice

8/8/80

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

SECURITY SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Reference is made to your letter of July 30, 1980,
requesting a security survey of the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) offices in room 4306 of Main Justice.

On July 31, 1980, in response to a telephone
request of [redacted] OPR staff, personnel of the
FBI's Technical Services Division, accompanied by
[redacted] of your staff, conducted an electronic
countermeasures survey of OPR offices in Main Justice.
Physical and electronic examination of all telephones
within the space revealed no evidence of tampering or the
installation of clandestine listening equipment. Monitoring
of the Radio Frequency spectrum from 3 KHZ to 2 GHz disclosed
no evidence of clandestine transmitters operating at the
time of the survey.

b6
b7C

Departmental personnel present at the time of the
survey were advised of the results.

V48 DE-48

62-97300-962

b6
b7C

NOTE: Above sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and
ETs [redacted] and [redacted]

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

CDWW:and
(6)

RW

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD Inv. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

FBI/DOJ

84 AUG 24 '80

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ ~~SECRET~~
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 04-12-2011

Date 8/20/80

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-97308)
 (ATTN: ~~TECHNICAL SERVICE DIVISION, ENGINEERING SECTION~~)
 FROM: ADIC, NEW YORK (66-8831-14)
 SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES

b6
 b7C

Retel calls between SA [redacted] (New York), and SPM [redacted] (New York), and SA WADE (FBIHQ) 7/23/80, and Buteletype to New York captioned as above, and dated 7/28/80. (U)

On 8/1/80, two (2) countermeasures searches and sweeps were conducted in the offices of USA [redacted] and USDJ VINCENT BRODERICK, SDNY. (U)

(U) The following is a synopsis of steps taken before and during the (FCIM) meetings. (S)

(U) Telephone instruments, including those with AC power connections; radios (AM/FM); clocks; and so on, in both locations were disconnected, and removed from the rooms where appropriate. (S)

(U) A radio frequency search failed to disclose any unauthorized room audio emanating from either location before or during the meetings. (S)

DE-64

~~SECRET~~

Classified and Extended by 8520
 Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2.
 Date of review for Declassification: _____

2- Bureau
 1- New York

PSD:kvk
 (4)

*Classified in Eng. Sect
 8-26-80
 [Signature]*

20 AUG 29 1980

[Signature]

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

84 OCT 16 1980

~~SECRET~~

NY

(U) . Physical searches in the rooms, as well as checks on the AC power lines did not disclose any apparent room audio passing along wires, through air ducts or passing in an unaided fashion (without amplification) directly through walls. (S)

(U) During the course of the meetings all means of room egress were monitored closely. This was done in effort to determine whether any individual (s) was (were) acting in an abnormal manner which would indicate possible close range eavesdropping. (S)

(U) In essence, no eavesdropping devices were detected before or during the meetings. (S)

-2*-

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Mr. Wade

September 10, 1980

REGISTERED

R
~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~
Mr. William H. Randolph
Director
Investigations and Security
United States Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230

Dear Mr. Randolph,

Telephone Security Surveys


Pursuant to your letter of August 12, 1980, personnel of my staff, on September 3, 1980, conducted an electronic countermeasures sweep of the Special Projects Office, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), located at 1325 G Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. (U)

The sweep, consisting of a physical and electronic examination of telephone instruments, as well as a Radio Frequency (RF) scan of the spectrum from 3 kilohertz to 2 gigahertz, revealed no evidence of the installation of clandestine listening equipment. (U) Referral/Direct

717607

MAILED 1

SEP 10 1980



(C)
DE-64

62-97308-965

Classified and Extended by 1445

Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2)

Date of Review for Declassification September 10, 2000.

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.: _____
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Insp. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Public Affs. Off. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

62-97308

PWW:dmd

(7)

WJ

clmd

Em

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 SEP 16 1980

MAIL ROOM ☐

FBI/DOJ

84 OCT 16 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William H. Randolph

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

Sincerely yours,

Referral/Consult

William A. Bayso
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

NOTE;

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(C)

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

10

9-26-80

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

TO LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY (66-381) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

Telephone Security Surveys

SECURITY OF OFFICE SPACE - MEXICO CITY (U)

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY TELETYPE, AUGUST 28, 1980. (U)

CONTACT WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY-PERSONNEL INDICATES THAT THE NEW TELEPHONE SYSTEM INSTALLED IN THE MEXICO CITY EMBASSY IS A WESTERN ELECTRIC "DIMENSION" ELECTRONIC SWITCH. TELEPHONE INSTRUMENTS INSTALLED IN LEGAT SPACE SHOULD BE WESTERN ELECTRIC, MODEL 500 LM UNITS WITH MODEL 6406 KEY PADS (SEPARATE LINE SELECTION BUTTONS). ONE TEN BUTTON MODEL 830 INSTRUMENT SHOULD BE INSTALLED AT THE SECRETARY/RECEPTIONIST POSITION. ~~(U)~~

LEGAT SHOULD VERIFY THE ABOVE AND REPORT ANY DISCREPANCIES TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION ENGINEERING SECTION (MR. WADE). (U)

REGARDING YOUR REQUEST FOR A SECURITY SWEEP TO INSURE

DO NOT TYPE IN BELOW THIS LINE

APPROVED BY <i>WAB/CR</i>	FORWARDED BY <i>WAB/DMK (6)</i>	DATE 9-26-80	ROOM 1B053/8	TELE EXT. 2700
------------------------------	------------------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-------------------

- 1 - MR. O'MALLEY
- ATTN: FOREIGN LIAISON UNIT
- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 -
- 1 - MR. WADE

OCT 1 1980

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

16327 PL
SEP 29 1980

84 OCT 16 1980

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~DPAGE TWO DE HQ 0010 SECRET~~

PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED TECHNICAL COMPROMISE OF NEW

20 TELEPHONE SYSTEM, LEGAT SHOULD CONTACT LOCAL REGIONAL SECURITY

18 [REDACTED] AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE STATE DEPARTMENT
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL PERFORM TECHNICAL INSPECTION OF LEGAT

16 TELEPHONES. [REDACTED] STATE DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL

SECURITY OFFICE IS AWARE OF THIS REQUEST AND HAS APPROVED

14 STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER. [REDACTED] ADVISED

(U) THAT A TECHNICAL SECURITY INSPECTION TEAM IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE

12 IN MEXICO CITY FROM PANAMA IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS TO CONDUCT

TECHNICAL SECURITY INSPECTION OF THE EMBASSY. ~~SECRET~~

10 LEGAT SHOULD ADVISE FBIHQ, ATTENTION ENGINEERING SECTION

{MR. WADE} OF ANY COMPLICATIONS RELATIVE TO ABOVE. ALSO,

8 ADVISE FBIHQ WHEN TECHNICAL INSPECTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

(U) RESULTS OF INSPECTION WILL BE PROVIDED TO FBIHQ BY STATE

6 DEPARTMENT THROUGH ROUTINE CHANNELS. ~~SECRET~~~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445, REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM,~~4 ~~11, 1-2.4.2 (2&3), DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION~~~~SEPTEMBER 26, 2000.~~

2 BT

1

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

b6
b7C

NOTE: BASED ON THE REQUEST OF LEGAT MEXICO CITY IN REFERENCED
TELETYPE, [REDACTED] STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE
OF TECHNICAL SECURITY, WAS CONTACTED REGARDING THE CHANGE
(U) TO TELEPHONE FACILITIES SERVICING THE MEXICO CITY EMBASSY,
AND CONSEQUENTLY THE FBI LEGAT. ~~IS~~

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT A WESTERN ELECTRIC "DIMENSION"
ELECTRONIC SWITCH WAS RECENTLY INSTALLED IN THE EMBASSY.
THE INSTRUMENTS INSTALLED WITHIN LEGAT SPACE ON A 1A2 KEY SYSTEM
INCLUDED WESTERN ELECTRIC MODEL 500LN TELEPHONE SETS EQUIPPED
WITH MODEL L406 KEY PADS, AS WELL AS ONE MODEL 830, TEN
BUTTON KEY SET (FOR THE RECEPTIONIST). HE ALSO ADVISED THAT b6
A TECHNICAL INSPECTION OF THE EMBASSY WAS SCHEDULED TO b7C
OCCUR IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE
MADE LOCALLY BETWEEN THE LEGAT AND REGIONAL SECURITY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TO HAVE THE LEGAT'S TELEPHONES INSPECTED AT THAT
TIME. ~~IS~~

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THE RESULTS OF THE TECHNICAL
INSPECTION PERTAINING TO THE LEGAT'S SPACE WILL BE PROVIDED
(U) TO FBIHQ AS SOON AS THE FINAL REPORT IS SUBMITTED TO HIS
OFFICE. ~~IS~~

075

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag

OCTOBER 6, 1980

UNCLAS E F T O

ROUTINE

#F075ERR MMDE HQ HQ075 #H0YERR 062015Z OCT 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

TO FBI MIAMI {183-790} ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

Telephone Security Surveys

BANCOSHARES, RICO {A} - NARCOTICS, OO: MIAMI

REMMTEL, SEPTEMBER 26, 1980, AND TELCAL SEPTEMBER 30, 1980,

BETWEEN SUPERVISOR LARRY COLLINS {MM} AND SA DAVID W. WADE,

{FBIHQ}.

IN RESPONSE TO REMMTEL, SA DAVID W. WADE AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILL ARRIVE MIAMI ON OCTOBER 7, 1980, AT 11:12 AM VIA

EASTERN AIRLINES, FLIGHT 195 TO CONDUCT REQUESTED ELECTRONIC

COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP. DETAILS REGARDING THE TIMES FOR THE

SWEEPS OF OFF-PREMISE SITE AND RESIDENCE WILL BE HANDLED

TELEPHONICALLY.

BT

2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C

APPROVED BY WAB/CM	DATE 10-6-80	TIME 18053	PAGE 2700
-----------------------	-----------------	---------------	--------------

- 1 - MR. MULLEN
- 1 - MR. MC KINNON
- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - MR. WADE

b6
b7C

FW

62-97308-967

2018207
007 6

SM
OCT 15 1980

84 OCT 22 1980

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

NOTE: RE MIAMI TELETYPE REQUESTED A COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP OF AN OFF-PREMISE, UNDERCOVER SITE UTILIZED IN CAPTIONED MATTER. ALSO, AN ADDITIONAL REQUEST TO SWEEP A RESIDENCE, UTILIZED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE, WAS REQUESTED IN RETELCAL. IN BOTH INSTANCES, THE SWEEPS WERE REQUESTED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, AFTER IT WAS LEARNED THAT SUBJECTS IN THIS CASE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO "SOPHISTICATED RADIO BROADCAST EQUIPMENT."

COSTS TO BE INCURRED IN THIS MATTER FOR THE ABOVE TWO EMPLOYEES INCLUDE: TRAVEL - TWO ROUNDTrip TICKETS AT \$370.00 EACH; PER DIEM - 4 DAYS AT \$50 PER DAY PER EMPLOYEE FOR A TOTAL COST OF \$1,180.00.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exec AD Inv. 4
Exec AD Adm. 1
Exec AD LES 1
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. 1
Crim. Inv. 1
Ident. 1
Intell. 1
Laboratory 1
Legal Coun. 1
Plan. & Insp. 1
Rec. Mgnt. 1
Tech. Servs. 1
Training 1
Public Affs. Off. 1
Telephone Rm. 1
Director's Sec'y 1

TO : Mr. E. J. O'Malley

b6
b7C

DATE: 10/1/80

FROM : [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FEDERAL SECURE TELEPHONE SYSTEM

Security Surveys

PURPOSE:

This is to recommend that a cross-divisional resources management and priority establishment responsibility be assigned to the appropriate overview unit in CI-3 Section, INTD. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended coordination of INTD interests in management of the Federal Secure Telephone Service be placed in the Budget and Analysis Unit, CI-3 Section. (U)

APPROVED: [Signature] Adm. Serv. 1 Legal Coun. 1
Crim. Inv. 1 Plan. & Insp. 1
Director 1 Rec. Mgnt. 1
Exec. AD-Adm. 1 Ident. 1 Tech. Servs. 1
Exec. AD-Inv. 1 Intell. 1 Training 1
Exec. AD-LES 1 Laboratory 1 Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. 1

DETAILS:

Secure telephone issues were first addressed from the viewpoint of field office installations in 1972, when a request for a secure telephone link between New York and

62-97308

JJS:tdc+dc
(6)

- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. J. H. Geer

b6
b7C

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified and Extended by 1752
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)
Date of Review for Declassification (October 1, 2000)

84 OCT 27 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. J. O'Malley
Re: FEDERAL SECURE TELEPHONE SYSTEM
62-97308

DETAILS: (Continued)

(U) Washington was considered. Following this installation, other offices were included in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(KY-70). Procurement by Technical Services Division of a new generation of equipment [REDACTED] is underway. It is eventually to replace all older systems. Deliveries, originally scheduled for late 1980, have fallen behind a year or more. (S)

b7E

(U) During the period that we have limited availability of equipment, it is necessary to apportion existing capacity between offices having the most compelling need from an FCI viewpoint. INTD oversight of apportionment of secure telephone equipment is the purpose of captioned matter. This responsibility involves evaluation of the FCI programs of offices competing for equipment and insuring that equipment is installed in the offices with the greatest FCI needs. It is most logical that responsibility for evaluating cross-divisional programs' impact on individual field offices, and establishing FCI policy for Secure Telephone System disposition be centered in the CI-3 Section's Unit overseeing resource allocation and management. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

083

1 2

OCTOBER 15, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#F083ERR MMUDE HQ H0083 #H0YCUR 151853Z OCT 80

FM DIRECTOR FBI 162-973083

TO FBI MIAMI 1183-7903 ROUTINE

BT

Telephone Security Surveys

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BANCOSHARES, RICO, [A] - NARCOTICS, OO: MIAMI [U]

REMMTEL, SEPTEMBER 26, 1980, AND BUTEL, OCTOBER 6, 1980. [U]

ON OCTOBER 7-8, 1980, PERSONNEL OF THE TECHNICAL SERVICES

(U) DIVISION [FBIHQ] CONDUCTED COUNTERMEASURES SWEEPS OF YOUR
OFF-PREMISE LOCATIONS UTILIZED IN CAPTIONED MATTER. ~~EC~~

NO EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING WITH RESPECT TO TELEPHONES, OR

(U) THE INSTALLATION OF CLANDESTINE LISTENING EQUIPMENT WAS FOUND
AT THE TIME OF THE SWEEPS. ~~EC~~

ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CAUTIONED
THAT THE FACT THAT NOTHING WAS FOUND DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF TELEPHONES BEING THE TARGET OF UNAUTHORIZED
WIRE TAPS. THERE IS NO RELIABLE METHOD OF DETERMINING WHETHER
OR NOT TELEPHONE LINES ARE BEING MONITORED FROM LOCATIONS OTHER

WWS/MB

[Signature]

10-15-80 18053 2700

- 1 - MR. MULLEN
- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - MR. WADE

b6
b7C

62-9138-

NOT RECORDED
10 OCT 17 1980
OCT 22 1980

2332 W

65-82444-549

ORIGINAL FILED IN

OCT 21 1980

2

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0083 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THAN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE INSTRUMENTS. ~~103~~

(U)

~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445, REASON FOR EXTENSION,
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2), DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
OCTOBER 15, 2000.~~

BT

1

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

(U)

NOTE: ABOVE SWEEP WAS CONDUCTED BY SA DAVID W. WADE AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] LOCATIONS SWEEP INCLUDED THE OFF-PREMISE,
UNDERCOVER OFFICE SPACE AND RESIDENCE. ~~ECI~~

b6
b7C

1 - Mr. Boyd
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Hager
1 - Mr. Wade

September 29, 1980

Honorable C. Moxley Featherston
Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court
400 Second Street, Northwest
Room 320
Washington, D. C. 20217

Dear Judge Featherston,

In response to your telephonic request of September 17, 1980, personnel of my staff conducted an electronic countermeasures sweep of the offices of Judge Samuel B. Sterrett, Room 422, United States Tax Court.

The sweep, conducted on September 19, 1980, consisted of a thorough physical and electronic examination of all telephones within the offices of Judge Sterrett, his secretaries, and his law clerks, as well as a local scan of the radio frequency spectrum from 3 kilohertz to 1.5 gigahertz.

No evidence of modification to the telephones or the installation of clandestine listening equipment was found at the time of the sweep. This fact was brought to the attention of Judge Sterrett at the conclusion of the sweep.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact Special Agent David W. Wade, telephone 324-2700.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

MAILED 13
SEP 29 1980
FBI

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

62-97308
DWW:dmd
(7)

SEE NOTE, PAGE TWO.

MAIL ROOM ☒

Honorable C. Moxley Featherston

b6
b7C

NOTE: Above sweep was conducted by SA David W. Wade and [redacted] and [redacted]

Judge Featherston requested the sweep after two members of the Church of Scientology apparently entered Judge Sterrett's offices without registering with the guard located at the entrance to the U. S. Tax Court.

APPROVED: _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgmt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

143

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 07-28-2011

OCTOBER 28, 1980

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

FMHERR NYEDE HQ H0143 FMHPSR 282202Z OCT 80

0141

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

TO FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE

ATTN: SA [REDACTED]

BT

~~SECRET~~

TEMPEST MATTERS - NEW YORK (U)

RE BUTEL, OCTOBER 10, 1980.

Telephone Security SUR b6 b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 - MR. BAYSE

1 - [REDACTED]

ATTN: [REDACTED]

1 - MR. WITZEL

1 - MR. HAGER

1 - MR. WADE

1 - 62-19226

b6
b7C

Ob52 in

16 OCT 30 1980

84 NOV 1 1980

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PAGE TWO DE HQ 0143 S F ~~C R E T~~

(S)

(S)

(S)

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4 RESULTS OF THIS SEARCH SHOULD BE REPORTED TO FBIHQ,
ATTENTION : ELECTRONIC ANALYSIS UNIT, ENGINEERING SECTION, SO
2 THAT A DETERMINATION CAN BE MADE AS TO WHETHER ADDITIONAL
SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE INITIATED. A DEADLINE OF DECEMBER 1,

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

~~SECRET~~

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(U)

PAGE THREE DE HQ 0143 ~~SECRET~~

1980, IS ESTABLISHED FOR REPORTING RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT. ~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY: 1445, REASON FOR EXTENSION~~

~~FCIM, 11, 1-2.4.2 12 & 31, DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION~~

~~OCTOBER 28, 2000.~~

16 BT

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~~SECRET~~

(U) NOTE: THE USE OF STANDARD X-RAY TECHNIQUES ON THICK WALLS
WOULD BE A POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARD. ALTERNATIVE MEANS ARE BEING
PROPOSED TO NEW YORK TO SECURE THEIR SPACE. THIS MATTER WILL
BE FOLLOWED CLOSELY. ~~SECRET~~

Memorandum



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Re Witzel

Subject

Security Survey of Associate Deputy Attorney
General Offices

Date

NOV 21 1980

Security Surveys

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director,
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Associate Deputy Attorney General offices in Room 4216 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

*Completed
11/21/80 per telecall
from 11/20/80
- conducted by DWS/DEM*

DC

UEB

62-97308-972

MLT

2 DEC 2 1980

*LET to DOJ
11/28/80
DWS:dmr*

RECEIVED

102
66 JAN 5 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

oga information handled per letter d. 6/6/11

TO : Mr. Bayse *was/cls*

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-24-2011 BY 60424 uc haw/sab/lag

DATE: 7/10/80

FROM : *R.W.* Witzel

SUBJECT: SECURE TELEPHONE
INSTRUMENT ADDITION (U)

Referral/Direct

Security of Telephone AND Teletype Lines

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to request approval for a secure telephone (Green Phone) to be placed in Room 1B035H for the use of the Unit Chief, Electronic Analysis Unit (EAU). (U)

DETAILS:

[Redacted Box]

[Redacted Box]

[Redacted Box] (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That a secure phone be placed in Room 1B035H to be used by Unit Chief, EAU. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD Inv. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *was/cls*
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Intell. _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____ Public Affs. Off. _____

2. If number 1 is approved, then the installation should be performed by the Systems Hardware Maintenance Unit. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *was/cls*
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Intell. _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____ Public Affs. Off. _____

1-Mr. Bayse

1-

Attn: [Redacted]

1-Mr. Witzel

1-Mr. Hager

b6 PER FBI
b7C

was: cah
(5)

62-97308-976
JUL 30 1980
CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II,
1.2.4.2 (2) 1.3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
7/10/2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 31 1981


FBI/DOJ

b6
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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag

NOTE: ABOVE SUEEPS WERE REQUESTED BY [REDACTED]
CHIEF, SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER, DOJ, ON 7-23-76. THE
ATTACHED LETTER "REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SECURITY COMPUTER-
MEASURES ASSISTANCE," DATED 7-24-76, FROM MR. D. JERRY RUBINO,
DIRECTOR SECURITY PROGRAMS STAFF, DOJ WAS PROVIDED AS FOLLOW-
UP TO [REDACTED] REQUEST.

b6
b7C



Handwritten signature and initials, possibly "H. D. [unclear]".

10-105-70

Memorandum

1411
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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *wp/c*

Date 2/13/81

Ran/mt
From : R. W. Witzel

mg
Subject: ~~X~~ COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Survey
Re: Kansas City airtel, dated February 5, 1981, captioned "Office Security, Kansas City Field Office," and Detroit phone call from SA James F. Peterka (airtel will follow).

PURPOSE: To obtain authority for [redacted] to travel to Kansas City, Missouri, and Detroit, Michigan, in conducting countermeasures sweeps of Bureau spaces and Warden's Office, Leavenworth, Kansas. *b6 b7C*

DETAILS: Detroit has moved their off-premise location to a newly constructed building and have requested FBIHQ technical assistance in conducting an electronic countermeasures sweep.

The Engineering Section has in the past provided technical assistance to field offices in conducting initial sweeps of newly occupied space, or when a specific problem arises where sophisticated equipment and expertise are required. This insures that personnel experienced in electronic countermeasures are made available for field support. It is anticipated that a 2 1/2 days effort in Kansas City and 2 days effort in Detroit will be required to support these requests. *(b6)*

SA [redacted] Indianapolis, should be available February 23-25, 1981, to help FBIHQ personnel in Kansas City. [redacted] will be available February 23-25, 1981, in Kansas City then travel to Detroit for February 26-27, 1981, to support the request for both Kansas City and Detroit Field offices. *b6 b7C*

Enclosure *handed rep.*

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Electronic Analysis Unit
- 1 - [redacted]

AEJ:amd
(6)

b6 b7C

(CONTINUED - OVER)

22 FEB 18 1981

33 MAR 26 1981

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum to Mr. Bayse
RE: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Costs to be incurred for the above trip to Kansas City and Detroit would include \$448 for travel and \$340 for per diem, totaling \$788.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) That [] be authorized to travel to Kansas City and Detroit to support their request for technical assistance.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. <u>was/cv</u>
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

(2) That the attached teletype be sent.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____		Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Tech. Servs. <u>was/cv</u>
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Hager
1 - [REDACTED]

141

2/17/81

Mr. D. Jerry Vabino
Department Security Officer
Department of Justice (DOJ)
William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

SECURITY SURVEY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Reference is made to your letter of January 26, 1981,
requesting a microphone and telephone security survey of the
Attorney General's Office, Conference Room, and Room 5123 of the
Main Justice Building.

On February 18, 1981, personnel of the FBI's Technical
Services Division and [REDACTED] from Security Office,
DOJ, conducted a countermeasures sweep of the Office of the
Attorney General, Conference Room, and Room 5123, Main Justice
Building. The sweep included an electronic check of telephones
within the office, a search of the radio frequency spectrum from
3 MHz to 1 GHz and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence
of tampering to the telephones or the installation of clandestine
listening equipment was found.

NOTE: The above sweep was conducted by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

AEJ:mdc
(7)

V-57

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Lab. Serv. _____
Public Affs. _____

62-97308-983

FEB 17 1981

- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD Adm. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Plan. & Insp. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Public Affs. Off. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

MAILED 12
FEB 17 1981
FBI

33 MAR 24 1981

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 04-12-2011

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison Unit

b6
b7C

March 2, 1981

✓ RE: COUNTERMEASURES

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

62-17306-985

HWP:pmo
(6)

~~SECRET~~

7 FEB 27 1981

(Classification statement on Bureau
copies only.)

Classified and Extended by 1541
Reasons for Extension FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (1, 2 and 3)
Date of Review for Declassification March 2, 2011

33 MAR 24 1981

Memorandum



Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WJ/10*

Date 3/2/81

From : *R. W. Witzel*

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b7C

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

Security of Telephone AND Teletype Lines *R. Witzel*

Re: Miami teletype dated February 20, 1981, captioned
"Bancoshares; Rico-Narcotics (B), OO: Miami."

PURPOSE: To obtain authority for SA [redacted] and
[redacted] to travel to Miami to conduct
countermeasures sweeps in two of Miami's off-premise sites.

DETAILS: Miami has occupied an off-premise location and have
requested FBIHQ technical assistance in conducting
an electronic countermeasures sweep.

The Engineering Section has in the past provided
technical assistance to field offices in conducting initial
sweeps of newly occupied space. It is anticipated that a 2 1/2
days effort will be required to support their request.

Costs to be incurred for the above trip to Miami
will be \$214.00 for travel and \$160.00 for per diem for each
person, totaling \$748.00 for both employees.

RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) That SA [redacted] and [redacted] be authorized
to travel to Miami to support their request
for technical assistance.

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. <i>WJ/10</i>
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

(2) That the attached teletype be sent. *WJ/10*

APPROVED: *DE-5*

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. <i>WJ/10</i>
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

Enclosure

1 - Merrill Parks (Division 6) *Ext*

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Hager

1 - Electronics Analysis Unit

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

BT:amd
(8)

3 3 APR 20 1981

FBI/DOJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Hager
1 -

b6
b7C

Date: March 17, 1981

To: Arthur A. Klekner
Director
Office of Security and Safety
General Accounting Office Building
Fourth and G Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

SECURITY OF
TELEPHONE SERVICES

Subject: AUDIO COUNTERMEASURE SURVEY

Reference is made to your letter of February 2, 1981, requesting an audio countermeasures survey of the CONTROLLER GENERAL'S MAIN BRIEFING ROOM.

On February 13, 1981, personnel from the FBI's Technical Services Division conducted an audio countermeasure survey of the CONTROLLER GENERAL'S MAIN BRIEFING ROOM and the CONTROLLER GENERAL'S OFFICE in the General Accounting Office Building, Fourth and G Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. The survey included a radio spectrum check and a nondestructive physical search. In the CONTROLLER GENERAL'S OFFICE check of all telephone lines was conducted. No evidence of tampering to the telephone lines or the installation of clandestine listening devices was found.

NOTE: The above survey was conducted by and

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APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Lead Com. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Intell. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____

62-17308-987

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

33 APR 16 1981

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Inv. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *W. Witzel*

Date 3/25/81

From : *W. Witzel*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

OS Security Survey

The Technical Services Division personnel, Electronic Analysis Unit, conducted a countermeasures check of the following conference rooms:

12 March 1981 Room 4017 Division 5
16 March 1981 Room 1B054 Engineering (TSD)
17 March 1981 Room 7225 Technical Services Division

The above countermeasures check included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone lines, and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of tampering with the telephone lines or the installation of clandestine listening devices was found.

The above countermeasures checks were performed by SA [redacted] and [redacted]

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RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *W. Witzel*
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Intell. _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____ Off. of Cong. _____
Public Affs. _____

- 1 - Division 5
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Electronic Analysis Unit
- 1 - [redacted]

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W. Witzel
AEC:and
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62-97308-988

MAR 26 1981

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FBI/DOJ

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Exec AD LES _____
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Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/RS*

Date 3/25/81

From : *WAB/RS* Mr. Witzel

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

OSecurity Survey

Re Chicago airtel dated March 17, 1981.

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b7C

PURPOSE: To obtain authority for SA [redacted] to travel to Chicago to assist in conducting a countermeasures sweep in a newly established resident agency.

DETAILS: The Chicago division has recently established a new resident agency which is located in a commercial building.

The Engineering Section has in the past provided technical assistance to field offices in conducting initial sweeps of newly occupied space. It is anticipated that a 2 1/2 days effort will be required to support Chicago's request.

Cost to be incurred for above trip to Chicago will be \$158.00 for travel and \$187.50 for per diem, totaling \$345.50.

RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) That SA [redacted] be authorized to travel to Chicago to support this request for technical assistance.

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APPROVED: Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *WAB/RS*
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Intell. _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

(Signature)

(2) If #1 is approved, that the attached teletype be sent.

62-97308-989

APPROVED: *WAB* Adm. Serv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *WAB/RS*
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Intell. _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Laboratory _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Electronic Analysis Unit
- 1 - [redacted]

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20 MAR 26 1981

BT:cmk
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33 APR 22 1981

PERS. SEC. UNIT

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Hager
1 - Electronics Analysis Unit
1 - [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

March 17, 1981

Mr. Joseph H. Parker
Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Washington, D. C. 20410

Dear Mr. Parker:

Reference is made to your letter of February 25, 1981,
requesting an audio countermeasures sweep, physical search and
check of telephones located in the Secretarial and Under
Secretarial suites in the HUD Building.

On March 5, 1981, in response to your request,
personnel of my staff conducted a countermeasures sweep of
the Secretarial and Under Secretarial suites and of rooms
10120 and 10132 in the HUD Building. The sweep, including an
electronic check of telephones within the offices, as well as
a radio frequency scan, revealed no evidence of tampering with
respect to the telephones, or the presence of clandestine audio
transmission equipment.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

NOTE: Above sweep was conducted by SA [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED]

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Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____
Exec AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

33 APR 17 1981

439

April 2, 1981

SECURITY SURVEYS

MEMORANDUM TO MR. COLWELL

At about 5:30 p.m. April 1, 1981, I received a call from Secretary of Interior Watt. Apparently his Chief of Security, Robert A. Smoak, Chief of the Division of Enforcement and Security Management, Department of the Interior, Room 5426, telephone 343-8357, has recommended a number of sweeping security changes, including guards, Park Service participation, automobiles before and after, etc., for the protection of the Secretary. D.C.

The Secretary says that before he relies on all of these recommendations he wants to know whether we know if the Chief of Security is sufficiently competent for these requirements to be respected.

Is there anything that we have in files or do we have any other information which we are in a position to furnish to the Secretary in response to his inquiry?

William H. Webster
Director

WHW:aga

62-97308-992

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Exec AD LES ☒
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ☐
Crim. Inv. ☐
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Tech. Servs. ☐
Training ☐
Public Affs. Off. ☐
Telephone Rm. ☐
Director's Sec'y ☐

MAIL ROOM ☐

3 MAY 26 1981

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APR 8 1981

Memorandum

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *Witzel*

Date 4/8/81

From *Witzel* W. Witzel

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~
Security Service

On March 26, 1981, personnel from the Electronic Analysis Unit conducted a countermeasures sweep at the Sam Rayburn Office Building, Room 2172. The countermeasures sweep included an electronic check of the telephones, a radio frequency spectrum scan and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of tampering with the telephones or the installation of a clandestine listening device was found.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Director _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____	Tech. Servs. <i>Witzel</i>
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Training _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Intell. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Laboratory _____	



- 1 - Director's Office
- Attn: Congressional Affairs Unit
- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Electronic Analysis Unit
- 1 -

Witzel
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Witzel

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3 APR 9 1981

Witzel

33 MAY 29 1981

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *Witzel*

Date 4/8/81

From : *R. W. Witzel*

Subject : *COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS*

Security Survey

On April 2, 1981, personnel from the Electronic Analysis Unit conducted a countermeasures sweep at the House of Representatives, Room H310. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum scan, an electronic check of the telephones and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of tampering with the telephones or the installation of a clandestine listening device was found.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Serv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Plan. & Insp. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. <i>Witzel</i>
	Laboratory _____	Training _____
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

- 1 - Director's Office
- Attn: Congressional Affairs Unit
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Electronic Analysis Unit

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APR 9 1981

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FBI/DOJ

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ROUTINE

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

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FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

BT

UNCLAS

COUNTERMEASURES TRAINING

REFERENCE BULET TO CHICAGO DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1979, AND BUTELCALL TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE MAY 15, 1981, AND MAY 18 1981.

CHICAGO'S SA [REDACTED] AND WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED] HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED TO ATTEND THE INTER-
AGENCY TRAINING CENTER (ITC), SILESTIA, MARYLAND, FOR THE
TECHNICAL SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) AGENTS COURSE FROM
JUNE 15, 1981, TO JULY 24, 1981.

SAS [] AND [] SHOULD COMPLETE AND SUBMIT TO

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1 - ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION

ATTN:

1 - MR. BAYSE
1 - MR. WITZEL

1. $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}$

7 MAY 26 1981

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

1505Z SB
MAY 24 1991

61 JUN 09 '81

POST OFFICE BOX 1000, CHICAGO, ILL.

2

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0042 UNCLAS

FBIHQ TRAINING FORM (OPTIONAL FORM 170) IMMEDIATELY.

ABOVE AGENTS SHOULD REPORT TO THE ITC BY 9:00 A.M. ON THE
FIRST DAY OF TRAINING AND HAVE APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION.

THERE ARE NO FACILITIES FOR SUBSISTENCE OR LIVING QUARTERS
AT THE ITC. DUE TO THE ITC'S LOCATION AND LACK OF ANY PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM THE ITC, AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORTATION
WILL BE REQUIRED.

ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING ABOVE, CALL SA [REDACTED]
EXTENSION 2700, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, FBIHQ.

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b7C

BT

1

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/leg

NOTE: THE ABOVE TRAINING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER THAT ADDITIONAL COUNTERMEASURES TRAINED AGENTS WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE FIELD TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT COUNTERMEASURES WORK.

THERE IS NO TUITION INVOLVED AND THE TOTAL COST OF TRAVEL, PER DIEM AND CAR RENTAL IS ESTIMATED AT \$4,000 FOR CHICAGO'S SA [REDACTED] AND APPROXIMATELY \$500 TRANSPORTATION FOR WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE'S SA [REDACTED] SHOULD HE BE REQUIRED TO USE HIS POA.

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Memorandum

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *WJS*

Date 6/3/81

From : Mr. Bayse *WJS*

SECURITY SURVEYS

Subject: ~~X~~ COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA [redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit.

b6
b7C

WJS
PURPOSE: To report the results of a microphone and telephone countermeasures sweep of Senator Denton's Office, Room 5327, Dirksen Building, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: On May 21, 1981, personnel of Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a microphone and telephone countermeasures sweep of Room 5327, Dirksen Building. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

The above sweep was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted] Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Tech. Servs. *WJS*
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Training _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

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- WJS*
1 - Mr. Young
Attn: [redacted]
1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - [redacted]

ET:cmd
(5)

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W-17

62-97308-996

JUN 4 1981

5-JEN

55 JUN 30 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - [REDACTED]

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Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division (DOJ)

6/3/81

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEYS

Reference is made to your letter of May 6, 1981, requesting an audio countermeasures security survey. (U)

On May 20, 1981, in response to your request, FBI personnel conducted a countermeasures security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 and the Judges' Chambers, Room 6725 of the Main Justice Building. The security survey consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone lines and a physical search. No evidence of clandestine listening devices or tampering with the telephone lines was found. (C)

During the survey three telephones in the room next to the Special Security Center were checked. Examination of these telephones determined that two telephones were Western Electric 2500 instruments utilizing 270B Automatic Disconnects. The purpose of the 270B Automatic Disconnect is to disconnect the telephone instrument from the line when the telephone is on hook. The same two instruments were also noted to have G-5 Handsets installed which have a push-to-talk button on the handset to disconnect the handset microphone when the button is released. The G-5 Handset does not, however, provide security to the telephone in that audio is passed by the telephone earpiece when in the off-hook position even when the push-to-talk button is released. The appropriate handset to utilize when the 270B Automatic Disconnect is used is the G-10F handset if telephone security is a consideration. It was further observed that the third telephone was a Western Electric 565 instrument which was located approximately 3 feet from the above described protected telephones. The 565 instrument had no protective devices installed which tends to negate the effectiveness of the protective devices installed on the other two instruments. This matter is being brought to your attention for your consideration in evaluating the security requirements of that room. (C)

ENCLOSURE

62-17308-997 JUN 4 1981

NOTE: The above security survey was conducted by SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The above information was provided orally to [REDACTED] Justice Security Programs Staff, during the countermeasures security survey. (C)

Exec AD Inv. _____
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II,
1.2.4.2 (2)
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
June 3, 2001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

61 JUL 08 '81

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

*Hager and
Kittling*

Subject

Security Survey of Special Security Center

Date

May 6, 1981

To

William A. Bayse,
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From
D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

Witzel

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 and the Judge's Chambers, Room 6725 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

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5/12/81

[redacted]

Schedule 5/21/81 Am

62-97308-997

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Hager
1 - Electronic Analysis Unit
1 - [REDACTED]

~~STANDARD CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 5, 1981

b6
b7C

Honorable Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

SECURITY MATTERS

Dear Senator Denton:

In response to [REDACTED] telephonic request
on April 29, 1981, personnel of my staff conducted an electronic
sweep of your apartment at [REDACTED]

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The sweep, conducted on April 23, 1981, consisted of
a nondestructive physical check, a thorough physical and electronic
check of all the telephones in the apartment, as well as a scan
of the radio frequency spectrum. No evidence of tampering with
the telephones or the installation of a clandestine listening
device was found.

As you are aware Senator, an audio countermeasures
sweep conducted in a place that is not physically secure
has no lasting effect. The sweep is only good for the duration
of the audio countermeasures teams' presence and ceases to be
valid upon their departure.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

100-17508-998
MAY 7 1981

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NOTE: Above audio countermeasures sweep was conducted by
SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Serv. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

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Training _____

Off. of Cong.
& Public Affs. _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

61 JUL 15 '81

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Exec AD Inv. _____
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Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/CM*

Date: 5/5/81

From : R. W. Witzel

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Reference Cleveland teletype dated April 28, 1981.

PURPOSE: To request authority for ET [redacted] to travel to Youngstown, Ohio, via POA.

DETAILS: The Cleveland Division has received independent information from two highly reliable sources that the Youngstown Resident Agency (RA) telephone communications are being intercepted by Youngstown's organized criminal elements.

The Cleveland Division has requested that Technical Services Division furnish personnel and equipment to conduct an audio countermeasures sweep and a thorough physical check of the Youngstown RA. A total of about three days will be required for this trip.

Estimated cost for [redacted] to travel to Youngstown, Ohio, via POA is \$140.00 transportation and \$150.00 per diem, total cost approximately \$290.00. Air fare to Youngstown, Ohio \$176.00 roundtrip which is more than via POA.

RECOMMENDATION: 1. That [redacted] be authorized to travel to Youngstown, Ohio, via POA to support the Cleveland Division in their request.

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WAB/CM*
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

2. That if #1 is approved, the attached teletype be sent.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Hager
- 1 - Mr. Killian
- 1 - [redacted]

RET:amd
(6)

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WAB/CM*
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

DE-84

17 JUN 5 1981

33 AUG 03 1981

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



b6
b7C

Subject

~~INTERNAL SECURITY~~
Security Survey of Special Security Center

Date

May 6, 1981

To

ph
~~INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM~~
William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

SECURITY SURVEYS

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 and the Judge's Chambers, Room 6725 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

5/12/81



Schedule 5/21/81 AM

(Signature)

completed 5/20/81



62-97308-999

FILE

7 JUN 2 1981

DE
61 JUL 27 1981

(Signature)

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Subject

Security Survey of Security Programs Staff
Offices

Date

June 4, 1981

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Security Programs Staff offices in Room 6525 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

called
on 6/8/81
9:00
6/11/81
Survey on ↑
(13)

62-97308-999X

JUL 14 1981

ENGINEERING

Rubino

730
6.1 AUG 31 '81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1000

CHANGED TO

80-805-110X

MAY 3 1984

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag

62-97308-1001
CHANGED TO
80-805-140X

MAY 3 1984

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Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *go/n*

Date 8/5/81

From : W. A. Bayse *WAB*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS Security OF Telephone Service

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA [redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of Congressman Stephen Solarz's office, Room 1536, Longworth Building, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: On July 29, 1981, personnel of the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, and of the Washington Field Office (WFO) conducted a microphone and telephone countermeasures sweep of Congressman Solarz's office. The sweep consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of the telephone and a nondestructive physical check.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephone was detected at the time of the sweep.

The above sweep was conducted by [redacted] SA [redacted] of the Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit, and by WFO SA [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. *go/n*
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WAB*
Training _____

- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Young
- Attn: [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

7 AUG 7 1981

b6
b7C

55 AUG 18 1981

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1003
CHANGED TO
80-805-148X1

MAY 3 1984

ds

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - b6
b7C

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

7/8/81

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
SECURITY SURVEY.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Reference is made to your memorandum of June 4, 1981,
requesting a security survey of the security programs staff
offices in Room 6525 of the Main Justice Building.


On June 9, 1981, employees of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation conducted a countermeasures sweep of Room 6525 of
the Main Justice Building. The sweep included a radio frequency
spectrum check, a check of all telephones, telephone lines, and
a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering
with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

NOTE: The above sweep was conducted by
and Engineering Section, Electronic
Analysis Unit.

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BT and
(6)



APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
	Intell. _____	Training _____
		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

(10)

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
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Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

61 AUG 31 '81

62-97308-1004

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 -

July 8, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William H. Randolph
Director
Office of Investigations
and Security
United States Department
of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230

SECURITY SURVEY

Dear Mr. Randolph:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 3, 1981, requesting an electronic countermeasures sweep of the Secretary of Commerce office, rooms 5038 through 5056 in the Main Commerce Building.


On June 16, 1981, personnel of the FBI's Technical Services Division conducted an electronic sweep of the office of the Secretary of Commerce as requested.

The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephones, telephone lines, and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of clandestine listening devices or tampering with the telephones or telephone lines was found.

Sincerely yours,

CS
William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

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b7C



NOTE: The above sweep was conducted by and

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

ET:dmd
(6)

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

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MAIL ROOM ☒

730
55 SEP 2 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *ep/ku*

Date 8/11/81

From : W. A. Bayse *wab/ku*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Survey

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA [redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit. [redacted]

PURPOSE: To report the results of a microphone and telephone countermeasures sweep of Senator Denton's Office, Room 5327, Dirksen Building, Washington, D. C.

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b7C

DETAILS: On July 28, 1981, personnel of Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a microphone and telephone countermeasures sweep of Room 5327, Dirksen Building. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

The above sweep was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted] Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

b6
b7C

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *wab/ku*
Training _____

- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Young
- Attn: [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - [redacted]

DEM:amd
(6)

DE-84-2-97308-1005

V-85

23 AUG 14 1981

730
61 SEP 2 1981

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Revell *DDR/1251*

Date 7/24/81

From : Mr. Bayse *WAB/KW*

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

SECURITY SURVEY

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of the Attorney General's (AG's), Suite #810, Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: At the request of the Administrative Services Division, personnel of the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a countermeasures sweep of the AG's Suite #810, Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D. C., on July 6, 1981. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

The above sweep was conducted by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: *WAB*
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. *DDR/1251*
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WAB/KW*
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

- 1 - Mr. Revell
- Attn: Mr. Graves
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killian
- 1 - [redacted]

DEM:amd
(6)

b6
b7C

DE-84

V-85

AUG 12 1981

97 SEP 30 1981

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Plan. & Insp. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Tech. Servs. _____
 Training _____
 Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Young

Date 9/2/81

From : W. A. Bayse

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 04-12-2011

Security Survey

PURPOSE: To propose the establishment of guidelines for countermeasures surveys requested by the Congressional Affairs Unit (CAU) to be conducted in offices on Capitol Hill. ~~(C)~~

DETAILS: The Technical Services Division (TSD), Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit (EAU), has been requested on a regular basis by the CAU to conduct countermeasures sweeps at offices of Senators, Congressmen, and at both House and Senate hearing rooms. The sweeps are conducted prior to a scheduled closed hearing or a briefing given by the Director or any other Bureau official. ~~(C)~~

Countermeasures sweeps conducted by TSD, EAU, personnel consist of a scan of the radio frequency spectrum, a check of the telephones in the office, a check of the telephone lines, and a nondestructive physical search. The radio frequency spectrum checks take approximately two hours to conduct. The check of the telephones and telephone lines will consist of disassembling telephones to check for any modifications made on the telephones which would allow audio information to leave the room or office. The telephone lines are checked to insure that no audio is present when the telephone is not being used and to check for microphones on the lines. In doing the nondestructive physical search, all walls, ceilings, and floors are checked for any evidence that might indicate the presence of a clandestine listening device. Wall mounted items, including mirrors, picture frames, and plaques are checked visually and electronically for a transmitting device or microphones. The furniture in the room or office is checked in the same manner. ~~(C)~~

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1440
 REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II,
 1.2.4.2 ()
 DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
 September 3, 2001

DE-81

62-97302-10678

- 1 - Mr. Young
- Attn: Congressional Affairs Unit
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel b6
- 1 - Mr. Killion b7C
- 1 - [Redacted Box]

2 NOV 16 1982

(CONTINUED - OVER)

BT:dmd
 (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76 NOV 24 1982

FBI/DOJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. Young
RE: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

(U) The length of time it takes to conduct a countermeasures sweep depends largely on the size of the space to be checked and the number of personnel conducting the sweep. No less than two hours should be budgeted for a thorough check of the space. (C)

(U) Even if there is no evidence of electronic eavesdropping at the time of the countermeasures sweep, it does not preclude the possibility of electronic eavesdropping in the future. (C)

(U) The EAU countermeasures team will carry with them about four pieces of equipment; most of it will be in Samsonite attache cases and in Halliburton cases. (C)

(U) TSD personnel have in the past experienced being questioned regarding their presence in offices and/or hearing rooms and also regarding equipment being used in conducting countermeasures sweeps. This, of course, is disadvantageous to the countermeasures sweep team as it would alert the adversary should the room or office be compromised in any manner. This would also make it harder to find transmitting devices, since some can be switched off remotely. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: 1. It is being recommended that upon receipt of a request for a countermeasures sweep to be conducted at Capitol Hill offices or hearing rooms, the CAU discreetly advise appropriate personnel at the place where the sweep is to be conducted of the following:

A. The number and names of TSD personnel conducting the sweep (names will be provided to CAU by TSD's EAU).

B. That TSD personnel will have with them about four pieces of electronic equipment.

C. Request that no questions be asked of the countermeasures sweep team regarding the team's presence, the equipment, or its function until after the conclusion of the sweep.

D. That telephones in the hearing rooms and/or offices to be checked will be disassembled and inspected. Telephone lines will be checked also.

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. _____

Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E. That a nondestructive physical search will be conducted of the space and that unavoidably some disruption of the office routine will occur but to the extent possible the office should carry on with normal business so as not to unduly indicate the presence of the sweep team.

F. The fact that no evidence of electronic eavesdropping is detected at the time of the countermeasures sweep does not preclude the possibility of electronic eavesdropping in the future.

(U) G. That at the conclusion of the sweep, an effort will be made to answer questions they might have pertaining to the countermeasures sweep. ~~(C)~~

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/11/81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

FM DIRECTOR FBI (80-805)

TO ADIC NEW YORK PRIORITY

ATTN: SUPERVISOR

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

SECURITY SURVEYS

COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

REFERENCE BUTELCALL SEPTEMBER 9, 1981. (U)

THE TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION (TSD) HAS RECEIVED FROM THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC) WASHINGTON, D.C. REQUESTS FOR COUNTERMEASURES (CM) SWEEPS TO BE CONDUCTED IN NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK AT TWO SEPARATE LOCATIONS. ONE IS AT ROOM 3720, FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, 26 FEDERAL PLAZA AND THE OTHER AT ROOM 42, HANGER NUMBER 11, JFK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ~~EC~~

MR. WILLIAM CARNEY, OFFICIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, NEW YORK AREA, TELEPHONE NUMBER 264-1365 IS TO BE DISCRETELY CONTACTED REGARDING THE CM SWEEPS.

- 1 - MR. O'MALLEY
1 - MR. BAYSE
1 - MR. WITZEL
1 - [REDACTED]

ET:DMK (5)

9/11/81

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62-97308-1008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

150520L

SEP 14 1981
SEP 14 1981

21 SEP 21 1981

61 OCT 14 '81

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0009 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(U)

NEW YORK IS REQUESTED TO CONDUCT ABOVE CM SWEEPS AT THE
EARLIEST TIME POSSIBLE AND ADVISE TSD OF OUTCOME OF THE SWEEPS.

~~ECF~~

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 1445; REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2. 4.2 (2 & 3); DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICA-
TION SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

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DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE THROUGH DIVISION 5, LIAISON
UNIT HAS REQUESTED THAT COUNTERMEASURES SUEEPS BE CONDUCTED AT
THEIR HEADQUARTERS AND AT TWO OF THEIR LOCATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY.
NEW YORK HAS BEEN ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY OF THE REQUESTS.
DISCUSSIONS IN THE OFFICES TO BE SWEPT CONCERNS NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(U) BY NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD (NFIB) AGENCIES. ~~DCI~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- E -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley

Date 9/18/81

From : W. A. Bayse

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEYS

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA [redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of Congressman Bill McCollum's Office, Room 1313, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D. C. b6 b7C

DETAILS: On September 9, 1981, personnel of the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a countermeasures sweep of Room 1313, Longworth House Office Building. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephones and a nondestructive physical check.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

The above sweep was conducted by [redacted] and SA [redacted] Engineering Section, Electronic Analysis Unit. (P)

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. WAB
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

1 - Mr. O'Malley
1 - Mr. Young

Attn: [redacted]

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Killion
1 - [redacted]

WAB
(7)

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62-97308-1009

10 SEP 28 1981

ENGINEERING

730
79 OCT 26 1981

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc Eaw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1010
CHANGED TO
80-805-175X

MAY 3 1984

ds

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Killion
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

10/1
9/25/81

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division
William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division
COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Reference is made to your memorandum dated August 6, 1981,
requesting a microphone and telephone security survey

On September 23, 1981, in response to your request, FBI
personnel and [redacted] of your office, conducted a
countermeasures security survey at the requested location. The
security survey consisted of a radio frequency check, a check
of the telephones, telephone lines and a nondestructive physical
search.

No evidence of any tampering with the telephones,
telephone lines or of electronic eavesdropping was detected at the
time of the sweep.

NOTE: The above sweep was conducted at the residence of the
Deputy Attorney General, [redacted] Northwest
by [redacted] and SA [redacted]
from the Department of Justice, Security Programs Staff, was present.

b6
b7C

ET:amd
(7)

62-97308-1011X

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. _____	Tech. Servs. _____
		Training _____

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

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DE NY 026

R 302100ZSEP 8

FM NEW YORK (SO-1)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY SURVEYS

COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

REBUTELTYPE TO NEW YORK, DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1981 AND
BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1981.

THE TWO (2) LOCATIONS NOTED IN RE TELETYPE WERE SWEEPED,
AND FOUND TO BE FREE, AT THE TIME, OF ANY EAVESDROPPING
DEVICES.

62-97308-1011X1

ROOM 3720, 26 FEDERAL PLAZA, MANHATTAN, NEW YORK, WAS
SWEEPED ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1981 WHILE ROOM 42, HANGER 11 WAS
SWEEPED ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1981.

A DETAILED REPORT CONCERNING THE SWEEPS WILL FOLLOW.

~~C & E BY 8520, REASONS 2 & 3, DRD SEPTEMBER 30, 2001.~~

BT

#

*let sent
10/21/81
ET: dmd*

Televised

b6
b7C

33 MAR 10 1982

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *[Signature]*

Date 10/21/81

From : Mr. Bayse *[Signature]*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Survey

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA Larry Rissler, Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of room 2200, Sam Rayburn Building, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: On October 6, 1981, personnel of the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a countermeasures sweep of room 2200, Sam Rayburn Building. The sweep consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of the telephone and a nondestructive physical check.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

Above sweep was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

b6
b7C

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
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Exec. AD-LES _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

- 1 - Director's Office
- Attn: Congressional Affairs Unit
- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion

b6
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FET:cmd
(7)

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ENGINEERING

FIVE

FBI/DOJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1012X
CHANGED TO
80-805-176X1

MAY 3 1984

ds

1 - Mr. O'Malley
Attn: [REDACTED]
1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Killion
1 - [REDACTED]

October 21, 1981 b6
b7C

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. William H. Randolph
Director
Office of Investigations and Security
United States Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230

Dear Mr. Randolph:

SECURITY SWEEPS

Reference is made to your letter dated August 24, 1981.

In response to your request, on September 9, 1981, FBI personnel of the Technical Services Division conducted a countermeasures sweep of rooms 2631, 2635, and 2639 in the Main Commerce Building, 14th and Constitution Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

FBI personnel from the New York Division conducted a countermeasures sweep in room 3720, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York and room 42, Hanger 11, J.F.K. International Airport, Jamaica, New York, on September 22 and 29, 1981, respectively.

Each countermeasures sweep consisted of a check of the radio frequency spectrum, a check of the telephones and telephone lines and a nondestructive physical check of the areas inspected.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Dayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

Exec AD Inv. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

NOTE: The sweep at the Main Commerce Building was conducted by [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Engineering Section, and

WFO SA [REDACTED]

The New York sweep was conducted by SAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec AD-Adm. _____

Exec AD-Inv. _____

Exec AD-LES _____

Adm Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

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Memorandum

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag



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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. 920
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Otto

Date 12/9/81

From : W. A. Bayse *WAB/ro*

Subject : *Security Survey*
COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Reference is made to the telephone call of Unit Chief [redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit, on December 7, 1981.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of Room S116, Capitol Building, Washington, D.C.

DETAILS: On December 7, 1981, SA [redacted] of the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a countermeasures sweep of Room S116, Capitol Building. The sweep consisted of a cursory physical check and a contemporaneous monitoring of the frequency spectrum. The monitoring was conducted from 4:10 p.m. until the termination of the briefing at 5:50 p.m.

Due to the limited amount of notice to conduct the countermeasures sweep, the telephones in Room S116 were not checked.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping was detected at the time of the sweep.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

Sum/ur
1 - Director's Office

(Attention: [redacted])

1 - Mr. Otto

1 - Mr. Monroe

(Attention: [redacted])

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Killian

1 - [redacted]

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

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62-97308-1013

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74 JAN 25 1982

FBI/DOJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1014
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Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Public Affs. _____
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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *BS*

Date 11/25/81

From : Mr. Bayse *WAB/CO*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEYS

Reference is made to the telephone call of SA [redacted]
[redacted] Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit, on
November 13, 1981.

b6
b7C

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep of room
B-360, Sam Rayburn Building, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: On November 23, 1981, personnel of the Technical Services
Division, Engineering Section, conducted a countermeasures
sweep of room B-360, Sam Rayburn Building. The sweep consisted of
a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of the telephone, telephone
lines and a nondestructive physical check.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with
the telephone was detected at the time of the sweep.

The countermeasures sweep was conducted by ET [redacted]
and SA [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *WAB/CO*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

1 - Director's Office
Attn: Congressional Affairs Unit

1 - Mr. O'Malley

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Killion

1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

ET: [redacted]
(7)

62-97308-1014X

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FBI/DOJ

Memorandum

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT



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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Subject

Date

Security Surveys

December 29, 1981

SECURITY OF Telephone Services

To

From

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

for *Donald [Signature]*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Offices of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Division, in Rooms 2107 and 2113 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

*Talked to [redacted]
1/6/82
Sweep to be done 1/18/82
Done - 1/19/82
AJ-ET*

OK

V. Saffers
[Signature]
[Signature]

b6
b7C

62-97308-1014X1

7 FEB 1 1982

61 APR 8'82

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Killion
1 -

December 15, 1981

Mr. James R. Richards
Inspector General
Department of Energy
Room 5A-228
1000 Independence Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20580

Attention: Mr. Richard Shaw

Dear Mr. Richards:

Reference is made to the telephone call of Special Agent to Mr. Richard Shaw of your office on December 2, 1981.

In response to a request by the Assistant United States Attorney, Yakima, Washington, on November 9 and 10, 1981, personnel of the FBI's Technical Services Division, conducted a countermeasures sweep of the office space of Resident Investigators Robert D. McCutcheon and Donald G. Farmer, located in the Federal Building, Richland, Washington. The countermeasures sweep consisted of a check of the radio frequency spectrum, a check of the telephones, telephone lines, all telephone line appearances within the Federal Building and a nondestructive physical check. During the nondestructive physical check, all ceiling tiles around the perimeter of the office space were lifted in search of microphones or other listening devices and all power line junction boxes were examined.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was noted at the time of the sweep.

Investigator Farmer of your Richland Office was verbally notified of the outcome of the countermeasures sweep.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Exec AD Inv. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____ MAIL ROOM ☒

72 APR 21 1982

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
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Off. of Cong. & Public Affairs _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

Mr. James R. Richards

NOTE: The countermeasures sweep was conducted by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: January 21, 1982

To: Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

TY OF Telephone Services

(U) Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 29, 1981, requesting a security survey of the Offices of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, rooms 2107 and 2113 of the main Justice Building. (C)

(U) On January 18, 1982, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a countermeasures sweep of rooms 2107 and 2113 of the main Justice Building. The sweep included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all the telephones, telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search. (C)

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the sweep. (U)

[Redacted] of your office assisted in the countermeasures sweep. (U)

Classified and Extended by 8, b6
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, b7C
1-2.4.2 (2 & 3), Date of Review
for Declassification
January 21, 2002.

67-97305-1015X

FEB 1 1982

1 - Mr. Bayse
Attn: Mr. Witzel
Attn: Mr. Killion

NOTE: The above sweep was conducted by [Redacted] and SA [Redacted]

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Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

APPROVED: _____

Director _____

Exec AD-Adm. _____

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Exec AD-LES _____

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Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. _____

Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____ FBI/DOJ

Memorandum

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DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse

Date 1/15/82

From : R. W. Witzel

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Envoys

Reference Louisville Teletype dated December 23, 1981.

PURPOSE: To request authorization for [redacted] to travel to the Louisville Division to conduct countermeasures sweeps and provide countermeasures training to Louisville technically-trained agents.

DETAILS: The Louisville Division has requested that the Technical Services Division (TSD), Engineering Section (ES), provide personnel and equipment to conduct countermeasures sweeps in the Louisville Division. The Louisville Special Agent in Charge (SAC) has received requests from two (2) newly appointed United States Attorneys for countermeasures sweeps of their respective offices located in Louisville and in Lexington, Kentucky.

The Louisville Division also requested that countermeasures sweeps be conducted of the office space in a commercial building in Lexington which is occupied jointly with the IRS and Departmental Attorneys investigating political corruption. The Louisville Division does not have the trained personnel or the equipment to conduct an appropriate countermeasures sweep.

SA [redacted] Chicago Division should be available to assist [redacted] FBIHQ in support of Louisville's request..

It is anticipated that a five (5) day trip will be required to support this request. The approximate cost to be incurred for above trip to the Louisville Division is \$252.00 for transportation and \$250.00 per diem, totaling \$502.00.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
Att: Mr. Witzel
Att: Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

ET:bee
(3)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

74 FEB 12 1982

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum to Mr. Bayse from R. W. Witzel
Re: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) That [REDACTED] be authorized to travel to Louisville, Kentucky, in support of Louisville's request for FBIHQ technical assistance and equipment.

b6
b7C

APPROVED: _____ Laboratory _____
 _____ Legal Coun. _____
 Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Exec. AD _____ Res. Mgmt. _____
 _____ Tech. Servs. Wang/cm
 _____ Training _____

2) That the attached teletype be sent.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *WMB*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

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Memorandum

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

*Included by
W. J. [unclear] → [unclear]*

Subject

Security Survey of Special Security Center

Date

February 18, 1982

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: *D. Jerry Rubino*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security surveys of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

*3/2/82
called B & 8:30 AM
no answer
Arrive to be
on 3/2/82
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done 3/3/82
ET-al*

*OK
CMB*

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62-97308-1017X

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Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Security of Telephone Services

Subject

Date

~~Security Survey of Judge's Chambers~~

February 4, 1982

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division, FBI

From *D. Jerry Rubino*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer's Chambers in Room 2309 of the U.S. District Court-house at 3rd and Constitution Avenue, N.W. in Washington, D.C.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Programs Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

*2/17/82
called Bob
meeting 2:45
He will call
later re - [unclear]
EP
2/17/82*

*423
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DE-82

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MAR 12 1982

76 MAR 1 1983

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. Bayse *W.B.M.*

Date 3/8/82 *14*

From : R. W. Witzel *R.W.W.*

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-12-2011

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Survey

REFERENCE: Norfolk airtel dated February 10, 1982. (U)

PURPOSE: To request authorization for [redacted] and SA [redacted] to travel to Williamsburg, Virginia, to conduct a countermeasures sweep and a contemporaneous monitoring of the SAC's Annual Conference. (U) *b6 b7C*

DETAILS: The Norfolk Division has requested that Technical Services Division personnel provide technical assistance in conducting a countermeasures sweep during the SAC's Annual Conference at Williamsburg, Virginia. The Norfolk Division does not have the technical equipment or trained personnel to conduct the countermeasures sweep and to do a contemporaneous monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum during the conference. The duration of the conference is from noon Sunday, March 14, through noon Wednesday, March 17, 1982. [redacted] and SA [redacted] will leave Williamsburg in the morning of March 17, 1982. (U) *b6 b7C*

The estimated cost for this trip is \$320.00 per diem and \$100.00 for transportation for both persons; totaling \$420.00. (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the trip to Williamsburg, Virginia, be authorized for [redacted] and SA [redacted] (U)

Enclosure *b6 b7C*

- 1 - Mr. Colwell (Attention: [redacted])
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

ET:pjf
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *W.B.M.*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

Classified and Extended by 8
Reason for Extension FCIM, II
1.2 4.2 (2 & 3) *62-97308-1019*
Date of Review for Declassification
March 8, 2002

21 APR 1982

CONTINUED OVER

72 730
APR 13 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. Bayse
RE: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

2. If Recommendation Number One is approved,
that the attached letter be sent. (U)

APPROVED:	/	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
		Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____			Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____		Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____		Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. <u>Woot</u>
Exec. AD-LES _____		Intell. _____	Training _____

*enclosure
detached &
sent to Norfolk
JH*

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: March 25, 1982

To: George G. Kundahl
Executive Director
Securities and Exchange Commission
500 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20549

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Reference is made to your letter dated February 25, 1982, requesting a technical survey of the offices of Chairman John Shad and four commissioners.

On March 4, 1982, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a countermeasures survey of Chairman Shad's office, the offices of the four commissioners and the office of the Director of Enforcement. The survey included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephones, telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was detected at the time of the survey. However, it was noted that the sliding glass doors on the Commission Meeting Room could not be locked. The technical and physical security of the Commission Meeting Room would be improved by locking the sliding glass doors to prevent access by unauthorized personnel. It is suggested that a bar be used to secure the doors.

NOTE: The above survey was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Director _____
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MAILED 16
MAR 25 1982
FBI

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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec. _____

TAES:pjf

(17) Pjx

WAB

WAB/CO

61 APR 14 82

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

March 25, 1982

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Reference is made to your memorandum dated February 18, 1982, requesting a microphone and telephone security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 of the Main Justice Building.

In response to your request, on March 3, 1982, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 of the Main Justice Building. The security survey consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a nondestructive physical check and a check of the telephone located in the secured room adjacent to the Special Security Room.


The security survey did not reveal any evidence of electronic eavesdropping or of tampering with the telephone.

NOTE: Above sweep was conducted by [redacted]
and SA [redacted] Engineering Section.

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

b6
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Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____



61 APR 15 '82
MAIL ROOM

MAR 23 1982

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *gjn*

Date 3/30/82

From : Mr. Bayse *WAB/TW*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEYS

REFERENCE: Telephone call of SA [redacted]
Director's Office, Congressional Affairs
Unit, on February 9, 1982.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures survey
of Room 357, Russell Building, Washington, D.C.

DETAILS: On February 11, 1982, personnel of the Technical
Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted
a countermeasures survey of Room 357, Russell Building,
Washington, D.C. The survey consisted of a nondestructive
physical search, a check of the telephones, telephone lines
and a radio frequency spectrum check.

No evidence of any eavesdropping was detected at
the time of the survey.

Above survey was conducted by [redacted]
and [redacted] both Electronic Analysis Unit.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Insp. _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. _____

Public Affs. _____

Tech. Servs. *WAB/TW*

Training _____

- 1 - Director's Office
Attention: Congressional Affairs Unit
- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [redacted]

gjn
pjf

(7) *pdb*

62-17308-1023
APR 6 1982

b6
b7C

730
72 APR 21 1982

B.S.

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

3 MAR 82 05 51 z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
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Tech. Servs.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Training	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

KX0001 0601448Z

RR HQ

DE KX

R 011448Z MAR 82

FM KNOXVILLE (66-752) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

SECURITY SURVEYS

ATTENTION: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

TECHNICAL MATTERS; COUNTERMEASURES

U. S. ATTORNEY [REDACTED] EASTERN DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE, (A FORMER FBI SPECIAL AGENT) HAS RECENTLY
TAKEN OFFICE AND IS AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING SEVERAL SENSITIVE
INVESTIGATIONS WITH THIS OFFICE. AS A RESULT OF THESE SENSITIVE
INVESTIGATIONS, USA [REDACTED] HAS REQUESTED THE FBI TO CONDUCT A
SURVEY OF HIS OFFICE AND TELEPHONE LINES TO DETERMINE IF ANY
LISTENING DEVICES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN HIS OFFICE.

b6
b7C

KNOXVILLE CONCURS IN THIS REQUEST BUT DOES NOT HAVE TRAINED
PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT TO CONDUCT THE SURVEY.

b6
b7C

10-2

FOUR
ELSUB-INDEX

PROG. 2-10

71 APR 22 1982

Handwritten notes:
Killion has talked at [REDACTED] Knoxville. They want some info. about [REDACTED] are coming here for other reasons, and we've got them at [REDACTED] in Knoxville. Act 1 scene 1

PAGE TWO KX 66-752 UNCLAS E F T O

IT IS REQUESTED THAT FBIHQ CONDUCT THE COUNTERMEASURE
SURVEY AT THE EARLIEST TIME.

BT

079

B.S.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

1 2

3/8/82

UNCLAS

ROUTINE

*F079TMR KXDE HQ HCO79 #HBYUOR 002137Z MAR 82

FM DIRECTOR FBI (80-805)

TO FBI KNOXVILLE (66-752) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

SECURITY SURVEYS

COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

REFERENCE KNOXVILLE TELETYPE DATED MARCH 1, 1982, AND
BUTELCALLS MARCH 3 AND 4, 1982.

REFERENCED TELEPHONE CALL OF MARCH 3, 1982, KNOXVILLE,
SA [REDACTED] ADVISED HE AND SA [REDACTED] ARE TO
TRAVEL TO FBI ACADEMY, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA, ON MARCH 8, 1982,
FOR TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR WORLDS EXPOSITION. IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THIS TRAINING, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
WILL PROVIDE BASIC COUNTERMEASURES TRAINING TO BOTH SAS, WHICH
WILL PREPARE THEM TO CONDUCT A COUNTERMEASURES SWEEP OF THE
OFFICE SPACE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, [REDACTED]
FBIHQ WILL PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT
TO KNOXVILLE ON A TEMPORARY BASIS.

b6
b7C

was for

EP/PJF (7)

3/8/82

62-97308-
18053/8 2700

- 1 - MR. MC KENZIE
- ATTENTION: [REDACTED]
- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - MR. KILLION
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

NOTED

b6
b7C

130 APR 20 1982

Initials on Original

XXX

71 APR 22 1982

ORIGINAL FILED IN 80-805-194

2

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0079 UNCLAS

ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE
DIRECTED TO FBIHQ, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] EXTENSION 2700.

BT

1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE: THE TRAINING OF KNOXVILLE SAS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] HAS
BEEN COORDINATED WITH ENGINEERING SECTION SA [REDACTED]
AND WITH TRAINING DIVISION SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

B.S.



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
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Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Revell *[Signature]*

Date 4/9/82

From : Mr. Bayse *[Signature]*

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

Security Survey

REFERENCE: Telephone call of Deputy Assistant Director
L. C. Groover, Jr., on March 29, 1982.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures survey.

DETAILS: On April 1, 1982, personnel from the Technical
Services Division (TSD), Engineering Section (ES),
conducted a countermeasures (cm) survey of Room 310H, House
of Representatives, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. The cm
survey consisted of a radio frequency search, a check of the
telephones and a nondestructive physical search.

No evidence of electronic eavesdropping or tampering
with the telephones was detected at the time of the survey.

The countermeasures survey was conducted by ET
[redacted] and SA [redacted] both Engineering
Section, Electronic Analysis Unit. *[Signature]*

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

- WR*
- 1 - Mr. Revell
 - Attention: Mr. Groover
 - 1 - Mr. Bayse
 - 1 - Mr. Witzel
 - 1 - Mr. Killian
 - 1 - [redacted]
- b6
b7C

ET:pjf
(6) py

APPROVED: *[Signature]*
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *[Signature]*
Training _____

EE-04

62-97308-1025

15 APR 12 1982

730
84 APR 23 1982

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley

Date 3/17/82

From : Mr. Bayse

Subject : ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

Security Searches

REFERENCE: Telephone call of SA [redacted] on February 18, 1982.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures sweep conducted of the Executive Conference Room, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia.

b6
b7C

DETAILS: On February 23, 1982, [redacted] and SA [redacted] Technical Services Division, conducted a countermeasures sweep of the Executive Conference Room, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. The sweep consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of the telephones and a nondestructive physical search. Also, a contemporaneous monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum was conducted for approximately one and one-half hours after the start of the conference.

No evidence of any tampering with the telephones or any eavesdropping was detected at the time of the sweep.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
Attention: Mr. Hajeski
1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Killion
1 - [redacted]

FT:pjf
(5) POK

b6
b7C

12 MAR 23 1982

61 APR 28 '82

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
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Adm. Servs. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *SM*

Date 4/22/82

From : Mr. Bayse *WB*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

REFERENCE: Telephone call of SA Kevin O'Brien, Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Unit, on April 12, 1982.

PURPOSE: To report the results of a countermeasures (CM) survey of the Labor and Human Resources Hearing Room Number 4232, Dirksen Building, Washington, D.C.

DETAILS: On April 14, 1982, personnel of the Technical Services Division (TSD), Engineering Section (ES), conducted a CM survey and a contemporaneous monitoring of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum of Room 4232, Dirksen Building, Washington, D.C. The cm survey consisted of an RF spectrum check, a check of the telephone and a nondestructive physical search. The contemporaneous monitoring of the RF spectrum was conducted from 10:30 a.m. until 1:45 p.m.

No evidence of any electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephone was noted during the survey. *PC*

The cm survey was conducted by [redacted] and SA [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

- SAK/450*
- 1 - The Director's Office
Attention: Mr. Haynes
 - 1 - Mr. O'Malley
 - 1 - Mr. Bayse
 - 1 - Mr. Witzel
 - 1 - Mr. Killion
 - 1 - [redacted]

720
BT:pjf
(7) *720*

APPROVED:

Quip

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
	Intell. <i>add</i>	Tech. Servs. <i>was to</i>
		Training _____

62-77305-1027

15 APR 22 1982

78 MAY 12 1982

Memorandum

10-27



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

Exec AD Adm. _____
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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. O'Malley *EXP/bs*

Date 4/23/82

From : Mr. Bayse *wab/bs*

Security Surveys

Subject: ~~COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS~~

ECW
REFERENCE: Telephone call of Inspector in Charge, William P. Haynes, Jr., Director's Office, Congressional Affairs Section, on April 21, 1982.

PURPOSE: To report results of a contemporaneous monitoring of Senator Barry Goldwater's Office, Room 337, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

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DETAILS: On April 21, 1982, [redacted] from the Technical Services Division, Engineering Section, conducted a contemporaneous monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum during the conference held at the Office of Senator Barry Goldwater.

No evidence of any electronic eavesdropping was detected during the contemporaneous monitoring.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

SKP

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Insp. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____

- SAB/bs*
Bayse
- 1 - Director's Office
Attention: Mr. Haynes
 - 1 - Mr. O'Malley
 - 1 - Mr. Bayse
 - 1 - Mr. Witzel
 - 1 - Mr. Killian
 - 1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

BT:pjf.
(7) *pjb*

DE-84

62-97308-1028

12 MAY 17 1982

77 JUN 08 1982

FBI/DOJ

June

102

4/6/82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#SERR RUEBHGA423 40102 097 00404YCMR 062252Z APR 82

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO GSA CENTRAL OFFICE, WASHINGTON D.C.

ATTN: [REDACTED]

BT

SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SERVICES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECURE TELEPHONE UNIT-II (STU-II)~~

(U) THIS IS TO CONFIRM AN FBI REQUIREMENT FOR STU-II
INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE. ~~FOI~~

(U) A STU-II CIRCUIT IS BEING ESTABLISHED BETWEEN FBIHQ AND
THE FBI, RESIDENT AGENCY, 816 WALKER STREET, ROOM 210, FEDERAL
BUILDING, AUGUSTA, GEORGIA. ~~FOI~~

b6
b7C

(U) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE TELEPHONE LINES WILL BE
INSTALLED AND STU-II'S ON-SITE PRIOR TO APRIL 12, 1982. ~~FOI~~

(U) FBI CONTACT AT AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, IS SA [REDACTED]
TELEPHONE [REDACTED] OR COMMERCIAL [REDACTED] FBI
CONTACT AT FBIHQ IS [REDACTED] TELEPHONE [REDACTED] ~~FOI~~

WAB/jmc *RRB* *VL* *197*

4/6/82

3730

3888

- 1 - MR. O'MALLEY,
ATTN: MR. PETTUS, RM. 4042
1 - MR. BAYSE, RM. 7159
1 - MR. CARY, OMS FILE IV, 1D
1 - MR. WADE, CE
ATTN: [REDACTED] K, RM. 6421

1 - [REDACTED] SENT DIRECT
1 - [REDACTED] SENT DIRECT

b6
b7C

DE-84

62-97308-1029

SEE NOTE

17 APR 8 1982

77 JUN 22 1982

DO NOT PUT IN FILE OF 100-110511

2

PAGE TWO DE RUEHFB 0102 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~C & E BY B, REASON 2 & 3, REVIEW APRIL 6, 2002.~~

BT

1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE:

GSA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED DUE TO SYSTEMS HARDWARE
MAINTENANCE UNIT MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS. GSA HAS A TRAINED
TECHNICIAN AVAILABLE IN AUGUSTA AND MAINTENANCE KIT
CAPABILITIES. FBI, SAVANNAH WILL BE NOTIFIED BY SEPARATE
COMMUNICATIONS.

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Subject

Security Survey of Criminal Division Office

Date

April 19, 1982

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Service Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division (CRM) has urgent requirements for a microphone and telephone security survey as soon as possible in the Multi-National Fraud Branch located in Room 824 of the Federal Triangle Building. This Branch is investigating an extremely sensitive case in which organized crime and a foreign country is involved. Sensitive information involving the CRM's investigation has been obtained by the potential defendants and interception of CRM phone calls is suspected.

Also, Mr. Richard has requested that telephones in the private homes of three attorneys working on this case be checked.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

Approved
[Signature]

62-97308-1030

JUN 9 1982

EIC

55 JUN 28 1982

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division

6/3/82

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director, FBI
Technical Services Division

COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 19, 1982, requesting an urgent microphone and telephone security check of Room 824, Federal Triangle Building, Washington, D.C., and the residences of five (5) attorneys. (U)

On April 20, 1982, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a microphone, telephone and radio spectrum check of the Multi-National Fraud Branch located in Room 824 at the Federal Triangle Building and the residences of [redacted] and [redacted] Countermeasures surveys were conducted of the residences of the following individuals on the dates indicated: on April 23, 1982, [redacted] on April 26, 1982, [redacted] on April 27, 1982, [redacted]

The countermeasures surveys included a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephones, telephone lines and a non-destructive physical search. No evidence of clandestine listening devices or tampering with the telephone lines was found. (U)

NOTE: The above countermeasures surveys were conducted by [redacted] and SA [redacted]

7 JUN 9 1982

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killian
- 1 - [redacted]

Classified and Extended by 3
Reason For Extension FCIM, II,
1.2 4.2 (2 & 3)

Date of Review For Declassification
June 8, 2002

b6
b7C

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

FBI/DOJ

55 JUN 28 1982

Memorandum

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
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Crim. Inv. _____
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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB*

Date 9/16/82 *141*

From : *[Signature]* Witzel

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Surveys
PURPOSE: To make a record of Countermeasures survey conducted at the Northeast Regional Computer Support Center.

DETAILS: On August 17, 1982, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted an audio countermeasures survey of the Northeast Regional Computer Support Center at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. The sweep included a check of the radio frequency spectrum, a check of all telephones, telephone lines, a check of the 200 pair cable going to the computer center and a check of all 900 pairs coming into the building from the central office. No evidence of eavesdropping devices or tampering with the telephone lines was found. However, it was found that several pairs in the incoming cable from the Telephone Company central office had a high value of capacitance and excessive crosstalk on them. Following the Countermeasures survey SA was orally advised of the results. *[Signature]*

The above survey was conducted by ET and SA

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

[Signature]
ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED *WAB*

Attachment

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Christensen
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 -

AEJ:vas (6)
Ref *vas*

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *WAB/san*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

DE-01 *62-97308-1032*

SEP 21 1982

76 OCT 12 1982

NORTHEASTERN COMPUTER SUPPORT CENTER

ABNORMAL CABLE READINGS

<u>PAIR #</u>	<u>CAPACITANCE</u>	<u>VOLTAGE</u>	
		<u>AC</u>	<u>DC</u>
77T	.25	1.56	
401T	.21		1.56
343T	.0150	.20	1.58
551T	.29	.11	1.59
557	.28	.11	1.46
572	.12	.62	1.59
701	.23	.72	1.50
704	.21	.76	1.50
707	.24	.65	1.53
708	.25	.67	1.47
712T	.30	.42	1.48
691R	.21	.63	1.46
878R	.21	.34	1.46
880T	.30	.46	1.46
886T	.33	.49	1.52
885R	.29	.5	1.48
888T	.36	.48	1.56
891T	.30	.46	1.52
881T	.29	.46	1.50
892T	.29	.50	1.57
 <u>NORMAL</u>			
301T	.07	.32	.02
425T	.01	.35	.023
650T	.01	.31	.013
725T	.006	.28	.010
825T	.04	.30	.012

62-97348-1032
ENCLOSURE

135

1 3

8/30/82

~~SECRET~~ (U)

BS HI

ROUTINE

#F1350RR AFOMDE HQ H0135 #H0135WR 262141Z AUG 82

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 07-28-2011

FM DIRECTOR FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES ROUTINE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALL ~~FBI~~ LEGAL ATTACHES ROUTINE


PERSONAL ATTENTION

BT

~~SECRET~~

FBI VULNERABILITY TO INTERCEPTION OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

Security Surveys



b1

JMM:MPB (193) 8/30/82 4847/5 ... 4713

- 1 - MR. L. COLWELL
- 1 - MR. J. E. OTTO
- 1 - EACH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

DE-ST

62-97308-1033

SEE NOTE PAGE 4

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

170174
AUG 27 1982

10 SEP 16 1982

b6
b7C

76 OCT 6 1982

~~SECRET~~

PERS/REC UNIT

~~SECRET~~

2

CONFIDENTIAL

b1

PAGE TWO DE RUEHFB 0135 ~~SECRET~~

(S)

(S)

RECENTLY SEVERAL ARTICLES, LARGELY ACCURATE, HAVE APPEARED IN THE MEDIA CONCERNING SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO INTERCEPT MICROWAVE COMMUNICATIONS, BY WHICH METHOD ALMOST ALL LONG DISTANCE CALLS, INCLUDING FTS, AND MANY LOCAL CALLS ARE TRANSMITTED. THE FBI CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT PUBLICLY CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF THESE MEDIA STORIES BUT WE CERTAINLY MUST REMIND OUR OWN EMPLOYEES OF WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING.

A DRAMATIC AND ACCURATE VIDEOTAPE "NO PRIVATE LINES" WHICH MIRRORS THE CONTENT OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE

3

CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE THREE DE RUEHFB 0135 ~~SECRET~~

UPON REQUEST FROM THE SECURITY OFFICE, ROOM 5434, J. EDGAR
20 HOOVER {JEH} F.B.I. BUILDING OR THE TRAINING UNIT, INTELLIGENCE
18 DIVISION {INTD}, ROOM 4847, JEH. THIS VIDEO TAPE IS USEFUL IN
PRESENTING PERIODIC BRIEFINGS OF PERSONNEL.

16 THIS COMMUNICATION IS NECESSITATED BY SEVERAL RECENT
EXAMPLES OF INDISCREET TELEPHONE CALLS MADE TO FBIHQ; THEREFORE,
14 CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE
ATTENTION OF ALL PERSONNEL.

12 ~~C BY: 857, REASON: 2 AND 3, DCL: OADR~~

BT

1

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4

~~SECRET~~

NOTE:

EACH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER
MAKING THIS COMMUNICATION AVAILABLE TO APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL
IN HIS DIVISION.

[Handwritten signature]

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lbg

62-97308-1034X
1034X1
1034X2
1035

CHANGED TO

80-805-265X1
265X2
265X3
270X

MAY 3 1984

ds

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



**LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE**

Subject

Security Survey of U.S. Attorney's Office

Date

NOV 16 1982

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

for D. Jerry Rubino
Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the offices of the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. The offices are located on the second floor at 701 Prince Street in Alexandria, Virginia.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

b6
b7C

**LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE**

47 FEB 28 1983

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/29/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION,
SA [redacted])

b6
b7C

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (66-54)

COUNTERMEASURES

Re Alexandria telcal (SA Benningfield) to Bureau
[redacted], 11/29/82.

On 11/22/82, a countermeasures "sweep" was performed
at the office of Assistant United States Attorney [redacted]
[redacted] 701 Prince Street, 2nd floor, Alexandria, Virginia.

2-Bureau
2-Alexandria
JWB:kar
(4)

FEB 2 1983

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Approved: [signature]

Transmitted _____
(Number) (Time)

Per _____

47 FEB 28 1983

Date: January 25, 1983

To: Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division
U. S. Department of Justice

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director FBI
Technical Services Division

Subject: AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Surveys
Reference is made to your letter dated
November 16, 1982, requesting a microphone and telephone
security check of the offices of the Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) for the Eastern District of Virginia,
located at 701 Prince Street in Alexandria.

On November 22, 1982, FBI personnel from the
Alexandria FBI Division conducted an audio countermeasures
survey at the office space of the AUSA for the Eastern
District of Virginia.

The survey, which consisted of a radio frequency
spectrum check, a non-destructive physical search and a
check of the telephone and telephone lines, did not reveal
any evidence of clandestine listening devices or of tampering
with the telephones.

NOTE:

The audio countermeasures survey was conducted by
Alexandria SA Jerry Benningfield.

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 -

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b7C

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

ET:pjf

(7) *pjo*

MAIL ROOM ☒

47 FEB 28 1983

62-97308-1038
2/2

Rum

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FM

DA TP

1740Z MAR 83

FM TAMPA (66-74) (33. 4)

TO DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

1

UNCLAS

ATTENTION: SA

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION b6 b7C

COUNTERMEASURE MATTERS

TAMPA HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE PINELLAS COUNTY STATE
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE TO CONDUCT ~~COUNTERMEASURES~~ SWEEP OF THEIR
OFFICE FACILITY. THEY ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
AND ARE CONCERNED THAT THEIR OFFICE SPACE MAY HAVE BEEN
COMPROMISED. TAMPA IS REQUESTING, THAT IF AVAILABLE, A PO 700
BE FORWARDED TO TAMPA PREFERABLY BY THE WEEK BEGINNING APRIL 4,
1983. TAMPA WILL ALSO UTILIZE THIS EQUIPMENT TO SWEEP THE
TAMPA OFFICE FACILITY.

H

DE-82

23 MAR 23 1983

b6
b7C

61 APR 12 '83

Exec AD	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Ident.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Off. Liaison	
Public Aff.	
Spec. Inv.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 12, 1983

Mr. Michael N. Cassetta
Director
Office of Security
United States Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Mr. Cassetta:

Reference is made to your letter dated January 31, 1983,
requesting a technical surveillance countermeasures survey of
[redacted] office suite.

In response to your request, on March 25, 1983, personnel
from the Technical Services Division, with the help of the Washington
Field Office, conducted a technical survey of [redacted] office
suite.

The technical survey consisted of a check of the radio
frequency spectrum, a check of the telephones in the offices and
a non-destructive physical search.

No evidence of any eavesdropping or tampering with the
telephones was noted during the the technical survey.

Sincerely yours,

Kier T. Boyd
Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

NOTE:

The above technical survey was conducted by [redacted]
and SA [redacted] WFO.

Exec AD Inv. 1 - Mr. Boyd
Exec AD Adm. 1 - Mr. Witzel
Exec AD LES 1 - Mr. Million
Asst. Dir.: 1 - [redacted]
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

ALS:pjf (6)

b6
b7C

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

DE-82

62-111111-1040

99 MAY 26 1983

May 13, 1983

Mr. Richard P. Kusserow
Inspector General
Department of Health and Human Services
Room 5250
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201

U.S. GOVERNMENT

Dear Mr. Kusserow:

SECURITY SURVEYS

Reference is made to your letter dated April 20, 1983, requesting a countermeasures security sweep of the offices of the Department's Secretary, Under Secretary and Chief of Staff.

On May 4, 1983, personnel from the Technical Services Division (TSD) initiated a technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) survey, however, it was aborted after telephone company personnel walked into the offices of the Secretary while the TSCM survey was in progress. The telephone company personnel were advised by the Secretary's staff that the "FBI was checking the telephones" and asked them to conduct their business at a later time.

In view of the above, and of the possibility that an eavesdropping device could have been remotely turned off, which would have made it harder to detect, the TSCM survey was terminated.

The FBI will be glad to arrange for another TSCM survey at the earliest time of mutual agreement.

It is requested that personnel who will be working in the area during the survey be advised to refrain from verbally discussing the TSCM survey either prior to or during the survey and not to remark about the equipment or the work in progress. Any such remarks will clearly alert a possible eavesdropper and will nullify the usefulness of the TSCM survey.

Sincerely yours,

Kier T. Boyd
Acting Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

1 - Mr. Boyd
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Killian
1 - [Redacted]

IT:PIE (6)

MAIL ROOM

b6
b7C

45 JUN 6 1983

FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 9/2/83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ENGINEERING SECTION, [REDACTED] AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES UNIT, SUPERVISOR DAVE WADE) b6 b7C

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (66-4418) (SQUAD 11)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
WEST RESIDENT AGENCY - CHICAGO DIVISION

The entire contents of this airtel are classified
~~Confidential.~~

Re memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge,
captioned "TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
SURVEYS AND POLICY," dated 8/2/83.

On 8/23/83, Technically Trained Agents (TTAs)

[REDACTED] conducted a TSCM sweep of the West Resident Agency (WRA) - Chicago Division. There are eleven rooms in the WRA (see Attachment #1 - Xerox copy of West RA blueprint). The TSCM encompassed a proper radio frequency check, physical and electronic checks of telephones and a comprehensive physical search of the space surveyed.

The following are the telephone numbers, models of telephones checked and complete appearance information on telephone lines checked:

- 4 - Bureau
3 - Chicago
1 - 66-4770
1 - 66-699 SUB D

JWSmt
(7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Classified by G-3
Declassify on OADR

1041X (X)

Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted

(Number)

Per [Signature]

(Time)

69 SEP 17 1985

68 JUL 27 1985

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BASEMENT - 3080 OGDEN AVENUE, Lisle, ILLINOIS:

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Cable</u>	<u>Pair</u>	<u>Binding Post</u>	
[Redacted]	31	1266	66	
	31	1267	67	b6
	31	1268	68	b7C
	33	1269	69	b7E
	31	1270	70	
	31	1271	71 (opr)	
				- Alarm Line to Police Dept.)

BASEMENT - 3060 OGDEN AVENUE, Lisle, ILLINOIS:

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Cable</u>	<u>Pair</u>	<u>Binding Post</u>	
[Redacted]		17	316	} HSE Prs.
		18	317	
		19	318	
		20	319	
		21	320	
		22	321	

*Where is
Atch #2?* — The WRA was found to have a Horizon Communication System (See Attachment #2 for specifications on telephone system utilized), housed inside the RA under their control. The following are numbers and types of telephone instruments utilized by the WRA:

- 9 - Model 2500 DMG-82084 Bell System telephone sets
- 1 - Model Z2500 MMGA/83109 Western Electric set
- 1 - Model 500 DZM Bell System rotary set
- 1 - Model 2500 DM/79141 Bell System set
- 1 - Model 2500 MM/79003 Western Electric set
- 1 - Model 2500 MM/79243 Western Electric set

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1 - Model 2500 MM/83052 Western Electric set
- 1 - DSS Console (Horizon)
- 1 - 30-button console for Horizon - Model 9A3-82DR5-5D69937-01-ISS.1

It was found that the Dektor Telephone Analyzer cannot be used when making off-line telephone checks on the main telephone console. The console cannot be unplugged for it will lose its program. If the power for the Horizon Unit is unplugged, it also will lose its program. Also, when doing various checks, the Dektor unit puts 115 VAC on the telephone lines which will cause damage to the IC circuits inside of the telephone unit.

It is not known whether the Horizon unit itself has remote maintenance capability. The WRA does have and securely maintains a portable computer attachment for reprogramming the Horizon unit if a problem develops.

Another problem encountered was that all telephone wiring from the outside telephone house closet on the second floor to the storage supply room inside the RA was exposed. This storage supply room houses the Horizon unit. From this room, all individual wires to telephone sets run through the floor and across a drop ceiling of space directly below the RA. This space is unoccupied but is locked. To defeat the WRA telephone system, someone knowledgeable could cut into any exposed wire and tap into the talk path of another telephone in the RA.

The above information was brought to the attention of the WRA Senior Resident Agent and to Chicago Office Services Manager (OSM).

The Bureau is requested to review the above stated potential telephone wiring hazard and advise Chicago if changes should be made. If so, appropriate funding for needed changes should be made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible]

SECOND FLOOR

SCALE 18" = 1'-0"

הדפוס

NEW CEILING HIGH PARTITION
EXISTING CEILING HIGH PARTITION
NEW FL. MTD. TELEPHONE OUTLET
NEW WALL MTD. " " "
NEW FL. MTD. ELECTRICAL OUTLET
NEW WALL MTD. " " "

GENERAL S PUBLIC BUILDING	
PROJECT	SHA.
LOCATION	L 12
STREET	308
PROJ. NO.	KILB1
DRAWN BY	NLM
DRAWING TITLE	FBI REG.
DRAWING NO.	5PRI

2336

ATTACHMENT 1

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Subject

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Date

12 SEP 1983

~~Security Survey of the Special Security Center~~

To

Kier T. Boyd
Acting Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

Security Survey
It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Special Security Center, Room 6744 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

Done Sept 16, 1983

OK @

Kellyon
[redacted]
ER

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DE-118

62-9750-1042

SEP 29 1983

LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE

SECURITY PROGRAMS UNIT

74 OCT 17 1983

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: September 26, 1963

To: Mr. D. Jerry Rubino
Director
Security Programs Staff
Justice Management Division
U.S. Department of Justice

From: Rier T. Boya
Acting Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

Subject: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

(U) Reference is made to your letter dated September 12, 1963, requesting a microphone and telephone (security survey of the Special Security Center, room 6744 of the Main Justice Building. (U)

(U) On September 16, 1963, personnel from the Technical Services Division (TSD) conducted a TSCM survey of room 6744, Main Justice Building. TSD personnel checked the two telephone lines in the room, conducted an electronic and physical search and a radio frequency spectrum check. No evidence of any eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones was noted during the survey. (U)

[redacted] from your staff assisted TSD personnel in conducting the TSCM survey. (U) b6 b7C

~~CLASSIFIED BY: 27~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

NOTE:

DE-118

62-7723-1043

Above TSCM survey was conducted by [redacted] and S.A. [redacted] b6 b7C

Exec AD Inv. 1 - Mr. Boya
Exec AD Adm. 1 - Mr. Witzel
Exec AD LES 1 - Mr. Million
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. 1 - [redacted]
Crim. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgnt.
Tech. Servs.
Training
Public Affs. Off.
Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

Director
Exec. AD-Adm.
Exec. AD-Inv.
Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
Crim. Inv.	Legal Coun.
	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
	Rec. Mgnt.
	Tech. Servs.
	Training

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 29 1963

74 OCT 17 1963



PERSONAL ATTENTION
MEMORANDUM 31-83
U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

(A) TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) SURVEYS AND
POLICY

Security Survey

The MIOG, Part II, Section 16-7.2(6), Page 1268, has been changed to indicate the duties of Technically Trained Agents (TTAs) concerning security checks, henceforth referred to as technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) surveys. These changes are in effect upon receipt of this communication.

Previously, it was required that TSCM surveys be conducted on a quarterly basis at field office cities and on an annual basis at resident agencies occupying Federal or commercial building space. This policy has been changed by reducing the frequency at field office headquarters city (from four times a year to twice a year) and increasing the required frequency for TSCM checks at resident agencies (from only once a year to twice a year). Consequently, all TSCM surveys will be performed on at least a semiannual basis. The new policy further clarifies what constitutes a proper TSCM survey by specifying that it encompass a radio frequency check, physical and electronic checks of telephones and a comprehensive physical search of the space surveyed. Further, it specifies that at minimum, the offices of the SAC, the ASAC, the FCI and organized crime supervisors, the communications center and off-premises locations should be surveyed at the prescribed frequency.

A new major topic, Section 16-17, on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Policy has been added to the Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines, Part II. The following TSCM Policy, which is effective immediately, provides guidelines to respond to the numerous requests received from various Federal and non-Federal agencies for TSCM surveys.

The primary objective of FBI-performed TSCM surveys is the protection of FBI space, sources and methods and the continued integrity of matters for which the FBI has investigative interest.

62-97308-
Not Recorded
152 NOV 28 1983

8-2-83

MEMORANDUM 31-83

68 NOV 30 1983

66-04-4453X

All TSCM surveys performed for other Federal agencies should be in response to a valid requirement to protect matters of National Security or of high sensitivity and should not be performed as a routine service. Requests for TSCM surveys from agencies outside the Department of Justice should be in writing with sufficient justification and may be conducted as FBI resources permit.

Prior to conducting a TSCM survey for other Federal agencies, it should be established that the requesting agency does not already have an in-house TSCM capability. For example, the Military Services and the Department of Energy have their own TSCM-trained personnel.

Under normal circumstances, TSCM surveys of residences, including those of FBI officials, SACs and other FBI personnel, are not routinely performed because continuing security or integrity of space, telephones and telephone lines cannot be assured in a private residence. However, TSCM surveys should be conducted when there is an indication that the residence in question has been technically compromised, when a residence is being used for a special case where its security and integrity can be maintained, or when circumstances indicate a special TSCM survey would be prudent.

TSCM surveys may be conducted, upon request, for the office space of Federal Judges, United States Magistrates, United States Attorneys and other Offices of the Department of Justice. However, all such requests must have SAC approval. The SAC should exercise good judgment to ensure that surveys are conducted in response to valid security requirements and are not performed with excessive frequency.

TSCM surveys may be performed, with FBIHQ approval, for officials of the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Government provided that requester certifies that one or more of the following conditions exist:

- (a) Matters discussed in that office involve National Security Information or are highly sensitive.
- (b) Matters discussed involve joint Agency/FBI investigations.
- (c) There are substantial indications that the office space of the requesting agency or official has been technically compromised.

TSCM surveys may be conducted for state and local law enforcement agencies only where the FBI has a joint investigative interest. The SAC must approve these surveys.

8-2-83

MEMORANDUM 31-83

- 2 -

Upon receipt of a request by, or on behalf of a U. S. Congressman, a written communication should be immediately directed to FBIHQ, Attention: Congressional Affairs Section, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, and Engineering Section, Technical Services Division, stating all pertinent details concerning the request. All TSCM surveys for U. S. Congressmen must be approved by FBIHQ.

Arrangements for TSCM surveys should be made discreetly. Prior to conducting a TSCM survey, the telephone numbers, number of telephones, model of telephones and all line appearance information should be obtained.

Upon completion of the TSCM survey, the results and recommendations should be orally furnished to the requester followed by a letter formally advising of the results. A copy of the letter should be designated for FBIHQ.

Immediately upon completion of a TSCM survey conducted for a Congressman or in connection with a particularly sensitive matter the field office must direct a communication to FBIHQ Attention: Engineering Section, Technical Services Division. The communication must contain the following:

- (a) Name of the Technically-Trained Agent(s) who performed the requested TSCM survey.
- (b) Name of requester and location(s) surveyed.
- (c) Number of rooms or offices covered.
- (d) Telephone number(s) and model(s) of telephone(s) checked.
- (e) Complete appearance information on telephone line(s) checked.
- (f) Problems or discrepancies encountered while performing the TSCM survey.
- (g) Recommendations made to requester.

The results of all other TSCM surveys conducted should be reported on the office Monthly Technical Report using the above format, but deleting items c, d and e.

Manual change follows.

8-2-83

MEMORANDUM 31-83

- 3 -

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Mintz *[Signature]*

Date 9/15/83

From : K. T. Boyd *[Signature]*

Subject : ~~TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES~~ (TSCM) MATTERS

SECURITY SURVEY

REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated August 11, 1983.

PURPOSE: To report the outcome of a TSCM survey conducted
of the office space of Department of Justice (DOJ),
[Redacted] Safeway Building, Room 1048,
Washington, D.C.

DETAILS: At your request, on August 22, 1983, a TSCM survey
was conducted of the office space of [Redacted]
his secretary's office area and of another DOJ attorney whose
office was adjacent to [Redacted] office space. A thorough
physical search was conducted within the area of concern.
The telephones in [Redacted] office and that of his secretary
were electronically and physically checked. An examination of
the radio frequency spectrum was also conducted. No evidence
of any electronic eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones
was noted at the time of the TSCM survey.

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The door which gives access to his office area
from the hallway has the air return grille (approximately
15" by 24") detached from the door. This door and the door to
[Redacted] inner office are both constructed with a hollow
core and the air return grille can easily be taken off by
removing several screws from the hallway side.

[Redacted] advised he has already requested that the
hallway door be replaced with a solid door having double cylinder
locks.

DE-60

It was recommended to [Redacted] that the door to his
office be replaced with a solid one.

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- ATTN: [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Boyd
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Killion
- 1 - [Redacted]

b6
b7C

16 OCT 4 1983

CONTINUED - OVER

ET:pjf (6)

55 NOV 30 1983

LEGAL COUNSEL

FBI/DOJ

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-8051

Memorandum to Mr. Mintz
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

Mr. Kruse was also advised of the TSCM outcome.

The above TSCM survey was conducted by [redacted]
[redacted] and SSA [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

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b7C

Handwritten signature: [illegible]

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Director _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Off. Cong. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Off. Affs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Rec. Mgmt. _____
		Training _____

Handwritten initials: [illegible] [illegible]

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & _____
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Young

Date 11/16/83

From : R. Boyd

Security Survey

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

PURPOSE: To report on the TSCM survey conducted at the office space of Senator Paul Laxalt. ~~(C)~~

DETAILS: On November 9, 1983, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a TSCM survey of the office space of Senator Laxalt, Room 323A, Russell Building, Washington, D.C. The telephones located in the office of the Senator's Administrative Assistant, Room 319, were also checked. ~~(C)~~

The TSCM survey consisted of a radio frequency check, an electronic check of the telephones and telephone lines and a cursory physical search. No evidence of any eavesdropping or tampering of the telephones was noted during the survey. (U)

The TSCM survey was conducted by [redacted] and SSA [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

SAK/ed

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. *4/12/84*

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. *RTB/ur*

Training _____

1 - Mr. Young

ATTN: [redacted]

1 - Mr. Boyd

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Killion

1 - [redacted]

b6

b7C

DE-60

CLASSIFIED BY: 27

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 DEC 5 1983

68 JAN 17 1984

Memorandum

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE



P. W. Hight
Hight
K. Hight

Subject

0
Security Survey of Judge's Chambers

Date

1 DEC 1983

To

Kier T. Boyd, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

D. Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Judge's Chambers, Rooms 6725 and 6740C of the Main Justice Building and the Special Security Center in the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr.
Done 12/27/83

[redacted]
12/19/83
judg "Not on time day"

62-97308-1046X

OK
(10)

(K)

Kucion
[redacted]

b6
b7C

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ET/PJ

68
JUL 5 1984

Memorandum

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT



B5

KILL BAW
White

Subject

Security Survey of Attorney General's Office

Date

DEC 12 1983

To

Kier T. Boyd, Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: Jerry Rubino
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division


It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Attorney General's offices, Rooms 5111 to 5119 of the Main Justice Building.

Please contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division for further information on [redacted]

Baw
12/19/83

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OK
B



(PC)

AG
Ames
L. Blunt
done 12/22/83

DE-105

62-97308-

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LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE

ET/PR

99 JUL 18 1984

1044

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. D. Jerry Ashby, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

1/19/84

Mr. C. Boyd
Deputy Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS (TSO) DIVISION

(U) Reference is being made to your memorandum dated December 1, 1983, requesting a security survey of the Judge's Chambers and December 13, 1983, requesting a microphone and telephone security survey of the Attorney General's Office. ~~(S)~~

(U) On December 22, 1983, personnel from the Technical Services Division (TSD) conducted a security survey of Judge John Lewis Smith's Chambers, the office space of the Attorney General and of his Special Assistant, [redacted] all in the Main Justice Building. ~~(S)~~ b6 b7C

(U) The security survey consisted of a nondestructive physical search, physical and technical examinations of telephone instruments serving the designated areas and a search of the radio frequency spectrum. ~~(S)~~

(U) No discrepancies were noted in the technical performance of the telephone instruments nor was there any indication of clandestine listening devices operating. No radio frequency covert tapping transmitters were detected during the survey. ~~(S)~~

[redacted] of your staff assisted the personnel in conducting the surveys. (U)

MAILED 15

JAN 11 1984

FBI

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~CLASSIFIED BY 27~~
~~EXEMPTED FROM GDS~~

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b7C

62-97308-1046X2

- Mr. Boyd
- Mr. Wilson
- Mr. Hillman
- [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JUL 5 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10000

The FBI survey was conducted by [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted] [redacted].
The following telephone numbers were checked at the FBI's
office:



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

At Judge Smith's office the following telephone
numbers were checked:



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Servs.	Laboratory
Exec. AD-Adm.	Chm. Lab.	Legal Coun.
Exec. AD-Inv.		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-LES		Res. Mgmt.
		Tech. Servs.
		Training

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD-LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & _____
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/19*

Date 3/2/84

From : R. Witzel *Witzel*

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

145
(U) PURPOSE: To request authorization for SSA [redacted] to travel to the Honolulu Division to conduct TSCM surveys. ~~(C)~~

b6
b7C

(U) DETAILS: The Honolulu Division has requested Bureau assistance to conduct several TSCM surveys in their division. Honolulu is in receipt of requests for TSCM surveys from the U.S. Magistrate, several Federal Judges, and the U.S. Attorney. There is an allegation from an informant that one of the Federal Judge's office has been compromised and the Judge has requested a TSCM survey of his office be conducted at the earliest time possible. ~~(C)~~

(S) The Honolulu Field Office has apportioned part of the office space for operations of technical installations against the [redacted] ~~(C)~~

b1

(U) Additionally, the Guam Resident Agency (RA) is being relocated to a new space in a public building. The Guam RA is currently engaged in several major fraud cases against the government and believe they are a likely target for a technical surveillance. The Guam RA also have requests for TSCM surveys from Federal Judges, U.S. Attorney's Office and Drug Enforcement Administration. ~~(C)~~

In view of the above, it is essential that the Engineering Section support Honolulu's request. (U)

(U) It is estimated that it will take approximately 12 working days to accomplish all the requested TSCM surveys. ~~(C)~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1, 6)
DATE 05-24-2011

MAR 7 1984

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [redacted]

(Continued-over)

b6
b7C

ET/crb (5)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983-411-864/9070

~~SECRET~~

PERS. REC. UNIT

DEC 04 1983

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Bayse
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
MATTERS

The approximate cost for this trip is as follows:
Roundtrip to Honolulu, \$660.00; roundtrip to Guam from
Honolulu, \$900.00; car rental in Guam, \$150.00; per diem,
\$1400.00, totaling \$3110.00. (S)

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) That authorization be granted for
SSA [redacted] to travel to the
Honolulu Division to assist in their request. (S)

b6
b7C

(U) *lee*
APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *W* _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

2) If recommendation number one is
approved, that the attached teletype be sent. (U)

lee
APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *W* _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

*Jul selected
and sent separately
W 10/1/68*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

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Exec AD Adm. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Lab. _____
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Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/g*

Date 4/2/84

From : *RW. Witzel*

Subject : COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Surveys

PURPOSE: On March 9, 1984, personnel from the Electronic Analysis Unit (EAU) conducted a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) of the Directors car.

DETAILS: The check included a Radio Frequency Spectrum check with a person sitting in all seat positions, engine running, car put into motion and engine stopped. A physical inspection was made of the entire vehicle including engine compartment, underside, trunk, doorpanels removed, rear seat removed and interior molding removed where practical. No clandestine radio frequency transmitting or tape recording device were found at the time of the check.

The above TSCM was conducted by [redacted] and [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. <i>WAB/g</i>
	Intell. _____	Training _____

DE-105

62-97308-1047

APR 4 1984

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Johnson

b6
b7C

AEJ/crb (6)
crb

68 MAY 3 1984

Memorandum

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DATE 05-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lag



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
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Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *w/s*

Date 4/2/84

From : *Witzel*
Witzel

Subject : *X* COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Surveys

PURPOSE: To report the results of a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) at the SAC Conference, Bellevue Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia, PA.

DETAILS: On March 25, 1984, [redacted] traveled to Philadelphia, PA. and with the help of SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] (of the Philadelphia Field Office) conducted a TSCM of the Directors suite, Director DEA's suite and the Rose Room on the 19th Floor of the Bellevue Stratford Hotel. The next three and half days contemporaneous monitoring of the meetings were held. No evidence of Clandestine Transmitting Devices were detected.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

wqf
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
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Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *w/s*
Training _____

DE-105

62-97308-1048

4 APR 4 1984

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Johnson

b6
b7C

AEJ/crb (5)

68 MAY 3 1984

Memorandum

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : *WAB/Run*
Mr. Bayse

From : R.W. Witzel
RW

Date 3/28/84

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE/COUNTERMEASURES/ (TSCM) SURVEYS
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OFFICE; TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

PURPOSE: To report results of TSCM survey conducted of
Room 7153, FBIHQ, on 1/27/84.

DETAILS: On 1/27/84, personnel from the Electronic Analysis
Unit conducted a TSCM survey of the Assistant
Director's Office, TSD, Room 7153, FBIHQ.

The survey consisted of a nondestructive physical
and electronic search, physical and electronic examination of
the telephone instruments and lines serving the area and a
search of the radio frequency spectrum.

No discrepancies were noted in the technical
performance of the telephone system nor was there any indication
of clandestine listening devices or radio frequency transmitters.
Nothing was noted which would indicate any type of technical
attack directed against this office space.

The TSCM survey was conducted by SSA [redacted] and [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

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b7C

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Johnson
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

b6
b7C

CWW/crb (7)

99 JUN 21 1984

21 APR 3 1984

62-97307-1049
T & J AM/CRB UNIT

Memorandum

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DATE 05-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. _____
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Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *wab*

Date 5/2/84

From : *Witzel*
R. Witzel

Subject : HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING.

Security of telephones

PURPOSE: To report the results of a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) in Room H310 at the Capitol.

DETAILS: On April 5, 1984, TSCM personnel [redacted] b6
[redacted] conducted a TSCM b7C
inspection of Room H310 in the Capitol.

The TSCM inspection consisted of a radio frequency spectrum check, a check of all telephone, telephone lines and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of tampering with the telephone, telephone lines or clandestine listening devices was found.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *wab*
Training _____

Sh

wab

1 - Mr. W.M. Baker

ATTN: [redacted]

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. Witzel

1 - Mr. Johnson

1 - [redacted]

ET/crb
ET/crb (6)

b6
b7C

DE-118 62-97308-10498

2 MAY 8 1984

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68 SEP 12 1984

037

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-24-2011

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6/22/84~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

*F*H*RR W*F*DE H*Q H*0037 *H*Y*CR 251554Z JUN 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

TO FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Security Survey*

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES {TSCM} MATTERS

THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS TELETYPE ARE CLASSIFIED

~~"CONFIDENTIAL".~~

MR. JERRY RUBINO, DIRECTOR, SECURITY STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HAS REQUESTED THAT THE FBI CONDUCT A MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SECURITY SURVEY OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ROOM 6217, CHESTER ARTHUR BUILDING, 425 EYE STREET, WASHINGTON D.C.

PLEASE HAVE A TSCM TRAINED TECHNICAL AGENT CONTACT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TELEPHONE [REDACTED] TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO CONDUCT THE REQUESTED TSCM.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: B; DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

BT 1

b6
b7C

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
1 - MR. WITZEL
1 - MR. JOHNSON
1 - [REDACTED]

ET/CRB {5}

6/22/84 18035H 2700

62-97306-1050

12 JUN 26 1984

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER03542mm
JUN 26 1984

weg/62

99 JUL 16 1984

NOTE: WFO HAS FIVE TTA TRAINED IN TSCM AND THE TSCM EQUIPMENT
REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THE INSPECTION. SINCE THE REQUEST
FOR THE TSCM SURVEY IS NOT FOR A HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT,
WE ARE ASKING WFO TO CONDUCT IT. FBIHQ PERSONNEL
WILL CONDUCT MOST OF THE TSCM SURVEY REQUESTS FOR
DEPARTMENT HEADS.

028

m5/m5

1 1

6/11/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

#F#HPP WFIDE HQ HQ028 #HMYCMP 121330Z JUN 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-24-2011

TO FBI WASHINGTON FIELD PRIORITY

BT

Security Survey of Attorney General's Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS.~~

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS REQUESTED A TSCM SURVEY ON
AN EXPEDITE BASIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,

(U) SUITE 314, 1717 H STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006. ~~EC~~

PLEASE HAVE YOUR TSCM TEAM CONDUCT THIS SURVEY. POINT OF
CONTACT IS [REDACTED] SECURITY STAFF, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, TELEPHONE, [REDACTED] {U}

b6
b7C

~~CLASSIFIED BY: B, DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

BT

1

(18)

WAB/wax. ET/NSD {6}

6/11/84

18035H

5823

b6
b7C

1 - MR. MONROE

ATTN: [REDACTED]

1 - MR. BAYSE

1 - MR. WITZEL

1 - MR. JOHNSON

1 - [REDACTED]

DE-105

62-97308-1051

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

JUN 12 1984

16 JUN 13 1984

76 JUL 27 1984

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE:

REQUEST WAS MADE PER MEMORANDUM OF MR. RUBINO, TO MR. BAYSE,
DATED JUNE 5, 1984.

1051

Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *was/ka*

Date 7-2-84

From : *Raw/afp*
R. W. Witzel

Security Search 15

Subject : *K* COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

b6
b7C

PURPOSE: To report the results of a technical surveillance countermeasures inspection (TSCM).

DETAILS: On June 5, 1984, [redacted] conducted a TSCM at the Xerox Training Facility, Room 3370, Leesburg, Virginia.

The TSCM included a radio frequency spectrum check and a nondestructive physical search. During the physical search, the telephone was disconnected and all wires were removed and checked for room audio. The Medeco lock cylinder was installed by Xerox personnel and a five-drawer safe was moved into the room (Bureau safe).

No evidence of clandestine listening devices was found. At the end of the TSCM survey, the door was locked and only FBI personnel had keys to the room.

The Xerox Training Facility is an international training facility, and many foreign personnel attend training sessions at various times. The frequency of using this facility for training and/or conferences should be kept to a minimum as the technical integrity of the spaces used cannot be maintained or controlled.

RECOMMENDATION: That conference and/or training of a highly sensitive nature not be conducted at the Xerox Training Facility.

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Pub. Affs. _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *Q*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

- 1 - Mr. O'Malley
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [redacted]

DE-60

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2 JUL 5 1984

ET/cae (6)
cae

99 JUL 31 1984

LA02731610526Z

RR HQ

DE LA 005

R 008 0526Z JUN 84

FM LOS ANGELES (185B-246)

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WILLIAM A. BAYSE,
TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION;
SECTION CHIEF STAN KLEIN,
TERRORISM SECTION, CID

1984 SUMMER OLYMPICS, MAJOR CASE 38.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET.~~

RE CONVERSATION BETWEEN ASAC P. BRYCE CHRISTENSEN
AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WILLIAM A. BAYSE, JUNE 5, 1984.

AS FBIHQ IS AWARE, LOS ANGELES DIVISION WILL BE ON

A 24-HOUR SHIFT SCHEDULE JULY 9 THROUGH AUGUST 17, 1984, JUN 26 1984

FOR THE 1984 OLYMPICS. THERE HAS BEEN AN EXTENSIVE

AMOUNT OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN LOS

ANGELES DIVISION OFFICE SPACE BY THE BUREAU AS WELL AS

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

6/20/84 advised
FBIHQ personnel
not required -
has to emergency
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b7c

99 SEP 6 1984

62-97308-1053
AS ASSIGN APPROPRIATE
PERSONNEL TO
SAC, ASAC'S
OFFICES +
COMMAND
CENTER.
WJ

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~

OTHER AGENCIES. WE ARE COGNIZANT OF OUR RESPONSIBILITY
TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND RELATED
INFORMATION. TO THIS END, IT IS REQUESTED THAT
AUTHORIZATION BE GIVEN FOR A FINAL ELECTRONICS
COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY TO BE CONDUCTED AT LOS ANGELES
BY TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION PERSONNEL DURING THE
FIRST WEEK OF JULY, 1984.

OK
②

~~C BY G 3, DECL OADR.~~

BT

#

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1 2

6/21/84

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

AFHRR LAMDE HQ H0196 #H4YSTR 212129Z JUN 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-24-2011

TO FBI LOS ANGELES (185B-246) ROUTINE

BT

Security Survey of Attorney General~~SECRET~~

(U)

OFFICE

1984 SUMMER OLYMPICS, MAJOR CASE 3B

THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED

~~"SECRET"~~

REFERENCE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE DATED JUNE 8, 1984, AND
BUREAU TELCALLS TO ASAC P. BRYCE CHRISTENSEN AND
SA WILLIAM SNELL ON JUNE 19 AND 20, 1984, RESPECTIVELY.

THIS IS TO CONFIRM REFERENCED TELCALL BETWEEN LOS ANGELES
SA WILLIAM SNELL AND FBIHQ SSA [REDACTED] CONCERNING THE
REQUEST FOR A TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
SURVEY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND CENTER.

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AS PER SA [REDACTED] ASSISTANCE FROM FBIHQ WILL NOT BE REQUIRED
AT THIS TIME. LOS ANGELES HAS TWO TECHNICALLY TRAINED AGENTS
(TTAS) WHO HAVE RECEIVED BOTH BASIC AND ADVANCED TSCM TRAINING.

1 - MR. REVELL
ATTN: MR. KLEIN
1 - MR. BAYSE

1 - MR. WITZEL
1 - MR. JOHNSON
1 - [REDACTED]

DE-60

2-97308-1054

16 JUN 26 1984

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

JUN 22 1984

99 SEP 6 1984

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE

2

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~PAGE TWO DE HQ 0196 SECRET~~
START HERE

THESE TWO TTAS WILL CONDUCT THE REQUIRED TECHNICAL INSPECTION.

20 LOS ANGELES ALSO HAS THE TSCM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH
18 THIS TASK.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, FBIHQ PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE TRAVELING
16 TO LOS ANGELES. IF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED AT A LATER
DATE, PLEASE CALL FBIHQ SSA [REDACTED] EXTENSION 2700.

14 ~~CLASSIFIED BY: B1 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

BT

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DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

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Memorandum

June 24 B5
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



244
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/10* Date 5/24/84

From : R. W. Witzel

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Subject : ~~TECHNICAL INSPECTION AT THE RAYBURN BUILDING~~

The entire contents of this memorandum are classified "~~Confidential~~."

PURPOSE: To report the results of a technical inspection of the Altec amplifiers used at the Rayburn Building, Capitol Hill, Washington, D. C.

DETAILS: During several countermeasures surveys conducted at the Sam Rayburn House Office Building, by personnel of the Engineering Section and by other agencies of Intelligence Community, numerous radio frequency signals have been found to be emanating clear text audio from Altec amplifiers. In view of this, [redacted] who works for the Architect of Capitol Hill, was contacted regarding this problem. He stated that he would try to solve this problem. Engineering Section personnel provided some technical assistance.

On April 6, 1984, [redacted] of the Engineering Section (ES), Electronic Analysis Unit (EAU), conducted a technical inspection of the Altec Lansing 1593B amplifiers located in the Rayburn Building. The following rooms with Altec amplifiers were inspected: 1100, 2200, 2203, 2226, 2337, 2318, 2325, 2212, 2118, 2154, B352 and B318. However, there were radio frequency oscillations detected at 4.2 MHz with a strong harmonic at 8.4 MHz in Room's 2200, 2203 and 2226. This problem was resolved by technicians from the Capitol Hill House Legislative Sound Call System Electronic Shop by removing the defective amplifier board, P/N 41830-12 and replacing each of the Altec amplifier units with a different amplifier board, P/N 41830-15.

All the aforementioned rooms were then found to be free from the detected radio frequency oscillations.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only. **DE-118**

- 1 - Mr. Monroe
Attn: [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [redacted]

ET:jmr (6)
jmr

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b7C

Classified by 8
Declassify on OADR

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. *MB*

Training _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

99 AUG 12 1984

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS
Date 6/8/84

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 09-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION; ENGINEERING
 SECTION

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (66-20) (P)

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY

The San Juan Division has been conducting intense investigations against terrorist organizations, organized crime elements and corrupt police officials which have revealed that each of these have utilized to varying degrees advanced electronic communications equipment. The San Juan Division has suffered one close call in an attack against bureau office space with a high explosive, rocket propelled ordinance and due to the nature of several very sensitive investigations is extremely vulnerable to electronic surveillance.

The San Juan Division currently has no personnel trained in electronic countermeasures. Due to the intense workload placed on San Juan TTA's by major case work, the Division is unable to spare any TTA's for in-service training.

As a result of the above, the Bureau is requested to provide experienced headquarters personnel to conduct a thorough countermeasures survey of the San Juan Division. In addition, during this survey, training should be provided to San Juan TTA's and suggestions made to improve San Juan's countermeasures program.

In order to maximize the benefit of such a visit to the San Juan Division, it is also requested that the headquarters assistance be provided as soon after July 16, 1984 as possible.

② - Bureau 1-TSD-ES, EAU
 2 - San Juan ES
 LAM:dfod
 (4)

1*

Approved: *RWH/RTG*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

744
 74 AUG 15 1984

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24
MR

197

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-24-2011

1 1

6/21/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#F197BRR SJUDE HQ H0197 #H4YCOR 212129Z JUN 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI {62-97308}

TO FBI SAN JUAN {62-20} ROUTINE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Security Source

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES {TSCM} MATTERS

THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED

~~"CONFIDENTIAL".~~

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b7C

REFERENCE SAN JUAN AIRTEL DATED JUNE 8, 1984.

ET [] AND SSA [] WILL ARRIVE

SAN JUAN ON JULY 16, 1984, VIA DELTA AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER 45
TO CONDUCT THE REQUESTED TSCM IN YOUR DIVISION.

(Handwritten signature/initials)

IT IS REQUESTED THAT LODGING RESERVATIONS BE MADE FOR ABOVE
PERSONNEL.

BT

1

62-97306-1057

12 JUN 25 1984

WAB/

ET/NSD {5}

6/21/84

18035H

5823

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
- 1 - MR. WITZEL
- 1 - MR. JOHNSON
- 1 - []

(Handwritten signature)

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(Large handwritten signature/initials)

005228
JUN 22 1984

746

NOTE:

BY REFERENCED AIRTEL, SAN JUAN REQUESTED FBIHQ ASSISTANCE TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH TSCM SURVEY IN THEIR DIVISION.

SAN JUAN DOES NOT HAVE TTAS TRAINED IN TSCM.

APPROXIMATE COST IS \$775 FOR TRANSPORTATION AND \$2000 PER DIEM, TOTALING \$2775 FOR TWO PERSONS.

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE

BS-JUNE



9/17

Subject

Security Survey of the Criminal Division
Offices

Date

JUL 30 1984

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division in Room 2105 of the Main Justice Building and the following Criminal Divisions areas; Rooms 2109, 2111, 2114, 2115, 2208 and 2229 of the Main Justice Building.

Please have members of your staff contact [redacted] Security Specialist, Security Staff, Justice Management Division, for further information on [redacted]

advised WFO
personnel would get
in touch with him
8/3/84

was
advised that
TSCM would be
conducted as soon
as WFO personnel
9/30/84 @ school

OK
OO

TO WFO
8/31/84

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62-77308-1057X

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10 SEP 5 1984

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-24-2011

SAC, Honolulu

8/29/84

Director, FBI (62-97308)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

Security Surveys

This communication is classified "~~Confidential~~"
in its entirety.

Reference Bureau teletype to your office dated
March 21, 1984.

FBIHQ SSA [redacted] and Honolulu SA [redacted]
[redacted] conducted technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM)
surveys in your office, the Guam Resident Agency (RA), and in
several Federal agencies located in your division during the
period of March 21, 1984, through April 9, 1984. At the
conclusion of each TSCM survey, each agency was advised of the
outcome. The TSCM surveys included a radio frequency spectrum
check, a telephone and telephone lines check, an electronic check
for possible hidden electronic surveillance devices on desks,
books, furniture and other items. A cursory physical check was
conducted in most offices with the exception of your field office
and the Guam Resident Agency where a more thorough physical
examination was conducted.

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The TSCM surveys were conducted as follows:

On March 21, 1984, the office of U.S. Magistrate Joseph
M. Gedan, room C-338, Federal Building, Honolulu, Hawaii, was
checked. The following telephone lines were checked:

Telephone# on hook (Volts) off-hook on-hook (current in off-hook
milliamps)

49.59	8.41	0	46.44
49.56	7.39	0	46.73
51.32	9.03	0	51.68
51.10	9.36	0	52.53

Exec AD Adm.
Exec AD Inv.

Exec AD LES

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs. 1 - Mr. Bayse

Crim. Inv. 1 - Mr. Witzel

Ident. 1 - [redacted]

Insp. 1 - Mr. W. Johnson

Intell. 1 - [redacted]

Lab. 1 - [redacted]

Legal Coun. 1 - [redacted]

Off. Cong. & Public Affs. 1 - [redacted]

Rec. Mgnt. 1 - [redacted]

Tech. Servs. 1 - [redacted]

Training 1 - [redacted]

Telephone Rm. 1 - [redacted]

Director's Sec'y 1 - [redacted]

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10 SEP 5 1984

(Continued - Over)


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 NOV 16 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

The following is the information obtained at the telephone wire closet located outside Judge Gedan's office:





Telephone#	Cable#	Trunk pair#
	8.01	257
	8.01	267
	8.01	259
	8.01	260

No discrepancies were noted in Judge Gedan's office.






On March 23 and 25, 1984 (On Saturday and Monday, March 24 and 26, Guam time) the Guam Resident Agency, located in the Pacific News Building, 238 O'hara St., Guam, was checked.

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Six Stromberg Carlson 2864 telephones were examined physically and with the telephone analyzer. Each instrument had the following telephone lines:

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. IT&E overseas line, telephone number not available.
5. 

The following voltage and current readings were measured from an instrument.

Telephone#	on hook (Volts)	off hook (Volts)	on hook (current in milliamps)	off hook (current in milliamps)
	25.85	8.21	0	50.85
	45.44(chaining switch disabled)			
	25.69	7.48	0	50.03
	51.85(chaining switch bar disabled)			
	25.90	8.00	0	55.60
	45.34(chaining switch bar disabled)			
	26.06	5.26	0	29.03
	25.85	12.70	0	108.30
	52.10(chaining switch bar disabled)			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

The telephones had dial intercom service which was the reason for the two voltage readings on hook. The higher voltage readings were measured by disconnecting the bar which allows the buttons to stay on the depressed position while on hook. By depressing the button for each particular line, the higher voltage readings were obtained.

All telephones are connected to a Key Service Unit (KSU) located within the RA office space. The five trunk lines go from the KSU to a connecting block above the ceiling of the interview room in the RA and continue to the telephone/electric power room located on the 4th floor. These lines appear on a 66 block and have the following line designations:

[REDACTED] W/BL, BL/W wire, House pair (HP) 210, cable #10
W/O, O/W wire, HP 211, cable #10
W/G, G/W wire, HP 212, cable #10
W/B, B/W wire, connects to a small box (marked IT&E)
W/S, S/W wire, HP 209, cable #10
W/R, R/W wire was not being used

These lines continue and terminate on the 3rd floor telephone/electric power room. This room and the one located above on the 4th floor were locked and the keys maintained at the Manager's office. These are the last appearances within the building. The house pair information on the third floor is as follows:

[REDACTED] Trunk pair (HP) #710
Trunk pair #711
Trunk pair #712

IT&E . Connects to a small box labeled "IT&E overseas lines"

[REDACTED] House pair #709

It was noted that lines 4 and 5 appear to have unusually low and high off-hook current readings respectively. However, it is pointed out that line 4 is the IT&E overseas line and line 5 is the unlisted telephone number and does not go

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Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

through the same switch as the other three lines. Attempts to have the local telephone company personnel explain the reason for the measurements taken on these two lines failed as the telephone personnel did not answer our calls. It is possible that they may have been working in another island.


The following observations were made while conducting the TSCM at Guam.

1. One of the two doors in the RA that open from the hallway did not have a dead bolt.
2. The RA did not have an alarm system.
3. There were several manuals on top of the safes in the bulky room.
4. A cabinet is needed for storage of firearms (e.g. shotguns).

On March 25, 1984 (March 26, 1984 Guam time) the office of U.S. Marshal Edward M. Camacho Room 507, PNB, Guam, was checked.

The following telephones were checked:

Telephone#	on-hook (Volts)	off-hook	on-hook (current in milliamps)	off-hook
------------	-----------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------



45.36	9.13	0	54.40
45.35	7.60	0	56.30
45.09	8.87	0	54.52
45.18	7.95	0	55.84
45.10	7.97	0	55.77

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No discrepancies were noted.

On March 26, 1984 (March 27, 1984 Guam time) a TSCM survey was conducted in the offices of the U.S. Attorney David T. Wood, Room 502A, PNB, Guam.

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Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

The following telephones and telephone lines were checked physically and with a telephone analyzer.

Telephone# on-hook (Volts) off-hook on-hook (current in off-hook
milliamps)

<div></div>	45.13	9.55	0	52.34
	45.07	6.91	0	56.92
	45.04	8.79	0	54.32
	45.02	8.15	0	54.79
	45.12	8.15	0	54.95
	45.08	7.86	0	55.39
472-7486	45.15	8.38	0	53.84
<div></div>	45.12	7.06	0	57.26

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1. All the instruments were Stromberg Carlson, SC 2500 with the exception of the telephone located in the library, telephone number 472-7486 which is an ITT 2500 instrument.

2. There were two doors that open to the hallway, one from the library which had a dead bolt and the other from the main entrance which did not have a dead bolt.

3. The offices of the U.S. Attorney were not alarmed.

4. The office door is maintained open and does not restrict anybody from walking into the office space.

On same day a TSCM survey was conducted in the office space of RAIC, DEA. All telephone instruments were Stromberg Carlson SC 2500 with the exception of one ITT 2500 instrument, telephone number . The following voltage and current reading were obtained:

Telephone# on-hook (Volts) off-hook on-hook (current in off-hook
milliamps)

<div></div>	45.12	7.46	0	56.15
	45.16	9.32	0	53.40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

	45.12	7.59	0	55.94	
	45.07	7.94	0	55.08	
	45.15	8.06	0	55.09	
	45.21	8.19	0	54.64	b6 b7C
	45.16	8.16	0	54.93	
	45.14	7.90	0	55.31	
	45.10	7.82	0	55.48	
	45.12	7.88	0	55.55	
	45.26	8.40	0	54.86	
	45.06	7.43	0	56.20	
45.09	7.56	0	56.06		

No discrepancies were noted on any of the telephones and telephone lines checked.

The following observations were made concerning the physical security of the DEA office.

1. The office is located adjacent to the U.S. Attorney's office on one end and the Grand Jury Room and restrooms at the north end and west side, respectively.
2. All walls on the perimeter of the office are constructed past the ceiling and up to the floor above.
3. Both doors leading to the hallway have dead bolts.
4. The office does not have an alarm system.
5. The door to the reception area is maintained open and not restricted to entering the office space.
6. Four pairs of telephone wires were removed from the DEA's space. These wires were terminated on a 66E block in the women's restroom located inside the Grand Jury Room space. No telephones were connected to their wires and which were part of the old telephone system that was replaced within the last year.

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Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

On March 27, 1984 (March 28, Guam time) a TSCM was conducted of the office space of U.S. Federal Judge Cristobal C. Duenas, all of his staff's offices, the Court Room and the Grand Jury Room.

The following telephones and telephone lines were checked in the Judge's space and courtroom:

Telephone# Model# on-hook (Volts) off-hook on-hook (current off-hook in milliamps)

(ITT 2844)	45.18	8.12	0	55.26
(SC 2500)	45.10	8.13	0	55.14
(SC 2500)	45.03	7.91	0	54.83
(SC 2500)	45.01	8.17	0	54.73
(SC 2500)	45.04	8.10	0	54.90
(SC 2500)	45.04	9.07	0	54.01

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No discrepancies were noted on any of the telephones checked.

The TSCM survey at the Honolulu Field office was started on March 30, 1984.

The field office telephone system is serviced by a Northern Electric switch model "Pulse-SG-1." All telephone lines to the field office from the Hawaiian Telephone Company Central Office appear on cable 51, Trunk pairs 301 through 400. Cable 51.02 line pair 1 through 25 appear in the Bulky Room in the basement of the Federal Building and at the telephone wire closet in the office. Cable 51.02 line pair 25 through 50 appear in the telephone wire closet in the office and at the radio shop which is located in the basement of the building.

The following are the findings of cable 51, line pairs 301 through 400.

Trunk Pair number

301 - Vacant

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu

RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

- 302 - J1-2651 Confidential File Room Extension #47. It also appeared at First Hawaiian Annex, S. King St. 20th floor. This extension was removed and replaced by extension #40 which was not in use.
- 303 - Vacant
- 304 - " "
- 305 - " "
- 306 - " "
- 307 - " "
- 308 - " "
- 309 - " "
- 310 - " "
- 311 - " "
- 312 - (808) 546-8924 (FTS), (T)-49.0, (R) 49.2 Volts to ground
- 313 - Vacant
- 314 - J4-1267-0 Teletype Room
- 315 - J4-1267-0 Teletype Room
- 316 - Vacant
- 317 - 50.2 Volts b7E
- 318 - Vacant
- 319 - Vacant
- 320 - 521-1411 In-coming calls only (T)-50.3, (R)-50.2 Volts to ground
- 321 - 521-1412 In-coming calls only (T)-50.3, (R)-50.6 Volts to ground
- 322 - 521-1413 Two-way (T)-50.6, (R)-50.3 Volts to ground
- 323 - 521-1414 Two-way (T)-50.3, (R)-50.6 Volts to ground

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

- 324 - [] Two-way (T)-50.6, (R)-50.2 Volts to ground
- 326 - [] Outgoing calls only (T)-50.5, (R)-50.6 Volts to ground
- 327 - 546-8318 (FTS) 49.1 Volts
- 328 - Vacant
- 329 - Vacant
- 330 - Vacant
- 331 - Two links, Honolulu Toll Test Board and HPD-
- 332 - Police at HAFB and ITB World Communications disc at FBI and HPD
- 333 - J1-2500-0 HPD Computer Terminal
- 334 - J1-2500-0 State Computer Terminal
- 335 - J52-1580 State Computer Terminal
J52-2640
- 336 - J52-1580 State Computer Terminal
J52-2640
- 337 - J60-4510 connected to cable 22, W/O, O/W pair. This line was not in use and was disconnected.
- 338 - [] WCC telephone
- 339 - [] FCI Supervisor office, Secure telephone
- 340 - [] FCI Supervisor office, Secure telephone.
- 341 - K61-2590 connected to cable 22, Y/BL, BL/Y
This line was not in use and was disconnected
- 342 - K61-2810 connected to cable 22, V/BL, BL/V
This line was not in use and was disconnected
- 343 - J12-6180
- 344 - J12-6190 To FM Radio console and at 1151 Punchbowl
5th Floor
- 345 - J12-6200

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu

RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

- 346 - 523-3684 (SAC) -50.7 Volts
- 347 - 523-3825 Outgoing calls only (T)-50.4, (R)-50.5 Volts to ground.
- 348 - Vacant
- 349 - Vacant
- 350 - Vacant
- 351 - Vacant
- 352 - Vacant
- 353 - Active (pen register line)
- 354 - Through 369-Not in use
- 370 - Connected to cable 22, W/BL, BL/W pair.
This line was not in use and was disconnected.
- 371 - Through 400-Not in use.

Bulky Room, Basement of Federal Building cable 51.02,
line pairs 1 through 25.

House Pair number

- 1 - Extension 43 (was disconnected)
- 2 - 546-5528 (telephone located in Radio shop)
- 3 - Alarm Circuit to Bulky room.
- 4 - Vacant
- 5 - Vacant
- 6 - Vacant
- 7 - Bulky Room telephone extension number 57.
- 8 - Through 25-Not in use.

Cable 51.02 pairs 1 through 25 located in the office telephone wire closet.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

House Pair Number

- 1 - Extension #43 (was disconnected)
- 2 - 546-5528 connected to cable 51.02 pair 27
- 3 - Alarm circuit, connects to connecting block numbers 12 and 13, BK/G, G/BK pair located in large gray box close to ceiling. This pair continues to the security console.
- 4 - Vacant
- 5 - Vacant
- 6 - Vacant
- 7 - Bulky room extension #57.
- 8 - Through 25-Not in use.

Cable 51.02 pairs 26 through 50, located in the office telephone wire closet. This cable goes to the Radio shop.

House Pair Number

- 26 - Radio shop extension #43. This extension also appeared in the Bulky room and was disconnected.
- 27 - 546-5528, connected to alarm dialer
- 28 - Connected to #16 of connecting block on large gray box and cable leading to the Security console.
- 29 - Connects to cable #32, BK/G, G/BK pair, FM Radio console.
- 30 - Vacant
- 31 - Public address system.
- 32 - Vacant
- 33 - Alarm circuit to the Radio shop
- 34 - Through 50-Not in use.

Radio Shop


Cable 51.02, pairs 26 through 50. (Same as above)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

On April 4, 1984 the office space of U.S. Attorney Daniel A. Bent was checked. The office telephone system was serviced by TIE/Communications, Inc., model EK 2600 Key Telephone system. The following is information on the telephone numbers checked at the telephone wire closet outside the U.S. Attorney's office space.

Cable #TX 8.01 pairs 301-through 350.

Telephone#	Cable#	House pair#	Voltage
	8.01	PR 12	49.3
	8.01	PR 21	49.3
	8.01	PR 14	49.2
	8.01	PR 15	49.2
	8.01	PR 22	49.3
	8.01	PR 23	49.3
	8.01	PR 10	49.2
	8.01	PR 08	49.1
	8.01	PR 24	49.3
	8.01	PR 25	49.3
	8.01	PR 06	49.2
	8.01	PR 07	49.3
	8.01	PR 20	49.3
	8.01	PR 09	49.2
	8.01	PR 11	49.3
8.01	PR 16	49.2	

b6
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The telephone instruments were TIE/Communications, Inc model 1-2260. Due to the type of telephones in the USA's office space, on-hook and off-hook voltage and current readings were not obtained. However, all combinations of the three pair wires were checked at the termination block in the telephone wire closet.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

On April 4, 1984, the office space of Federal Judges Harold M. Fong, Room C-438, and Samuel P. King, Room C-444 were checked.


Both offices had Automatic Electric telephones, model 1860.

The following information was obtained from the telephone lines in Judge Fong's office.

Telephone#	on-hook (Volts)	off-hook	on-hook (current in milliamps)	off-hook
------------	-----------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------

	49.48	8.24	0	47.80
	49.52	8.05	0	47.90
	49.58	8.84	0	45.90

His telephone lines appeared in the main frame as follows:


Telephone#	Cable#	House pair
	801	207
	801	208
	801	209

b6
b7C

No discrepancies were noted during the survey.

The following information is from the telephones in Judge King's office.

Telephone#	on-hook (Volts)	off-hook	on-hook (current in milliamps)	off-hook
------------	-----------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------

	49.48	7.60	0	47.45
	49.62	7.90	0	46.40
	49.60	7.95	0	45.60
	49.55	8.30	0	46.95

Cable information at the wire closet is as follows:
Cable #801 (Pair 1-50)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

The following telephone lines were checked:

Telephone#	on-hook (Volts)	off-hook	on-hook (current in milliamps)	off-hook
------------	-----------------	----------	-----------------------------------	----------

[REDACTED]	49.45	7.83	0	48.51
[REDACTED]	49.49	7.75	0.	48.13
[REDACTED]	49.50	7.55	0	48.85
[REDACTED]	49.53	8.60	0	47.10
[REDACTED]	49.50	8.55	0	47.13
[REDACTED]	49.30	7.85	0	46.83
[REDACTED]	51.86	8.60	0	24.00

b6
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The telephone lines were also checked at the telephone wire closet which appear on cable 8.01, house pairs 1150-1200.

Telephone#	Cable#	House pair#
------------	--------	-------------

[REDACTED]	8.01	1151
[REDACTED]	8.01	1152
[REDACTED]	8.01	1153
[REDACTED]	8.01	1154
[REDACTED]	8.01	1155
[REDACTED]	8.01	1156
[REDACTED]	8.01	1157

Also pairs #1158 and 1159 were connected to cables #21 and 94 and appeared inside DEA's office space.

On April 9, 1984, the office of U.S. Magistrate Bert S. Tokairin, Room C-340 was checked. His office had ITT 2830 telephone.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

The following are voltage and current readings obtained from two telephones lines:

Telephone#	on-hook (Volts)	off-hook	on-hook (current in milliamps)	off-hook
------------	-----------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------

<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 60px;"></div>	49.40	8.55	0	47.60
	49.40	7.70	0	47.60

The cable and pair information obtained at the telephone wire closet outside his office is as follows:

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b7C

Telephone#	Cable#	House pair#
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 60px;"></div>	8.01	257
	8.01	258

It is noted that physical security inspection is normally not part of the TSCM survey, however, in view of the many sensitive public corruption cases being worked in Guam and the fact that the RA is located in a public building with somewhat inadequate physical security, the following recommendations are being made;

1. That all doors leading to the hallway from the office space of the RA be outfitted with double cylinder dead bolt locks and installed by Bureau personnel only.
2. That the RA be provided with a cabinet or a large safe so that weapons (e.g., shotguns) left in the RA office can be stored safely.
3. That the RA be provided additional safes to store manuals and other sensitive materials.
4. That an alarm system be installed in the RA at the earliest time possible.
5. That the combinations to the safes be changed according to the M10G, Part II, Section 16-7.2(7) a and b, each safe having a different combination number.

In addition, personnel from the Guam RA should advise The United States Attorney's office that they could improve the physical security of their office by having a double cylinder

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to SAC, Honolulu

RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

dead bolt in the main entrance door. All other Federal offices checked in. Guam appeared to have adequate physical security and no discrepancies were found during the TSCM survey.

In identifying all telephone pairs located in Headquarters City, it was found that extension #47 was leaving the office premise and this extension also appeared at the First Hawaiian Annex, S. King St. 20th Floor. Inasmuch as this extension was also located and used in the Confidential File room, it was disconnected from the lease line leaving your office space. This extension was replaced by extension #40 which was not in use.

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
	Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



*By WFO airtel
dated 9/20/84
this has been completed*

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Subject

Security Survey of Senior Management Offices

Date

AUG 15 1984

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

from
for *Carandazzo*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the following Department senior management office spaces:

Building	Room	Office
Main	4111	Deputy Attorney General
Main	1111	Assistant Attorney General for Administration

*To WFO
158 Security
sent
8/31/84*

Please have members of your staff contact [redacted] of this staff on [redacted] for further information.

*Mr. McManis was advised
that WFO personnel would
get in touch with him in
order to conduct the requested
TSCM.*

*Received copy
8/28/84
Received original
8/29/84*

62-97308-1059

On 9/29/84, Mr. [redacted] was advised that WFO personnel would conduct the TSCM survey in training and would call him next week.

b6
b7C

TO SEP 5 1984

8/24/84

LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE

08 DE 04 17 1984

NOV 2 1984 JAN 22 1985 SD & AMR FIL

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Monroe
Attn: [REDACTED]
1 - Mr. Baker
Attn: Congressional Affairs Office
[REDACTED]
1 - Mr. Bayne
1 - Mr. Witzel
1 - Mr. Johnson
1 - [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

August 20, 1984

BY LIAISON

[REDACTED]
Office of the Sergeant at Arms
Room S-321, The Capitol Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

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b7C

Dear [REDACTED]

Reference is made of your letter to [REDACTED]
Chairman, Security Committee, dated June 25, 1984, and his response
to you by letter, dated July 3, 1984.

In response to your request, on July 16, 1984, the FBI,
with the assistance of other members of the Intelligence Community
and U.S. Capitol Police, conducted a series of technical tests from
various locations within the Senate Chamber. These tests were
conducted in order to evaluate the vulnerability of this space
to a technical penetration.

The tests consisted of transmitting a very low power
signal with the receiver located in a van in several areas outside
the Capitol Building. The results of this test indicated that the
Senate Chamber is susceptible to a technical attack by a person
placing a small, low power, radio frequency transmitting device
in this room.

The survey team also placed two recorders in different
locations within the Chamber. Several recordings were made by
reading from printed text. Although the recorded audio was not
excellent, by enhancing the tape recordings, most of the recorded
text can be recovered.

A physical inspection of the Senate Chamber revealed that
the main floor is raised approximately three feet and hollow
underneath. The Gallery floor also presents a problem. These areas
provide easy access for the placement of a technical surveillance device
which would be very difficult to find during a physical inspection.

Also, the main amplifiers to the public address system
in the Chamber are located outside the Senate Chamber which causes
some concern as they can be used as surveillance devices.

Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Insp. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Public Affs. Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

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68 JAN 7 1985

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[REDACTED]

It is pointed out that an adversary having access to the attic directly above the Chamber could easily hear proceedings of any sensitive information or briefings being presented.

In addition, the survey team performed a physical survey of the areas surrounding the Senate Chamber. It was noted that various services of the Press have offices on the third floor adjacent to the North Gallery of the Senate. This would pose a problem in securing the Senate Chamber each time a sensitive briefing on National Security issues is conducted.

Based on the observations noted above, it would be very difficult to secure the Senate Chamber each time briefings of a sensitive nature are to be held.

However, in the event that the Senate Chamber is used for briefings on issues of National Security, the following recommendations are made for temporarily securing the Senate Chamber to a limited degree:

1. Post a U.S. Capitol Police Officer in the attic directly above the Senate Chamber to preclude an adversary from listening during the briefings.
2. Re-key all doors leading to the Senate Chamber and provide keys only to a limited number of personnel, keeping a record of all persons with keys.
3. Permanently relocate all Press services from the north end of the third floor, making that area a corridor where it can easily be checked prior and during briefings.
4. Post U.S. Capitol Police Officers outside each door leading to the Senate Chamber during briefings.
5. Disconnect the public address system.
6. Trace all telephone lines and public address wires before each briefing to ensure that they are not being used with surveillance devices.
7. Conduct a very thorough physical inspection of the Senate floor and Gallery before each briefing.
8. Disconnect all telephones in the Senate Chamber.
9. Provide radio frequency coverage of the Senate Chamber through the proposed In-Place Monitoring System, which is to be installed in the Capitol Building.

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[REDACTED]

10. Provide at minimum 24-hour notice prior to a briefing in order to conduct a thorough physical inspection of the Chamber during that 24-hour period.

We want to emphasize that taking the above precautions will not preclude hostile intelligence services from technically compromising the Senate Chamber.

To fully secure the Senate Chamber for briefings of National Security issues would require the necessary changes to bring the Chamber in compliance with the U.S. Intelligence Community Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

We will be happy to show and discuss with you these requirements, if you so desire.

If we can be of any further assistance, please call on us.

Sincerely yours,

UBM

[REDACTED]
FBI Member, DCI Security Committee

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

126

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DATE 06-01-2011

141

927

8/31/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

*F*H*RR WFIDE HQ H0126 *H*YS*CR 312000Z AUG 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

TO FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

ATTN: CI-4 SUPERVISOR

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

FOR THE INFORMATION OF WASHINGTON FIELD, MR. D. JERRY RUBINO, DIRECTOR SECURITY STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), HAS REQUESTED THAT THE FBI CONDUCT A TSCM SURVEY OF ROOMS 1111, 4111, 2105, 2109, 2111, 2114, 2115, 2208 AND 2229, ALL LOCATED IN THE MAIN JUSTICE BUILDING.

YOU ARE REQUESTED TO HAVE YOUR TECHNICALLY TRAINED AGENTS WITH COUNTERMEASURES TRAINING CONTACT MR. ROBERT GRAYTOCK, DOJ, AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO CONDUCT THE REQUESTED TSCM SURVEYS AT THE EARLIEST TIME POSSIBLE. HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER IS 633-2396.

- 1 - MR. BAYSE
1 - MR. WITZEL
1 - MR. JOHNSON
1 - [REDACTED]

DET: NSD (5)

8/31/84 18035H 5823

b6 PER FBI
b7C

10 SEP 5 1984

2210ZMM
AUG 31 1984

68 NOV 29 1984

68 NOV 29 1984

77 NOV 29 1984

55 DEC 26 1984

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~PARAMETER DE HQ 0125 CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 ALL COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING TSCM MATTERS AND EQUIPMENT
SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL" AT MINIMUM.

18 FOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS TELETYPE, PLEASE CALL

SSA [REDACTED] EXTENSION 2700.

16 ~~CLASSIFIED BY: BT DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

b6 PER FBI
b7C

BT

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DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

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DATE 05-24-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE:

DUE TO THE WORK LOAD OF SSA [REDACTED] WE ARE
ASKING WFO TO CONDUCT THE TSCM SURVEYS FOR REQUESTORS UNDER THE
HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT. REQUESTS FOR TSCM SURVEYS FOR HEAD OF
DEPARTMENTS OFFICE SPACE WILL BE CONDUCTED BY ENGINEERING SECTION
PERSONNEL. WFO HAS 5 TTAS TRAINED IN TSCM.

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DATE 06-01-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 9/13/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ENGINEERING SECTION,
[REDACTED] ROOM 1B053

FROM: SAC, JACKSONVILLE (66-181)

SUBJECT: AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES
TECHNICAL MATTER

Security Service

Re telcal, 9/12/84.

This confirms request for assistance in sweeping the Jacksonville Division Headquarters City telephones and the request for necessary telephone analyzing equipment to use in conjunction with above. This will also provide refresher training for Jacksonville TTA's. The most ideal period is the first week of 12/84, but most any other period between 10/1/84 and 12/24/84, could be arranged.

Coordination should be made with Jacksonville SA's [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

2 - Bureau
2 - Jacksonville
PS:psd
(4)

1-TSD-ES, EAM

62-97306-1060X

JW

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

69 FEB 01 1985

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 9/20/84

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 06-01-2011

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-97308) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 (ATTN: SSA [redacted] TSD)

FROM: SAC, WFO (62-8247)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
 COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS

All markings, notations and items of information contained in this communication are classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" unless otherwise noted.

Re FBIHQ tel to WFO, 6/25/84, advising of request for sweep of the Crisis Management Center, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 425 I Street, WDC.

Enclosed is the original and four (4) copies of an LHM for dissemination to DOJ and INS outlining the sweep and its results. [redacted] INS Security Office, who initially requested the sweep, asked to be furnished a copy of the LHM directly rather than await dissemination through DOJ. His address is Room 2108, Chester Arthur Building, 425 I Street, N.W., WDC, 20536.

The sweep was conducted 9/6/84, by WFO Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. It included on and offline telephone tests using the Dektor Telephone Analyzer, an rf sweep using the PR700A receiver and a physical search using the non-linear junction detector. No devices were found.

On and off hook voltages and current draw were normal for trunk lines [redacted]

No abnormal connections were found during the offline tests of three (3) WECO 2565 HKM and two (2) 2830 CM telephone sets.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1737-JW
 Declassify on: OADR

Approved: (1-62-97308) 2 - WFO

(1-66-5539)

ADVISOR DEC 2 5 1985

(4)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
 Transmitted (Number) (Time) Per [redacted]

MAR 05 1986
 98 FEB 01 1985

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

111



68-177308-1060X1
ENCLOSURE



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
September 20, 1984

[Redacted]
Security Staff, Room 6531
U.S. Department of Justice
10th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20530

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Pursuant to your request for a sweep of the Crisis Management Center, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Room 6217, Chester Arthur Building, 425 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., Special Agents from the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an audio countermeasures sweep at that facility on September 6, 1984. The sweep included online and offline tests of the telephone sets, an rf sweep and a physical search of the room and its furnishings. No devices were found.

From a security standpoint, several unused 25 pair telephone cables appear in the room and pose a potential hazard. You may want to consider removing them.

If I may be of any further assistance in this regard, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Norman A. Zigrossi
Special Agent in Charge

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DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

62-97308-1060x/

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 05-19-2011

Date 9/20/84

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-97308) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 (ATTN: SSA [redacted] TSD)

b6
 b7C

FROM: SAC, WFO (62-8247)

TSCM

Security Surveys

All markings, notations and items of information contained in this communication are classified "~~Confidential~~" unless otherwise noted.

Re teletype dated 8/12/84, advising of request for sweeps at Department of Justice.

Enclosed for FBIHQ is one copy of an LHM replying to DOJ's request. The original LHM has been sent to [redacted], Security Staff, DOJ.

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 b7C

Requested sweep was conducted 9/7 through 9/14/84, by WFO SAs [redacted] and DON [redacted] with assistance from ALBERT E. JARRELL, FBIHQ. It included suites/rooms 1111, 4111, 2105, 2109, 2111, 2114, 2115, 2208 and 2229. No devices were found.

On and offline telephone checks were made using the Dektor Telephone Analyzer; rf checks were made with the PR700A and Scanlock/Compuscan receivers; and physical searches were made using the non-linear junction detector.

62-97308-1060X2

On and off hook voltage and current measurements were normal for the trunk lines tested. These include 628-1444; 633-1527, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2333, 2334, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2633, 2634, 2636, 2637, 3033, 3101, 3102, 3103, 3104, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3729, 4654, 4655, 4656, 4674, 4675, 5127, 5500, 5597, 5626 and 5650; 737-0664 (inactive) and 789-1558 (a direct dial outside line).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1737

Declassify on: OADR

Approved: (2) - Bureau (Enc. 1)
 (1-62-97308)

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

2 - WFO

(1-66-5539)

DV:smt

(4)

APR 24 1985

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 b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Offline tests were conducted on the following instruments:

Suite 1111

Sta. 110 D, WECO 2631 DAM
Sta. 110 E, WECO 2630 CM
Sta. 110 F, WECO 2830 CM
Sta. 110 J, WECO 2830 CM
Sta. 110 K, WECO 2830 CM
Sta. 110 L, WECO 2830 CM
Sta. 110 AH, WECO 2830 CM

Suite 4111

Sta. 413 P, WECO 2831 CM
Sta. 413 Q, WECO 2831 CM
Sta. 413 R, WECO 2830 CM

Room 2105

Sta. 202 G, WECO 2631 DAM
Sta. 202 H, WECO 2631 DAM

Room 2107

WECO 2630 CM

Room 2110

WECO 2830 CM

Room 2111

WECO 2631 DAM

Room 2115

Sta. 202 AA, WECO 2565 HKM
Sta. 202 M, WECO 2631 DAM

Room 2206

Sta. 202 Q, WECO 2565 HKM
Sta. 202 AB, WECO 2565 HKM

Room 2208

Sta. 202 R, WECO 2565 HKM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 62-8247

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Suite 2229 A/B (rooms 2232 and 2234)

Sta. 206 K, WECO 2831 CM

Sta. 206 J, WECO 2830 CM

Sta. 206 AH, WECO 2831 CM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

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DATE 05-19-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



7411
341

To : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: Technical Services Division Date 11/7/84
SSA [REDACTED]

From : SAC, LOS ANGELES (66F-7387)

b6
b7C

Subject : LOS ANGELES DIVISION
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SCHOOL

Security Surveys

Re Los Angeles monthly Technical Reports 7/13/84 and 10/10/84.

The Los Angeles Division has one trained Technically Trained Agent in Electronic Countermeasures and he is the Technical Coordinator. Due to the increased technical coordinator administrative duties and to the increased demand for Electronic Countermeasures, the Los Angeles Division requests training for two Technically Trained Agents in Electronic Countermeasures.

Los Angeles requests that Technically Trained Agents [REDACTED] attend the next available Electronic Countermeasures In-Service.

b6
b7C

If there are no available Electronic Countermeasures schools, Los Angeles recommends and will host a regional Electronic Countermeasures school to be held in the Los Angeles area during February or March, 1985.

18

DE-188 62-97308-1062

10 NOV 27 1984

③ - Bureau
1 - Los Angeles

WHS/llp
(4)



b6
b7C

98 JUL 27 1985

97 JUL 25 1985

Letter sent 11/23/84 by TSD

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *was/co*

Date 11/14/84

From : R. W. Witzel *raw/wat*

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)

PURPOSE: To report the results of a TSCM survey of the Director's office and conference room.

DETAILS: On November 9, 1984 ETs [redacted] and [redacted] conducted a TSCM survey of the Director's office and conference room in the JEH Building. No evidence of clandestine listening devices or tampering with the telephone or telephone lines was found at the time of the survey.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED: _____
Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *was/co*
Training _____

- 1 - Director's Office
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [redacted]

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b7C

AEG/er
AEG/crb (5)
crb

62-97308-1064

NOV 20 1984

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48 JUL 20 1985 97 AUG 22 1985 751

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10/26/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

*FOABTERR JK NYDE HQ H0086 *H04C0R 261700Z OCT 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-97308)

TO FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE

ATTENTION: SSA [REDACTED]

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FBI JACKSONVILLE

ATTENTION: SA [REDACTED]

BT

Security Source

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED

~~"CONFIDENTIAL."~~

REFERENCE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL OF SSA [REDACTED] TO
NEW YORK SA [REDACTED] OCTOBER 25, 1984.

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THE JACKSONVILLE DIVISION HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE TO
CONDUCT TSCM SURVEYS IN THEIR DIVISION.

NEW YORK IS REQUESTED TO SEND TSCM TRAINED PERSONNEL TO
JACKSONVILLE TO ASSIST THEM IN THEIR REQUEST.

FW

NEW YORK PERSONNEL SHOULD CARRY TSCM EQUIPMENT WITH THEM.

- wc9/87*
- 1 - MR. BAYSE
 - 1 - MR. WITZEL
 - 1 - MR. JOHNSON
 - 1 - [REDACTED]

ET/NSD (53)

10/26/84 18035H

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62-97308-1065

1 OCT 30 1984

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98 FEB 01 1985 *AN*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~PAGE TWO DE HQ 0086 CONFIDENTIAL~~

COORDINATION FOR DATES AND LODGING ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE

20 MADE WITH JACKSONVILLE SA [REDACTED]

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18 ~~CLASSIFIED BY: 84 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

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DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-19-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE: JACKSONVILLE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH
TSCM OF THEIR HEADQUARTERS CITY OFFICE AND OF THEIR RAS.
NEW YORK HAS TWO TTAS TRAINED IN TSCM.

Memorandum

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-19-2011



BS 141

To : DIRECTOR, FBI Date 11/13/84
(ATTENTION: TRAINING DIVISION AND TECHNICAL SERVICE DIVISION)

From : SAC, ALEXANDRIA (66-55)

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE (COUNTER)
MEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Security Surveys

Reference Director teletype to Alexandria dated October 3, 1984.

This entire communication is classified "~~Confidential~~."

On October 3, 1984, a thorough TSCM was conducted in classrooms 310 and 312 of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) ACADEMY. No intercept or attempted intercept devices were located.

While the overall security at the QUANTICO TRAINING COMPLEX appears to be adequate, the use of training classrooms for high-level conferences is not recommended from a TSCM stand point. These classrooms were designed for training purposes utilizing State of the Art Audio Visual Aids, which could be utilized for a technical surveillance. The following are items prone to attack by anyone desiring technical coverage of classroom 312:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
7	Speaker elements
1	Microphone
3	Television Sets
1	Master Control Panel, with large wiring train leaving classroom
55	Wire cables leaving classroom (1 at each desk position)
1	Telephone
9	Miscellaneous jacks leaving classroom
6	Blank receptacle covers

62-97308-1067X

12 JAN 25 1985

④-Bureau - 2 det QX (1-TSD-ES, EAM) ED
2-Alexandria
(1-66-55)
(1-66-54)
JWB:pdj
(8)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 08 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AX 66-55

9	AC recepticables
1	AC powered clock
7	AC switches
1	Video screen, with wire leaving classroom
2	Removable ceiling panels
1	Removable wall panel
1	Thermostat
2	AC powered exit signs

Miscellaneous lights and air events

The results of the above TSCM survey were provided
to SSA [redacted] Training Division, Quantico.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ ~~AIRTEL~~

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 05-19-2011

Date 2/8/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-97308) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 (ATTN: SA [redacted] EAU, TSD)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-5539) (TSS)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
 COUNTERMEASURES MATTERS (TSCM)

Security Sweep

All markings, notations and items of information contained in this communication are classified "~~Confidential~~" unless otherwise noted.

Re letter from FBIHQ, dated 1/3/85, which advised of a 10/30/84 request from the Department of Justice for security sweeps of rooms 3143 and 6725 at the main building and room 200 at the Federal Triangle Building.

Enclosed for FBIHQ are two copies of a confidential LHM reporting the results of the sweep. By previous arrangement with SA [redacted] EAU, TSD, the original LHM has been forwarded to [redacted] Security Staff, Room 6531, U.S. Department of Justice, 10th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20530.

Per above request, the sweeps were conducted 2/4/85 by

[redacted] (FBIHQ) and WFO [redacted] and [redacted]
 [redacted] No devices were found.

The sweeps included on-line and off-line checks of the telephone instruments using the Dektor Telephone Analyzer, rf searches using the Scanlock receiver and physical searches.

For reference, the below listed telephone instruments and lines were checked during the sweep. On and off-hook voltages and current draw measurements were normal and all detections found during the off-line tests were normally found wiring connections for WECO instruments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 1737
 Declassify on: OADR

Approved: 1-750-65 Transmitted

1 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
 1 - WFO
 (1-Attachment)

DV: smt
 (3)

(Number) (Time)

Per [redacted]

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DEC 04 1985

WFO 66-5539

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Room 3143, Civil Division

A. Assistant Attorney General's Office

1. Instruments:

- a. WECO 2831 CM, Station 309 N
- b. WECO 2831 CM, Station 309 P

B. Receptionists' Area

1. Instruments:

- a. WECO 2631 DAM 1 (30 button "Call Director"), Station 309 Q
- b. WECO 2631 DAM 1 (30 button "Call Director"), Station 309 R
- c. WECO 2631 DAM 1 (30 button "Call Director"), Station 309 S
- d. WECO 2500 MM (single line), station number 633-3304

2. Lines: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (All lines are common to above
"Call Director.")

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Room 6725, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

A. Court Room

- 1. Instrument: WECO 2565 HKM, Station 614C
- 2. Lines: [REDACTED]

B. Receptionist's Desk

- 1. Instrument: WECO 2565 HKM, Station 614 A
- 2. Lines: Same as court room's

C. Legal Advisor's Office

- 1. Instrument: WECO 2565 HKM, Station 614B
- 2. Lines: Same as court room's

Room 200 Federal Triangle Building

A. Attorney's Office

- 1. Instrument: WECO 2631 DAM (modified for 18 buttons), Station 200AF
- 2. Lines: [REDACTED]

WFO 66-5539

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. Receptionist's Area

1. Instruments

- a. WECO 2631 DAM, Station 200AC
- b. WECO 2631 DAM, Station 200AD

2. Lines: Same as attorney's office

C. Advisor's office

- 1. Instrument: WECO 2630 DAM, Station 200AE
- 2. Lines: Same as attorney's



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
February 8, 1985

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b7C

Security Staff, Room 6531
U.S. Department of Justice
10th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20530

This letter is in response to your request on October 30, 1984 to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) for security sweeps of rooms 3143 and 6725 at the Department's main building and Room 200 at the Federal Triangle Building.

The sweeps were conducted February 4, 1985 by countermeasures trained personnel from FBIHQ and the Washington Field Office (WF). They included on and off line checks of the telephone instruments and lines, a rf sweep, and a physical search. No devices were found.

You are cautioned that these sweeps cannot guarantee absolute security from microphonic and/or telephonic surveillances of these offices. Discretion must still be exercised when sensitive matters are discussed, especially when the telephone system is used.

If we may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Norman A. Zigrossi
Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. WAB/BS
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse WAB
From : RWO/WAB
R. W. Witzel

Date 2/20/85

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS
ENGINEERING RESEARCH FACILITY (ERF)
NEWINGTON, VIRGINIA

Security Surveys

This document is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

PURPOSE: To set forth details of a TSCM survey conducted of the of the ERF space, Newington, Virginia.

RECOMMENDATION: That TSCM surveys continue to be performed at the ERF in compliance with MIOG, Part II, Section 16 - 7.2 (b), which states that TSCM surveys should be conducted in six month intervals.

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. <u>WAB/BS</u>
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

DETAILS: During the period of November 26, 1984, through December 2, 1984, a TSCM survey was conducted of the completed portion of the ERF. The TSCM survey was conducted with the assistance of 5 Technically Trained Agents from the field offices. The TSCM survey included a radio frequency (RF) search, thorough physical and electronic search and a thorough inspection of the Electronic Private Branch Exchange (EPBX), a DIMENSION 400 system serving the ERF.

No evidence of any clandestine listening devices or tampering of the telephone system was found during the survey.

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [Redacted]

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CLASSIFIED BY: 8
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

ET:hsd (5)

(CONTINUED - OVER 27 1985)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEC 04 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from R. W. Witzel to Mr. Bayse
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS
ENGINEERING RESEARCH FACILITY (ERF)
NEWINGTON, VIRGINIA

The following are the findings of the inspection of the
EPBX:

A. A cable enters the building and makes its only appearance in the switchroom, where 300 pairs attach to 66-type blocks. The first four blocks (100 pairs) contain pairs leading to the central office. According to information furnished by the Building Manager, the other 200 pairs are unterminated in a boot at the road outside the building. The FBI's trunks (19 ground-start, or 19 pairs), and (15 four-wire tie trunks, or 30 pairs) enter on this cable. They total 52 pairs, and only these 52 pairs are cross-connected from that cable to other terminal blocks in the switchroom.

The following checks were conducted on the 300 pairs:

- (1) Voltage checks between wires on each pair
- (2) Voltage checks between each wire and ground
- (3) Audio checks between wires of each pair
- (4) Audio checks between each wire and ground
- (5) Oscilloscope checks between wire of each pair
- (6) Oscilloscope checks between each wire and ground
- (7) Conductance checks between each wire and all other wires of the 200 floating pairs
- (8) Conductance checks between each wire of the 200 floating pairs and ground
- (9) All cross-connects from this cable were checked to insure that only 52 legitimate pairs are further connected inside the facility.

B. In addition to the FBI's legitimate trunks enumerated in paragraph A above, at least 23 other pairs appearing in the cable are trunks which have nothing to do with the FBI. Eighteen of them are loop-start lines, four are ground-start lines evidently in service on one or more PBXs, and one is a pair, both wires of which are at the same -50.6 VDC potential to ground, which contains telephone conversations most of the working day. Each

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum from R. W. Witzel to Mr. Bayse
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS
ENGINEERING RESEARCH FACILITY (ERF)
NEWINGTON, VIRGINIA

one of these (except the last one with same potential on each wire) can be seized, and dial tone drawn, by a lineman's handset in the FBI switchroom.

C. All connections of the PBX purple connector field (all AX, LX, TX and TCX cables) and PBX red connector field (all KX cables) were checked for legitimacy, from which it was ascertained that all cross-connects from the PBX fields to station and trunk connector blocks are legitimate. The following checks were performed on all station pairs at the cross-connect point from the PBX field:

- (1) Voltage checks between wires of each pair
- (2) Voltage checks between each wire and ground
- (3) Audio checks between wires of each pair
- (4) Audio checks between each wire and ground
- (5) Oscilloscope checks between wires of each pair
- (6) Oscilloscope checks between each wire and ground
- (7) Ohmmeter checks on all pairs which contained no voltage

D. The checks made in C, above, were done without any telephones connected downstairs. Therefore, although useful checks of the wiring were accomplished, further checks should be made at a later date on the downstairs part of the DIMENSION system's station network.

E. No off-line tests were made on any telephones.

F. A copy of a Telephone Security Panel approved procedure for updating master memory tapes is being sent to the Building Manager for consideration. This procedure, if followed, will add to security of the system by insuring that the master program tape of the DIMENSION system contains only translations entered by authorized personnel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-19-2011



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To : Mr. Bayse *was/eb*

Date 3/14/85

From : *R. W. Witzel*

Security Surveys

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) SURVEY;
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE ROOM, at 7142, FBIHQ

This document is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety,
unless otherwise noted. (U)

PURPOSE: To report results of TSCM survey conducted of Executive
Conference Room at 7142, FBIHQ, on 3/7/85. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only. (U)

was/eb

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Tech. Servs. *was/eb*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

DETAILS: On 3/7/85, personnel from the Electronic Analysis Unit
(EAU), conducted a TSCM survey of the Executive Conference
Room at 7142, FBIHQ.

The survey consisted of a nondestructive physical and
electronic search, physical and electronic examination of the
telephone instruments and lines serving the area and a search of
the radio frequency spectrum.

No discrepancies were noted in the technical
performance of the telephone system nor was there an indication
of clandestine listening devices or radio frequency transmitters.
Nothing was noted which would indicate any type of technical
attack directed against this conference room.

The TSCM survey was conducted by SSA [redacted]
and [redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Witzel
- 1 - Mr. Johnson
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

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5/21/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#FL128ERR KCIDE HQ 40178 1412100TYCTR 211848Z MAY 85

FM DIRECTOR FBI (80-805)

TO FBI KANSAS CITY ROUTINE

PERSONNEL ATTENTION: SAC

BT

Security, Surveys

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS.

THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. (U)

REFERENCE YOUR TELETYPE DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1985; BUREAU

AIRTEL DATED DECEMBER 3, 1984, CAPTIONED TECHNICALLY TRAINED

AGENTS (TTA) KANSAS CITY DIVISION; BUREAU TELEPHONE CALLS OF

SSA [REDACTED] TO KANSAS CITY SA [REDACTED] ON

MARCH 26, 1985 AND TO KANSAS CITY SA [REDACTED] ON

MARCH 26, 1985 AND MAY 14, 1985; AND MIOG, PART II, SECTION

16-17.1 (9), PAGE 1286.06.

IN REGARDS TO YOUR REQUEST FOR BUREAU POLICY ON UTILIZING

NON-BUREAU SPACE FOR SENSITIVE MEETINGS, THERE IS CURRENTLY NO

RTT/ [REDACTED] 5/21/85 1413 110-3145

1 - EACH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (FOR INFORMATION ONLY)

2 - MR. STOOPS (ROOM 5425)

ATTN: MR. CUNNINGHAM

ATTN: [REDACTED]

1 - MR. BAYSE

1 - MR. KILLION

1 - MR. JOHNSON

1 - [REDACTED]

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12 MAY 21 1985

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

05/23
MAY 22 1985

74 SEP 9 1985

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

100-300

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~DISSEMINATION DE HQ 0178 CONFIDENTIAL~~

WRITTEN POLICY ON THIS MATTER. TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
(TSD) DISCOURAGES THE USE OF HOTEL AND MOTEL CONFERENCE ROOMS
FOR DISCUSSIONS OF SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. HOWEVER,
IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT MOST FIELD OFFICES DO NOT HAVE THE
FACILITIES TO ACCOMMODATE LARGE GROUPS FOR MEETINGS AND THAT
NON-BUREAU FACILITIES HAVE TO BE USED. HOWEVER, WHENEVER
POSSIBLE, OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY CONFERENCE ROOMS
SHOULD BE USED FOR THESE MEETINGS. PRIOR TO ANY CLASSIFIED
CONFERENCE OR MEETING A THOROUGH TSCM SURVEY MUST BE CONDUCTED
AND CONTEMPORANEOUS MONITORING OF THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED DURING THE ENTIRE MEETING. THE CONFERENCE
ROOM AND ASSOCIATED PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM SHOULD BE UNDER
THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF AN FBI EMPLOYEE DURING THE ENTIRE
CONFERENCE PERIOD. SENSITIVE MATERIAL SHOULD NOT BE LEFT IN
THE CONFERENCE ROOM UNATTENDED DURING THE DAY. OVERNIGHT, THE
MATERIAL SHOULD BE STORED IN AN APPROVED SECURITY CONTAINER AND
HAVE THE CONFERENCE ROOM UNDER THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FBI
AT ALL TIMES.

CONCERNING THE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO CONDUCT TSCM
SURVEYS IN YOUR DIVISION, TTAS FROM THE CHICAGO DIVISION WILL

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 3

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~PAGE THREE DE HQ 0128 CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTACT SA [REDACTED] TO COORDINATE THE TIME OF MUTUAL
20 AGREEMENT TO PERFORM THE TECHNICAL SECURITY CHECKS.

18 SAC MAY CONSIDER REACTIVATING SA [REDACTED] TO CONDUCT
TECHNICAL DUTIES AND PERFORM TSCM SURVEYS. SA [REDACTED] IS
16 TSCM TRAINED AND HAS RECEIVED ADVANCED TSCM TRAINING. AS
STATED IN REFERENCED MIOG SECTION, TSCM SURVEYS SHOULD BE
14 PERFORMED BY TSCM TRAINED TTAS. IF SA [REDACTED] IS NOT
REACTIVATED AS A TTA, KANSAS CITY SHOULD SUBMIT THE NAME
12 OF A TTA FOR TSCM TRAINING. TSD ANTICIPATES HAVING A TSCM
PHASE I IN-SERVICE AROUND OCTOBER/NOVEMBER TIME FRAME.

10 FOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS COMMUNICATION, PLEASE CALL
FBIHQ, SSA [REDACTED]

~~CLASSIFIED BY B1 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

BT

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-19-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

NOTE: THIS HAS BEEN COORDINATED BY SSA [REDACTED] WITH
DIVISION FOUR SECTION CHIEF GARY L. STOOPS, ASSISTANT SECTION
CHIEF JOSEPH C. MOORE, JR., UNIT CHIEF JOHN F. CUNNINGHAM
AND SSA [REDACTED]

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FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/23/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 ATTN: SA [REDACTED] TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION

FROM: SAC, PHOENIX (66-58)

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES Survey (TSCM)
 OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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b7C

On 7/11/85, SAs [REDACTED] of the Phoenix Division;
 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Chicago Division and
 [REDACTED] of the Technical Services Division, conducted
 a TSCM Survey of the office of the Attorney General, State of
 Arizona, located at 1275 W. Washington, Phoenix, Arizona.

During this survey, seven offices, one conference room
 and eight telephone instruments were checked. The telephones
 were all model 2830 CM's and were manufactured by Western Electric.
 A radio frequency (RF) examination plus a physical examination
 was also conducted.

No problems or discrepancies were encountered while
 conducting this TSCM Survey, and no recommendations to the requestor
 were necessary.

The office of the Attorney General advised by separate
 communication.

*The attorney General was
 advised of the outcome -*

2 Bureau
 1 - Phoenix

JAH:lss
 (3)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

26 AUG 8 1985

W. Johnson
62-97303-1071
SAK/4/4

74 SEP 3 1985 C

Memorandum

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-19-2011



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Exec AD Inv. _____
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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

KBS
U
To : Mr. Geer *JK*
Date 8/30/85
From : W. A. Bayse *WAB*
Security Surveys
Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS

This document is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

REFERENCE: Telephone call on 8/16/85, from SSA [redacted] CI-3 Section, Office of Foreign Missions, U. S. Department of State, to SSA [redacted] Electronic Analysis Unit (EAU), Engineering Section, Technical Services Division. *WAB* *NAK*

PURPOSE: To report on the TSCM survey conducted at the U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C. in support of briefing given by the FBI to officials in the intelligence community.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

APPROVED:

Director
Exec AD-Adm
Exec AD-Inv
Exec AD-LES

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. *WAB*
Training _____

DETAILS: On 8/20/85, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a TSCM survey of the Conference Room 6210 at the U.S. Department of State.

The TSCM survey consisted of a radio frequency check, an electronic survey of power outlets, and a cursory physical examination of the room. No evidence of any eaves-dropping or tampering was noted during the survey.

The TSCM survey was conducted by SSA [redacted] and Electronics Technician [redacted] *(CP)*

1 - Mr. Geer
Attn: [redacted]

Classified by 8
Declassify on: OADR

62-97308-1072

1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Killion *SAK*
1 - Mr. Johnson

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1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

JWS/cmb (8)

~~SECRET~~

DEC 06 1985

FBI/DOJ

AIRTEL

9/26/85

Director, FBI

All SACs

SECURITY SURVEY OF BUREAU FACILITIES

It has been brought to the attention of FBIHQ that the Federal Protective Service (FPS), General Services Administration (GSA), has been conducting physical security surveys of Government buildings, including FBI space. These surveys of Government facilities are conducted by the GSA under the authority of Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 101, Subpart 101-20.5 - Physical Protection.

For information, these physical security surveys range from small blocks of leased space to comprehensive complex facilities and are conducted once every four years for all GSA controlled property and buildings as a part of the standard level protection provided under the Standard Level Users Charge (SLUC). The surveys are part of the FPS's security and crime prevention program and are designed to identify risks, assess crime potential, and evaluate weaknesses in current operations of occupant agencies. These security surveys are conducted with the intent to provide a safe work environment for Federal employees and customers and to protect Government property by recognizing, appraising, and taking action against potential problems.

The security surveys and reports have included location of space, physical description, access areas, locking devices, alarm systems, and photographs of areas. Though parts of such surveys and reports concerning FBI space may be public record, i.e., location and outside appearance, dissemination of information relative to inside operations and security features of FBI space represents serious security concerns, inasmuch as this information must not be routinely disseminated outside the FBI.

Should any attempt be made by the GSA to conduct a physical security survey of Bureau space, GSA officials should be

Exec AD-Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

1 - Each Executive Assistant Director
1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Security Programs Unit
1 - Security Unit

b6
b7C

(SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

MAIL ROOM

62-97308-1073

WFO:crv (24) JAN 13 1987

Airtel to All SACs

RE: Security Survey of Bureau Facilities

advised of the requirement to protect the integrity of FBI space and security systems. Although contact with survey personnel may enhance overall building or site security for Government employees, no surveys should be conducted in FBI space that may jeopardize operational security and the reasons for not permitting the survey should be explained to appropriate personnel.

NOTE: This airtel based upon inquiries from field offices regarding the physical security surveys being conducted by the GSA. Airtel submitted to all offices explaining this situation and the need to maintain the integrity of FBI space security.

RECEIVED
FBI
JAN 10 1964
JAN 10 1964
JAN 10 1964
JAN 10 1964
JAN 10 1964

Memorandum

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-12-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

165

1/11/85
Johnson



Subject

Security Survey of a Senior Management Office

Date

To

William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

B. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the following Department senior management office spaces:

<u>Building</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Office</u>
Main	5111	The Attorney General

I request that the survey be conducted on September 12 or 13, 1985 during the Attorney General's absence.

Please have members of your staff contact [redacted] of this staff on [redacted] for further information.

(2)

Completed
9/12/85
RD

62-97308-1074

3 DEC 17 1985

SFR

APR 17 1987

1.5.85

LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE

APR 17 1987

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 06-19-2011



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Adm. Servs. _____
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Public Affs. _____
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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WAB/100*

Date 10/25/85

From : S. A. Killion *J.A.K. 10/25/85*

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)/
DEFENSE MOBILIZATION SYSTEMS PLANNING ACTIVITY (DMSPA)

Security Surveys

This document is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its entirety,
unless otherwise noted. (U)

PURPOSE: To note request by DMSPA for a TSCM at Roswell,
New Mexico.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. *WAB/100*
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

DETAILS: Based on a telephone call from Deputy Assistant
Director KIER T. BOYD to Acting Section Chief

STEVEN A. KILLION, SSA [redacted] called [redacted]
(phonetic) at telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] on 10/16/85. [redacted] requested that a TSCM survey
be conducted at one of their locations in Roswell, New Mexico.
He also asked SSA [redacted] to contact [redacted] or
more details.

On same day, [redacted] was telephonically contacted
at telephone number [redacted] who in turn asked that [redacted]
be contacted in Albuquerque, New Mexico, telephone number [redacted]
for additional details and as the point-of-contact.
SSA [redacted] contacted [redacted] and advised him that SA [redacted]
[redacted] from the Phoenix Division would be arriving Albuquerque
on thursday to conduct the requested TSCM survey and that
additional agent personnel would also assist SA [redacted]

(Continued-Over)

NOV 1 1985

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Killion b6
- 1 - Mr. Johnson b7C
- 1 - [redacted]

ET:ljn (5)

Classified by ~~8~~
Declassify on OADR

~~SECRET~~

68 JUN 1 1987

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from S. A. Killion to Mr. Bayse
RE: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)/
DEFENSE MOBILIZATION SYSTEMS PLANNING ACTIVITY (DMSPA)

Telephonic contact with Messrs. [] and [] had all indicated that the TSCM survey had to be conducted prior to 10/21/85.

Due to the short notice, SSA [] was unable to find additional personnel to assist SA [] and was going to travel to Albuquerque to conduct the TSCM survey, however, SA [] had contacted Mr. [] who advised him that if SA [] arrived Albuquerque on thursday that the TSCM survey could be conducted the same evening. Based on [] comment SA [] believed he could conduct the TSCM survey by himself.

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SA [] will advise [] that a more thorough TSCM survey can be conducted with more advance notice so that plans for additional personnel and equipment can be made.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

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gu
Subject: Security Survey of Senior Management Offices

Date

MAR 26 1986

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

To: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: *D. Jerry Rubino*
D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

It is requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct a microphone and telephone security survey of the following Department senior management office spaces:

<u>Building</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Office</u>
Main	4208	Deputy Attorney General

Please have members of your staff contact [redacted] of this staff on [redacted] for further information.

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SA [redacted]
WILL HANDLE THIS.
HE WILL CALL AND MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS.
3/31/86
22

62-97308-1075X

23 MAY 15 1986

WFO Airtel 4/22/86 with
ATT. copy of letter to Mr. [redacted]
Advise of memo to Security Staff
[redacted] 4/29/86

UNITED
OFFICIAL USE

JUN 18 1987

Memorandum

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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. McCreight *Alm*
Date January 13, 1987
From : *[Redacted]*
Security Programs Manager
Subject : *Survey*
SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES (S/CM) WORKING GROUP
MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING, JANUARY 13, 1987

The first meeting of the S/CM Working Group was held January 13, 1987, at 9 a.m. Those in attendance were:

Identification:

[Redacted]

Criminal Investigative:

[Redacted]

Training:

[Redacted]

Laboratory:

[Redacted]

Administrative Services:

[Redacted]

Technical Services:

[Redacted]

Records Management:

John F. Cunningham

[Redacted]

Legal Counsel:

[Redacted]

Intelligence:

[Redacted]

Inspection:
no attendee

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[Handwritten signature]

Security issues discussed at this S/CM Working Group meeting included:

62-47308-1076

1. Opening remarks by *[Redacted]* Security Programs Manager, focusing on short- and long-term goals of the S/CM Working Group, to include: pooling resources together; detecting vulnerabilities in personnel, equipment, and operations; developing policy; using stop-gap measures to take care of immediate identified problems in the short term.

62 MAR 31 1987

- 1 - Mr. Glover
- 1 - Mr. Otto
- 1 - *[Redacted]*
- 1 - Each Assistant Director (Mr.)

- 1 - *[Redacted]*
- 1 - *[Redacted]*
- 1 - *[Redacted]*
- 1 - Each Attendee Listed Above (M)

- 1 - Case File S/CM
- 1 - OS FO-File

GLS:jml (39)
jml

4/1/88 jml

(CONTINUED - OVER)

JUN 16 1987 *gpm*

PERS. REC. UNIT

FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from [] to Mr. McCreight
Re: Security Countermeasures (S/CM) Working Group
Minutes of First Meeting, January 13, 1987

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2. Implementation of the FBI's Industrial Security Program (ISP) was approved by Judge Webster September 3, 1986. The Department of Justice, on January 12, 1987, formally approved the FBI's request for an independent ISP, exempting the FBI from the Department of Justice Order and dependence on the Defense Investigative Service.

There were two primary reasons for the development of an independent ISP for the FBI: 1) The Defense Investigative Service could not get the required investigations done on a timely basis; and 2) the FBI at times did not want to disclose to the Defense Investigative Service the nature of its classified contracts.

The Defense Investigative Service retains primary responsibility for the inspection of facilities in connection with the U.S. Government's ISP. The Department of Energy, National Security Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency, each has their own ISP. Those four agencies, with their expertise and personnel, will be consulted regularly while the FBI develops its own ISP.

Our ISP must include: clearances of top echelon personnel of the parent corporation, personnel involved with the contract, subsidiaries involved; accounting for FBI material (classified and unclassified) provided to the contractor; furnish user's guides for the safeguarding of National Security Information.

3. Develop user's guides for the ISP and provide them to each Headquarters and Field Office Security Officer to outline rules, regulations, and procedures. These guides should be developed from those used by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of Energy, and the Defense Investigative Service.
4. Develop immediate "stop-gap" measures on the following current vulnerabilities as part of the short-term goals:

Group R-1 and Group R-1, combination locks, which are General Services Administration-approved for the U.S. Government's use; and the

Burroughs hard disk, which is not adequately safeguarded from penetration, even with the use of passwords.

5. A long-term goal should be to develop strategy in budgeting and funding for the Bureau's security countermeasures. Countermeasures must be included as a part of the Bureau's foreign counterintelligence and criminal missions.

Memorandum from [] to Mr. McCreight
Re: Security Countermeasures (S/CM) Working Group
Minutes of First Meeting, January 13, 1987

6. Presentation by the Contract Review Unit, Administrative Services Division, furnished an overview of the contract process with the two types of contracts: sole-source contract, wherein the company chosen generally has both facility and personnel security clearances from the Defense Investigative Service; and competitive contracts. The present policy is for the requesting Division to be responsible for certifying the clearances of the contractor's personnel, and ensuring the company can have access to and properly store classified information.

Discussion of the type and scope of background investigations required for the granting of a "Secret" security clearance, and the granting of a facilities clearance: All personnel involved with the hierarchy of a subsidiary/company/corporation and those involved with the actual contract must be certified with the proper clearances before the subsidiary/company/corporation can receive a facilities clearance. Interim security clearances for contractor personnel can be granted by the Department of Justice, pending completion of the required security clearance investigation.

Before interim clearances can be granted, the following basic criteria must be met: satisfactory credit, arrest, and indices check of the field and Headquarters indices, and passing a polygraph examination, if deemed necessary.

In summary, the requesting Division submits the contract proposal to the Contract Review Unit which awards the contract and, in turn, the Security Programs Unit is advised to handle personnel and facility clearance certifications and, when needed, conduct the necessary investigations for the granting of personnel and facility clearances.

7. Technical Services Division presentation centered on the methodology of its contract arrangements with the private sector regarding National Security Information.

This Division deals primarily with companies already handling classified contracts with other U.S. Government agencies and, therefore, these companies are familiar with handling such information. However, they do have contact with companies with old (ten/twenty years) Defense Investigative Service clearances which must be updated.

When a contract is awarded to a company for the Technical Services Division, the company must submit a list of people holding Defense Investigation Service clearances, which clearances are all re-verified by the Technical Services Division Security Officer, together with the date of their clearance; who, in addition:

Memorandum from [] to Mr. McCreight
Re: Security Countermeasures (S/CM) Working Group
Minutes of First Meeting, January 13, 1987

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reviews all security measures in place; checks the information the contractor has been provided; ensures a signed form (SF-189a) is received from each person who has access, and these people have "Secret" clearances and a "need-to-know." The SF-189a enables an individual to be briefed into a special access program.

Written authority from the FBI is required before the contractor is allowed to show/divulge any FBI information to anyone (subsidiary/subcontractor).

The Technical Services Division maintains a data base with the name of each person working on any of their contracts, their work place, clearance level, and what project the individual is assigned to.

Problems encountered by Technical Services Division include:

Central Intelligence Agency's reluctance to furnish the FBI information regarding Sensitive Compartmented Information access data;

The "Secret" clearance level issued by the Defense Investigative Service is based on a National Agency Check, but should include, at a minimum, a local credit and arrest check;

Defense Investigative Service's inspections at facilities used by both that Service and the FBI have resulted in the Defense Investigative Service seizing FBI documents because they are not covered by the DD-254 form, used to accompany classified documents by the Defense Investigative Service. (It was proposed the FBI develop its own form for its own information based on the DD-254, especially when the FBI grants the facility clearance.)

8. A discussion of where personnel resources to handle the burgeoning security workload would come from disclosed most of the personnel being assigned to the Security Programs Unit were coming from the Records Management Division, and there was some reprogramming of Direct Agent Work Years from the Foreign Counterintelligence Program.

The Field Office Security Officers' responsibilities will, most likely, result in the Security Officer becoming a full-time position, along the lines of the Principal Legal Advisor or the Privacy Control Officer. Instead of Headquarters personnel traveling to conduct facilities inspections, it is anticipated the responsible Field Office Security Officer will conduct these inspections and reinspections, once properly trained to do them.

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. McCreight
Re: Security Countermeasures (S/CM) Working Group
Minutes of First Meeting, January 13, 1987

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9. The Drug Enforcement Administration does not enter into the FBI's ISP or security clearance arena until the two agencies are fully merged, which appears unlikely unless the law is changed to allow the Drug Enforcement Administration to become an "excepted service."
10. The next S/CM Working Group meeting will be held February 24, 1987, from 10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in Room 5641; to include discussion of the A-76 potential contract problem wherein maintenance, library, and warehouse positions at Quantico will be contracted out (wage grade employees) requiring either a "Top Secret" clearance or the same type of investigation for access into FBI space.

In addition to A-76, discussion will include all service contracts not involving National Security Information, i.e., computer repairmen, photocopier repairmen, etc.

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____		Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

[Handwritten signature: J. M.] *[Handwritten initials: J. M.]*

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-19-2011



Exec AD Adm. _____
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Ident. _____
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Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *was* Date 3/23/87

From :

[Redacted]

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b7C

1075

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
U.S. CAPITOL ROOM H310

Security Survey

This document is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

PURPOSE: To report the results of a TSCM check on Room H310 U.S. Capitol.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only. (U)

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Insp. _____ Tech. Servs. *was* _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

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DETAILS: On 3/11/87, Electronics Technician [Redacted] conducted a TSCM of the House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing Room H310.

The TSCM included a radio frequency spectrum check and a check of the telephone and telephone lines. A nondestructive physical search and a contemporaneous monitoring of the meeting were conducted. No evidence of clandestine listening devices or tampering with the telephones was found.

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Bayse
- 1 - Mr. Ludemann
- 1 - Mr. Johnson *was*
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Jarrell

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62-97308-1077

Classified by 9175
Declassify on: OADR

APR 29 1987

AEJ:df (7)

8/00

JUN 16 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.12 (#3700)

TEXT: BAO003 029 1820Z

PP HQ

DE BA

FZ91825ZJAN87

FM BALTIMORE (66-3840 SUB C) (SQ 4)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BT

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ATTENTION: SSA [REDACTED] ELECTRONIC ANALYSIS UNIT,
ENGINEERING SECTION, NEWINGTON FACILITY

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTER

THE DIRECTOR'S ANNUAL EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED
FOR HARBOR TOWNE, MARTINGHAM, ST. MICHAELS, MARYLAND FOR
FEBRUARY 3, 4 AND 5, 1987, AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT
A TSCM SURVEY AT THE CONFERENCE SITE ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 3,
1987. IT IS REQUESTED THAT A TECHNICIAN FROM THE ENGINEERING
SECTION BE SENT TO ST. MICHAELS ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 3, 1987
TO ASSIST BALTIMORE AGENTS WITH THE TSCM SURVEY. THE TECHNICIAN
SHOULD BRING WITH HIM THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING THE
TSCM SURVEY.

BBT

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*Arranged
1/27/87
with SA [REDACTED]*

*Baltimore
1/29/87*

Johns m [REDACTED]

ED 62-97308-1078

16 MAR 23 1987

CC-TSD, ES, EAU

JUN 23 1987

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ X Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/3/87

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 05-19-2011

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (80-805)
 (TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, EAU, ATTN: SSA [redacted])
 (CID, GFU, ATTN: SSA [redacted])

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (66-5539)

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES
 MATTERS (TSCM), REQUEST FROM U.S.
 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FOR ASSISTANCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

All markings, notations, and items of information
 contained in this communication are classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~"
 unless otherwise noted.

REFERENCES

1. Telcall 1/16/87, from [redacted] (TSD/EAU)
 to SA [redacted] (WFO/TSS) advising the U.S. Veterans
 Administration (VA) had requested a TSCM survey and also
 requesting WFO to assist with the survey.

2. Telcalls 1/27/87, between SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted]
 [redacted] (TSD/EAU) regarding disapproval of the sweep.

Enclosed for FBIHQ is a copy of a letter sent by WFO to
 [redacted] Deputy Inspector General for Investigations,
 U.S. Veterans Administration, 810 Vermont Avenue, N.W.,
 Washington, D.C. 20420, telephone [redacted] setting forth
 the Bureau's TSCM policy and declining FBI countermeasures
 assistance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: 1737
 Declassify on: OADR

②-Bureau (Enc. 2)
 (1- [redacted])
 (1- [redacted])
 1-WFO (Attachment 1)

DV: cdp
 Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

47 AUG 19 1987

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~b6
b7C

For the information of FBIHQ, on 1/20/86, SA [] spoke with [] about the VA's TSCM requirements. [] advised the VA's current Administrator for Veteran's Affairs is a retired general officer who, during his military service, was accustomed to periodic sweeps of his offices and who feels his current office should be swept. There are no problems or other reasons to believe it has been technically compromised, according to []

On 1/27/87, SA [] conferred with SSA [] (TSD/EAU) regarding the VA's request and the appropriateness of doing the sweep vis a vis the Bureau's stated TSCM policy (MIOG, Part II, Section 16-17, page 1286.05). SSA [] concurred that the VA's reason was not in line with the Bureau's policy, and he authorized SA [] to decline the sweep. Accordingly, on 1/27/87, [] was informed the FBI would not perform the sweep.

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UACB WFO is taking no further action in this matter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington Field Office
Washington, D.C. 20535
February 3, 1987

[REDACTED]
U.S. Veterans Administration
810 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420

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DATE 05-19-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg

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Dear [REDACTED]

This is in reference to your agency's request for countermeasures assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and your subsequent conversation with Special Agent [REDACTED] on January 27, 1987.

The Bureau recognizes and appreciates other agencies' needs for security from technical compromise, and its policy is to conduct countermeasures sweeps in response to specific and valid indications that violations of the Interception of Communications (IOC) statute have occurred or to protect matters involving national security. Unfortunately, the FBI's manpower and equipment resources are very limited, and because of the large number of requests it receives it cannot respond to those that do not meet the above criteria. After due consideration of your request, the Bureau feels that it does not satisfy FBI policy requirements and, therefore, must respectfully decline to do the sweep.

If my office can be of any further assistance to you with this matter, please call Supervisory Special Agent [REDACTED]

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b7C

Sincerely yours,

W. Douglas Gow
Special Agent In Charge

62-41328-1079
ENC. 1

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/8/86

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE 05-19-2011

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES PATTERN (TSCM)

Re memo AD SWAPP to AD BAYSE, dated 10/20/86 requesting TSCM service for Director WEBSTER's primary and backup vehicles and telcall from [redacted] TSD/EAU, to SA [redacted] WFO, 10/28/86 requesting WFO to handle the sweep.

Attached for WFO is a copy of re memo.

On 11/5/86, a radio frequency survey and physical search was performed on the Director's primary and two backup vehicles by WFO SAs [redacted] and [redacted] (TSCM trained). No devices were found or indicated.

The 494P spectrum analyzer and Scanlock receiver were used to perform the radio frequency survey.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by: 1737~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

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4-Bureau

②-Special Detail Group, ASD, ATTN: SSA [redacted]
 (2-TSD/OSU, ATTN: SSA [redacted])
 1-WFO (44-5536) (Enc. 1)

EV:edp
 (5)

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JUN 12 1987

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

62-12654

Memorandum

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DATE 05-19-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsg



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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To :

Mr. McCreight

b6
b7C

Date

May 26, 1987

From :

Security Programs Manager

Subject :

SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES (S/CM) WORKING GROUP
MINUTES OF FIFTH MEETING, MAY 26, 1987

The fifth meeting of the S/CM Working Group was held May 26, 1987, at 9 a.m. Those in attendance were:

Identification:

Criminal Investigative:
No representative

Training:

Laboratory:

Administrative Services:
No representative

Technical Services:

Records Management:

Legal Counsel:

John F. Cunningham

b6
b7C

Intelligence:

Inspection:
No representative

Security issues discussed at this S/CM Working Group meeting included:

1. The impact of Physical Security on Bureau operations and the need to have a formalized program in this area. Selected number of field office Security Officers are being brought in to help formulate policy on the storage/access of classified information in the field office, particularly the closed file sections, and to devise procedures to remove them from an open file system into a closed system.

- 1 - Mr. Glover
- 1 - Mr. Otto
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Each Assistant Director (Mr.)

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Cunningham
- 1 - Each Attendee Listed Above (M

- 1 - Case File S/CM
- 1 - OS FO File
- 3 AUG 18 1987

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GLS:jml (30)

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FBI/DOJ

Memorandum from [redacted] Mr. McCreight
Re: Security Countermeasures (S/CM) Working Group
Minutes of Fifth Meeting, May 26, 1987

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file environment to limit access. Ideas by the attendees on this matter should be presented to SSA [redacted] who will author the proposed policy statement for a uniform policy of storing and accessing classified information throughout the FBI.

2. The proposed Top Secret Security Clearance Program was explained and discussed. The Program will consist of the following:
 - a. Applicant investigations and the security adjudications;
 - b. Briefings/Debriefings of new, on-board, and employees separating from the FBI;
 - c. Personnel Security Reinvestigations of on-board employees and the security adjudications; and
 - d. Security Clearance Revocation Process.

The Records Management Division is hopeful this proposed Program will be approved soon.

3. Four new file classifications have been established for Security Programs for TURK purposes:
 - 259 - Security Clearance Investigations for non-FBI personnel;
 - 260 - Industrial Security Program;
 - 261 - Security Officer matters - a "catch-all" not falling into 259 or 260; and
 - 67E - FBI Employee Reinvestigations.
 - a. Marriage Program (marriage of an on-board employee to a non-FBI employee),
 - b. Travel Program (any foreign travel outside the continental United States which should be brought to the attention of the SPU 30 days in advance of the travel in order to review the impact the trip will have on the employee's trustworthiness, to brief the employee concerning the trip, debrief and possibly polygraph the employee upon return),
 - c. FD-285 "Personnel Status and Security Questionnaire" (executed by all FBI employees every two and one-half years, catches various things, such as bankruptcy, traffic arrests, etc., that should have been brought to the Bureau's attention by the employee - such personal

Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. McCreight
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problems constitute both suitability and trustworthiness issues, but will undoubtedly be handled in discipline and dismissal situations as suitability issues most of the time,

- d. Five-Year Reinvestigation Program (consists of a personnel file review and may in the future include credit and criminal checks),
 - e. Sensitive Compartmented Information Access (subjects the individual to credit and criminal checks).
4. The Laboratory Division made a presentation as to the use of computers and diagnostic equipment which meet TEMPEST standards and the problems associated with securing TEMPEST laboratory equipment. It was ascertained the Laboratory Division does not process National Security Information in its computer and laboratory equipment, and any emissions from their equipment would have no value to either hostile intelligence or the criminal element. At the present, the Laboratory Division has no demonstrated need for use of TEMPEST equipment.
 5. The general responsibilities in Government for Computer Security and Communications Security rest with the National Security Agency pursuant to National Security Decision Directive (NSDD). NSDD 145 coordinates computer security throughout the Government and requires a definition of "sensitive but unclassified, but needs protection" information.
 6. The following items were suggested as topics for the next meeting:
 - Neil Price, Technical Services Division (TSD), to discuss Physical Security matters of alarms, locks, and vaults.
 - Another representative from TSD to discuss the security presently used for safeguarding STU IIs and the safes which secure the codes located in certain private residences where they may be unattended for periods of time and may be subjected to break-in/theft. In addition, this representative will discuss the security presently used for the Voice Privacy and Digital Voice Privacy Systems.
 7. The sixth meeting of the S/CM Working Group will be held June 30, 1987, in Room 5641, from 9 to 11 a.m.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Inspection _____	Intell. _____	Laboratory _____	Legal Coun. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs. _____	Rec. Mgmt. _____	Tech. Servs. _____	Training _____
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[Signature] *ARM/BS*

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10/21/87

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Acting Director, FBI

SAC, Denver

UTILIZING THE TELEPHONE
FOR DISSEMINATION OF SENSITIVE
INFORMATION

SECURITY SURVEYS

At the conclusion of a recent investigation in the Denver Division information was telephonically disseminated to local authorities as a matter of courtesy and possible investigative interest. The conversation, as a matter of routine, was recorded by the local authority and then later played for the local city council.

This led to a somewhat embarrassing situation wherein the original complaint alleged the FBI had made the recording and provided it to the city council. The matter was easily resolved but points out an obvious concern regarding sensitive information.

You are requested to remind all personnel of the necessity to be discreet when discussing sensitive matters on the telephone. Whenever possible, the matter should be discussed in person or proper steps should be taken to ensure the conversation is not being recorded.

62-97308-1082

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FBI

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Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

FWR:tea (4)

Based on airtel from SAC, Denver, to Acting Director, 7/6/87, JEH:skc, and ASD addendum, 9/29/87, FWR:tea

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

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AUG 25 1988